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Abstract
The ability to organize concepts (e.g., dog, chair) into efficient mental representations,
i.e., categories (e.g., animal, furniture) is a fundamental mechanism which allows hu-
mans to perceive, organize, and adapt to their world. Much research has been dedicated
to the questions of how categories emerge and how they are represented. Experimen-
tal evidence suggests that (i) concepts and categories are represented through sets of
features (e.g., dogs bark, chairs are made of wood) which are structured into differ-
ent types (e.g, behavior, material); (ii) categories and their featural representations are
learnt jointly and incrementally; and (iii) categories are dynamic and their representa-
tions adapt to changing environments.
This thesis investigates the mechanisms underlying the incremental and dynamic for-
mation of categories and their featural representations through cognitively motivated
Bayesian computational models. Models of category acquisition have been extensively
studied in cognitive science and primarily tested on perceptual abstractions or artificial
stimuli. In this thesis, we focus on categories acquired from natural language stimuli,
using nouns as a stand-in for their reference concepts, and their linguistic contexts as
a representation of the concepts’ features. The use of text corpora allows us to (i) de-
velop large-scale unsupervised models thus simulating human learning, and (ii) model
child category acquisition, leveraging the linguistic input available to children in the
form of transcribed child-directed language.
In the first part of this thesis we investigate the incremental process of category ac-
quisition. We present a Bayesian model and an incremental learning algorithm which
sequentially integrates newly observed data. We evaluate our model output against
gold standard categories (elicited experimentally from human participants), and show
that high-quality categories are learnt both from child-directed data and from large,
thematically unrestricted text corpora. We find that the model performs well even un-
der constrained memory resources, resembling human cognitive limitations. While
lists of representative features for categories emerge from this model, they are neither
structured nor jointly optimized with the categories.
We address these shortcomings in the second part of the thesis, and present a Bayesian
model which jointly learns categories and structured featural representations. We
present both batch and incremental learning algorithms, and demonstrate the model’s
effectiveness on both encyclopedic and child-directed data. We show that high-quality
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categories and features emerge in the joint learning process, and that the structured
features are intuitively interpretable through human plausibility judgment evaluation.
In the third part of the thesis we turn to the dynamic nature of meaning: categories and
their featural representations change over time, e.g., children distinguish some types
of features (such as size and shade) less clearly than adults, and word meanings adapt
to our ever changing environment and its structure. We present a dynamic Bayesian
model of meaning change, which infers time-specific concept representations as a set
of feature types and their prevalence, and captures their development as a smooth pro-
cess. We analyze the development of concept representations in their complexity over
time from child-directed data, and show that our model captures established patterns of
child concept learning. We also apply our model to diachronic change of word mean-
ing, modeling how word senses change internally and in prevalence over centuries.
The contributions of this thesis are threefold. Firstly, we show that a variety of ex-
perimental results on the acquisition and representation of categories can be captured
with computational models within the framework of Bayesian modeling. Secondly,
we show that natural language text is an appropriate source of information for model-
ing categorization-related phenomena suggesting that the environmental structure that
drives category formation is encoded in this data. Thirdly, we show that the experi-
mental findings hold on a larger scale. Our models are trained and tested on a larger
set of concepts and categories than is common in behavioral experiments and the cat-
egories and featural representations they can learn from linguistic text are in principle
unrestricted.
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Lay Summary
Humans represent their knowledge about the world around them as categories, which
allow them to efficiently learn about, understand, and interact with their surroundings.
Concepts (such as objects or actions) are grouped into categories based on common
features. For example, sparrows and finches are members of the category bird, because
they share features such as their appearance (they have wings and feathers), and their
behavior (they can fly, they sing). Established categories can be used to generalize:
Observing an unknown creature with feathers that sings and flies allows to infer that
it is likely a kind of bird, based on the established knowledge about that category.
Categories are fundamental cognitive building blocks: they determine how humans
perceive and interact with the world.
Previous research has established three important characteristics of category learning.
First, categories are learnt incrementally. Humans observe input over time and inte-
grate the information from those observations into their category knowledge imme-
diately, incrementally improving their representations. Secondly, categories and their
associated features are learnt together and mutually improve each other: Knowing that
both birds and finches are members of the category bird helps to extract representative
features for the category. At the same time, knowing that having feathers is a feature
of all members of the category bird helps to categorize unfamiliar objects. Thirdly,
categories and their features are flexible and adapt over time. For example, expert ed-
ucation in ornithology establishes increasingly specialized features which may change
the representation of members of the bird category.
In this thesis we study the three phenomena described above using techniques from
computational modeling. Traditionally, human learning has been investigated in lab-
oratory studies where participants were given a task, for example to learn categories
from a small set of artificial objects, and their behavior was carefully analyzed. The
tasks and objects involved in laboratory studies are often overly simplistic, and do not
capture the complex environment humans are exposed to and learn from. Computa-
tional modeling provides an alternative to laboratory studies for investigating cogni-
tive processes. We develop computer programs that simulate the learning process from
input data. The programs and the input are systematically manipulated to explore con-
ditions that must be met for successful learning. Moreover, our computational models
investigate learning on a large scale and from complex data.
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Specifically, our models learn from natural language texts which are available in large
quantities and discuss many aspects of concepts. Exposing our models to naturalistic
data allows us to simulate learning for a broad range of categories and their representa-
tive features. In addition, language plays an important role during category learning in
infants. We study child category acquisition by training our computational models on
child-directed language (i.e., collections of child-directed language from parent-child
interactions).
The first part of this thesis introduces a model which learns categories incrementally,
consistently improving the categories while receiving new information over time. We
train our model using both general (news) text and child-directed language and show
quantitatively and qualitatively that high-quality categories emerge. Our model, how-
ever, does not learn representative features together with the categories. We address
this shortcoming in the second part of the thesis, where we present a model which
learns categories and their features in one process. We evaluate the categories and fea-
tures emerging from (a) general (encyclopedic) text and (b) child-directed language,
and show that meaningful categories and features emerge in both settings. In the fi-
nal part of the thesis we investigate the development of meaning representations over
time. We explore how concept representations develop with increasing age and general
knowledge in children. We also investigate how word meaning changes over centuries
by applying our model to collections of texts covering multiple centuries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
From day one, infants are exposed to a complex world of objects, humans, and their
interactions. They need to acquire an extraordinary amount of knowledge in order to
be able to comprehend their environment and react meaningfully to it. Not only in
childhood, but throughout their lives, humans continue to experience novel concepts,
problems and situations on a daily basis. How do they acquire and represent the knowl-
edge that allows them to understand and interact with the world? Structured mental
representations, in terms of categories have been shown to underlie fundamental cog-
nitive abilities and influence the way humans perceive and react to their environment.
This thesis investigates how categories are acquired, how they are internally repre-
sented and how these representations change over time.
Categories are fundamental cognitive building blocks allowing humans to organize
their knowledge, and make inferences about the world (Rosch, 1978; Medin and Schaf-
fer, 1978; Murphy and Medin, 1985). We investigate the acquisition and representation
of superordinate level CATEGORIES, as collections of taxonomically coherent basic
level concepts (Rosch, 1978).1 Categories (such as FOOD or ANIMAL) are groups of
concepts (such as apple or cat) which share important properties. Examples of such
properties include their appearance (apples and kiwis contain seeds), their function
(apples and kiwis are edible), or their behavior (cats and dogs eat and play). Estab-
lished categories enable generalization and inference: by extrapolation from estab-
lished knowledge about FRUIT, one can infer that an unfamiliar object with a sweet
smell and seeds inside is likely edible. Table 1.1 summarizes the terminology and
1Throughout this thesis we use the term ‘category’ to refer to superordinate level categories, and
‘concept’ to refer to basic level categories.
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Term Explanation Example
concept living- or non-living thing (basic level category) pear, cat, train
category taxonomically coherent set of living- or non-
living things (superordinate level category)
FRUIT, ANIMAL,
VEHICLE
feature individual properties of a concept {eats, is_furry}
feature type class of properties appearance,
behavior
stimulus mention of a concept in a linguistic context “Cats are furry.”
Table 1.1: Overview of the terminology used in the thesis. We denote concepts in
italics, CATEGORIES as small caps, feature types as true type, and {features} as
lists.
typography used throughout this thesis.
Understanding the process with which categories and their representations are formed,
has been the subject of significant research efforts both from a behavioral and modeling
perspective. Prior research on category learning has often involved a small set of artifi-
cial stimuli such as binary strings, or purpose-built objects (Anderson, 1991; Bornstein
and Mash, 2010), containing a limited number of prominent features. Humans, how-
ever, are constantly confronted with myriads of different concepts; just consider the
number of objects a child interacts with at home. Furthermore, observations of con-
cepts are often noisy or incomplete. Humans are capable of detecting and filtering
noise, distinguishing relevant features from irrelevant ones. Moreover, humans ob-
serve concepts in context, and use the context to infer complex and structured featural
representations (Murphy and Medin, 1985). Prior research has predominantly focused
on adult categorization, assuming that learners have developed categorization mecha-
nisms and a large number of categories have already been learnt. Children, however,
learn categories “from scratch”, with access neither to prior category knowledge, nor
to sophisticated input processing abilities such as language parsing. It is not clear that
results from small-scale studies extend to more natural settings where a large number
of categories is being acquired and complex representations must be formed in the face
of noisy, naturalistic input and under cognitive constraints such as memory limitations.
This thesis investigates the acquisition and representation of categories from natural-
istic input at scale. Specifically, we consider three tasks: Firstly, we look at the in-
3cremental process of category acquisition (Bornstein and Mash, 2010); secondly, we
model the joint acquisition of categories and structured features (Goldstone et al.,
2001; Ahn, 1998); thirdly, we investigate how concept representations develop over
time (Keil, 1987; Schyns et al., 1998; Aitchison, 2001). We approach these questions
from a modeling perspective, and train and test our models on linguistic input. We
expose our models to natural language stimuli extracted from large text corpora in an
attempt to approximate (a) the number of categories and features acquired in a realistic
setting; and (b) the complexity and richness of the learning environment. We inves-
tigate category acquisition from large corpora of general text (e.g., encyclopedic text
or news). In addition, we expose our models to child-directed language, modeling the
specific problem of category and feature acquisition in infants.
Why computational cognitive modeling? Computational models shed light on cogni-
tive processes at scale, and make predictions which can be tested empirically. They
impose constraints on the cognitive processes under investigation, and learn from ex-
posure to input. The constraints and the input can be manipulated to systematically
explore aspects of human cognition in general, and categorization in particular. Specif-
ically, we develop models of category acquisition within the framework of Bayesian
modeling. Bayesian models provide a mathematically principled way of formalizing
constraints and processes, and have been shown to accurately describe a variety of
cognitive phenomena (see e.g., Chater et al. 2010). Computational models provide an
opportunity to investigate cognition on a larger scale than behavioral experiments. The
majority of previous categorization and feature acquisition models either replicate hu-
man categorization behavior under simplistic conditions in the laboratory (Anderson,
1991; Sanborn et al., 2006), or are trained on rich and multimodal input, but evaluated
on small-scale problems (Yu, 2005; Frank et al., 2009). This thesis capitalizes on the
opportunities that computational modeling provides for investigating the process of the
acquisition and development of a large number of categories and complex features.
Why natural language input? We train and test our models using natural language
stimuli, representing observations of concepts as their mentions in text. Figure 1.1
illustrates our representation of concepts. Our choice of representation is motivated
by prior research which showed that linguistic input plays an important role during
child category acquisition (e.g., Waxman and Markow 1995). Furthermore, much of
the structure of our environment is redundantly encoded in language (Riordan and
Jones, 2011). Each observation, or stimulus, consists of the mention of a concept
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Concept Natural Language Stimuli
ca
t “Cats are furry.”
“Cats are carnivores.”
“Cats have tails and whiskers.”
“The cat says meow!”
do
g “The dog has nice fur.”
“Dogs eat meat.”
“Dogs have tails.”
“Look, the dog is playing!”
ap
pl
e “I’d like to eat an apple.”
“Apples grow on trees.”
“Apples can be red or green.”
“An apple contains seeds”
ki
w
i “This kiwi is tasty.”
“Kiwis are green inside.”
“Can you cut me a kiwi?”
“Kiwis have seeds.”
Figure 1.1: Illustration of natural language stimuli provided as input to the models
presented in this thesis. Each stimulus contains a mention of a concept (e.g., cat or
apple) in its local linguistic context. Concepts are clustered into categories (e.g., ANIMAL
or FRUIT) based on the similarity of the contexts they occur in.
in local context. Linguistic context serves as a representation of the concept’s fea-
tures comprising potentially diverse properties such as perceptual, relational, or other
knowledge-based associations. Indeed, it has been shown that child-directed language
comprises substantial explicit explanation of non-perceivable features shared among
members of categories (Callanan, 1990). The idea that the meaning of a word is char-
acterized by the contexts in which it occurs is well-established as the distributional
hypothesis (Harris, 1954). In this thesis we extend the distributional hypothesis, as-
suming that linguistic context is predictive of a word’s category. Our models group
concepts into categories based on the similarity of the contexts in which they appear.
Classically the term features has been used to refer to lists of necessary and sufficient
properties of concepts which have the explicit purpose of defining category member-
ship. Rather than assuming that linguistic context comprises features in the classical
sense, we view the features induced by our models as properties which are associated
with concepts and categories. Concept and category associates have been collected as
verbal descriptions of relevant properties of concepts and categories, and have been
argued to provide a window into the cognitive representations of concepts in the brain.
Typically, such descriptions are collected through feature norming studies (e.g., McRae
et al. (2005); Vinson and Vigliocco (2008)) where participants are asked to produce a
set of relevant properties of a target concept. Feature norms have been shown to ex-
plain a variety of cognitive phenomena and to provide valuable input to computational
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cognitive models. The work presented in this thesis replaces feature norms with rep-
resentations derived from concept mentions in contexts in corpora. We assume that
words whose referents exhibit differing features are likely to occur in correspondingly
different contexts and that these differences in usage can provide an approximation of
featural associates. In the context of discussion of the models presented in this thesis,
we use the term feature interchangeably with associate.
The work in this thesis does not address the problem of word learning which involves
learning a lexicon mapping from words to referent concepts. Instead, we equate words
with concepts, assuming that words themselves are instantiations of their referents. In
addition, we make the simplifying assumption that concepts and their verbal realization
as a written string of letters have a one-to-one correspondence which is known a priori
(e.g., the written word ‘dog’ always refers to the concept dog and no other word type
refers to the same concept). Our models learn to group concepts into categories based
on featural commonalities which are acquired through repeated observations of con-
cept instances. In that sense we adopt a cross-situational learning framework (Siskind,
1996).
1.1 Contributions
This thesis investigates a range of category-acquisition phenomena within the unified
framework of Bayesian modeling from naturalistic input on a large scale. Our contri-
butions are:
Naturalistic processes. We develop three novel Bayesian models which reproduce
four phenomena of human category acquisition and their mental representations which
have been established in prior research: Firstly, categories are acquired incrementally
(Chapter 4). Secondly, categories and their features are learnt jointly (Chapter 5).
Thirdly, feature representations of categories are structured (Chapter 5). Fourthly, fea-
tural representations are dynamic and flexibly adapt to changes in the learner’s knowl-
edge or environment (Chapter 6). Our models are designed to capture these phenomena
in the context of category acquisition in children. They learn categories “from scratch”
without initial categorization knowledge and advanced data processing abilities, which
young infants do not possess. To the best of our knowledge our work is the first to
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investigate the joint emergence of features with categories, and their dynamic devel-
opment over time at scale from naturalistic input. We formalize the above processes
within the unified and principled framework of Bayesian modeling. We qualitatively
and quantitatively demonstrate the effectiveness of incremental and joint category and
feature learning, showing (a) that our models fit incremental human category learning
more closely than a previously proposed graph-based model of incremental category
learning; and (b) that they learn features which are more interpretable compared to
those produced by a knowledge-heavier but cognitively less plausible model of feature
extraction from text. Our results provide further evidence to the claim that humans
acquire categories by aggregating information over time and by establishing represen-
tations which describe their environment increasingly accurately.
Naturalistic input. We show that the above phenomena emerge from our models
trained on linguistic stimuli (i.e., mentions of concepts in context; see Figure 1.1).
Stimuli are extracted from natural language corpora, which can be noisy or contain
irrelevant information. Taken together, the results presented in this thesis reveal that
our models are able to detect and represent those aspects which are relevant to concept
meaning. They are also able to learn meaningful and richly structured features, which
demonstrates that the linguistic stimuli contain rich information about different aspects
of properties of concepts. Our models learn categories and their representations from
different forms of linguistic input. We learn broad-scale categories from general (news
or encyclopedic) text. In addition, we show that our models capture the emergence,
representation, and dynamic development of categories and their representations from
child-directed language demonstrating that our models capture aspects of category ac-
quisition in infants.
Naturalistic scale. We present our models with large sets of linguistic stimuli in
an attempt to approximate the scale and complexity of the environment humans ex-
perience. We evaluate the categories inferred by our models against a cognitive gold
standard categorization comprising more than 500 target concepts of more than 50 cat-
egories. The contexts of our language stimuli are thematically unrestricted in principle,
covering a wide range of properties. In this regard, our models learn from rich feature
representations approximating the variety of contexts in which concepts are observed
in the real world. They model human category acquisition under more realistic condi-
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tions than previously proposed models of small-scale category learning from artificial
stimuli. We show that Bayesian models of categorization extend to learning problems
of naturalistic scale and that Bayesian modeling is a fruitful framework for testing
hypotheses about category acquisition, structure, and development.
Relevance for AI and NLP. Beyond the motivation of scientific discovery, under-
standing human category acquisition may lead to improved mechanisms for artificial
intelligence (AI). Humans acquire complex conceptual knowledge, which they then
use to understand and reason about the world, highly efficiently and reliably. The
ability of machines to represent conceptual knowledge pales in comparison. If human
cognition was understood to an extent that allowed implementation in machines, the
performance gap could be bridged. The three cognitively motivated computational
models introduced in this thesis efficiently learn high-quality categories and their rep-
resentations, and provide a step towards this goal.
By learning structured knowledge from language input, our models are relevant to the
field of natural language processing (NLP), where much research has been dedicated
to automatic extraction of information from text. We compare our models against ex-
isting models from NLP on tasks including feature extraction from text, and capturing
the change of word meaning over centuries. Unlike some of these prior models, our
models are knowledge lean (they do not require sophisticated linguistic pre-processing
or access to informed prior knowledge), and yet they still perform competitively. The
knowledge-lean nature also makes our models straightforwardly applicable to texts
across different genres (e.g., text from social media) and languages.
1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 reviews previous research on category acquisition from an experimental
and computational perspective. The first part of the chapter summarizes experimental
evidence for strong links between category acquisition and word learning. In the sec-
ond part of the chapter we position our work with respect to existing computational
models of word learning and category acquisition. We discuss existing models in the
context of their representation of the learning environment, and the influence it has on
the scope of learning problems which can be feasibly modeled.
8 Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 3 introduces Bayesian modeling, the mathematical foundations underlying
the models presented in this thesis. We motivate Bayesian modeling as a framework for
investigating cognitive phenomena. The second part of the chapter reviews the mathe-
matical paradigm of Bayesian statistics, and the ideas underlying generative Bayesian
modeling. We conclude with an overview of Monte Carlo-based sampling methods for
approximate Bayesian inference.
Chapter 4 introduces BayesCat, a Bayesian model for large-scale category acquisi-
tion. We model category acquisition as an incremental process, and investigate the
effect of an incremental learning algorithm (by comparison to an ideal batch learner),
as well as computational and memory constraints on the learning process and outcome.
We study the incremental process of category acquisition by evaluating our model on
a large corpus of general texts and on transcribed child-directed speech.
Chapter 5 zooms into specific phenomena of category acquisition: the joint emer-
gence of categories and their features in a single process, and the structured nature of
cognitive representations, as feature types. We present BCF, a Bayesian model which
jointly learns categories and their structured representations. We evaluate the qual-
ity of the categories and feature representations learnt by our model when exposed to
large-scale encyclopedic data. We show that our knowledge-lean, cognitively moti-
vated model performs competitively with a feature extraction model that presupposes
a hand-crafted set of rules based on substantial linguistic knowledge. In the second
part of the chapter, we investigate the incremental, joint learning process of categories
and features in children, applying our model to a corpus of transcribed child-directed
speech.
Chapter 6 is concerned with the dynamic nature of meaning, and presents SCAN,
a dynamic Bayesian model of semantic change. The first part of the chapter inves-
tigates how structured concept representations develop and improve over the course
of concept acquisition in infants by applying our model to a corpus of transcribed
child-directed speech. The second part of the chapter applies SCAN to the task of cap-
turing diachronic meaning change: word meanings change over time and adapt to their
speakers’ environment. We expose our model to diachronic text corpora and show
that it captures a variety of aspects of word meaning change over centuries, and that it
1.3. Published Work 9
performs competitively compared to a range of previously proposed problem-specific
models across tasks.
Chapter 7 summarizes our main findings, discusses limitations of our work, and
points out directions for future research.
1.3 Published Work
Portions of this thesis have been published previously. The model and experiments
presented in Chapter 4 are published in Frermann and Lapata (2015b). A preliminary
version of this work was published in Frermann and Lapata (2014). Our work on
joint category and feature learning from encyclopedic data (Chapter 5) is published
in Frermann and Lapata (2015a). The work on diachronic change of word meaning
presented in Chapter 6 is published in Frermann and Lapata (2016).

Chapter 2
Learning Words and Categories
Young children are incredibly efficient learners, and the circumstances and processes
underlying the rapid process with which they acquire the skills to interact with and talk
about their environment is one of the most widely studied areas in psychology and cog-
nitive science. Our work lies at the intersection of categorization, category- and word
learning, as well as the emergence and nature of structured featural representations of
categories and concepts. Given the vast amount of prior work in each of these areas, a
complete review of prior work is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Infants start learning the meaning of words and the meaning of concepts and categories
around the same age, and a broad body of research suggests that the two processes are
closely entangled. In the first part of this chapter we provide an overview of these
studies and summarize their findings. We then discuss relevant computational models
of category and word learning. We review prior work on the featural representations of
concepts and categories, their emergence and development in the context of our own
models and experiments in Chapters 5 and 6.
Learning categories and learning words is a chicken-and-egg problem: Imagine an
infant at the onset of this endeavor hear the word “dog” while observing a situation
involving a small furry animal with a tail and two ears that says woof. In principle
there are countless potential meanings the child could infer: “dog” might refer to the
small furry animal; or to the stretch of land the animal is sitting on; or to its left ear;
or to the sound the animal is making; etc. If the child already had acquired conceptual
knowledge about the world (which would probably involve a DOG category comprising
‘furry living things with tails that say woof’, but not a LEFT EAR category), learning
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the meaning of the word “dog” would be simplified considerably. Conversely, knowing
that the word “dog” refers to small furry living things that run and say woof would
provide a strong cue for learning the correct conceptual category DOG (rather than a
different category, for example one that comprises living things that have particularly
prominent left ears).
Extrapolating from this rather contrived example to the complexity of the situations
and environments the child is confronted with from day one, the speed and reliability
with which children learn to talk and reason about the objects and persons surrounding
them seem stunning. The early development of conceptual and linguistic knowledge
has been under active research for decades. In the following we review prior behavioral
and computational studies which investigate the mutual influence of the two, as well
as the learning environment and processes from which they emerge.
2.1 Acquisition of Linguistic and Conceptual Knowledge
In this thesis, we propose models of category acquisition from natural language input,
which rest on the assumption that there is a strong relation between linguistic input
and emerging categories. Prior work discovered a range of phenomena and biases
in early child development which suggest that word learning and learning conceptual
categories mutually influence each other (Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1987; Waxman and
Markow, 1995; Borovsky and Elman, 2006). The age at which such biases emerge,
their specificity to word learning, and the precise mechanisms and direction of influ-
ence are subject to considerable debate in the literature, however, their existence has
been repeatedly demonstrated in a wide range of studies. Our aim here is to discuss
their impact on language and category acquisition.
Linking Words to Objects and Concepts General constraints or biases which guide
children at the onset of language acquisition in their hypotheses about potential refer-
ents for a novel word have emerged in behavioral experiments over the last decades.
Learning a novel word involves (a) mapping the word to a referent (in this review we
focus on common nouns referring to objects in the child’s environment); and (b) to gen-
eralize the meaning beyond the particular situation. For the former challenge children
have been shown to assume that unfamiliar words refer to whole objects rather than
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their parts or properties (whole-object constraint, Markman 1991; Hollich et al. 2007),
while the generalization problem is influenced by the taxonomic constraint (Markman
and Hutchinson, 1984; Markman, 1994). The taxonomic constraint refers to the obser-
vation that linguistic labels shift children’s preference from grouping objects themati-
cally (e.g., cows and milk) towards grouping objects taxonomically, by kind (e.g., cows
and pigs). Markman and Hutchinson (1984) presented children with an initial object
(e.g., a cow) and two related objects one of which is thematically related (e.g., milk)
and the other is taxonomically related (e.g., a pig). They investigated the relations chil-
dren form in two conditions: in the first condition they provided no label for the initial
object (“See this? Can you find another one?”). Children selected the thematically re-
lated object (i.e., milk) much more often than the taxonomically related object. In the
second condition, the initially provided object was labeled with a novel term (“See this
dax? Can you find another dax?”). Children’s preferences shifted towards selecting the
taxonomically related object (i.e., the pig). This effect has been shown across a variety
of studies and paradigms for children as young as 18-months old (Markman, 1991).
The fact that linguistic labels influence the type of inferences children make about
relations among objects strongly suggests that language input has an impact on how
categories are learnt and represented. Beyond results emerging under laboratory con-
ditions, further evidence for this phenomenon comes from the general patterns of chil-
dren’s linguistic and conceptual development: it has been shown that children’s sudden
and rapid growth of noun vocabulary (the naming explosion) coincides with children
starting to sort objects into categories at an age of around 18 months (Gopnik and Melt-
zoff, 1987). Knowing linguistic labels for objects seems to help infants in constructing
and organizing their conceptual representations.
Another constraint on word learning has been put forward which encourages mutual
exclusivity of labels. Children have a strong preference to associate unfamiliar words
with objects for which they do not already know the label (Taylor and Gelman, 1988;
Markman, 1994; Xu, 2002). In a typical study, children are presented with two ob-
jects, one for which they already know the label (e.g., a doll) and an unfamiliar object
(e.g., tongs). When asked to “show the dax” (where “dax” is a novel label) children
are more likely to associate the label with the object for which they did not previously
know a word (i.e., they select the tongs, Markman and Wachtel 1988.)
The bias towards mutual exclusivity in word learning aligns with a similar tendency
concerning concepts and categories: categories are often mutually exclusive (for ex-
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ample, an object cannot be an animal and a fruit). Clearly this is not true in general
(for example, an object can be both a fruit and a food). However, children’s category
representations have been shown to strongly (over-)rely on this assumption of mutual
exclusivity. Children have difficulties to acknowledge and learn about inclusive or
overlapping categories, for example that an object can be at the same time a doll and a
toy (Markman, 1987).
The constraints introduced above provide strong cues for learning the names of objects.
But how do children move beyond this task, and learn to name object parts and proper-
ties? The mutual exclusivity constraint may be one factor which enables to learn word
meanings beyond object labels: If a novel word is used to refer to an object for which
the child already knows a label, she may infer that the term refers to one of its parts, its
material or another property related to the object instead. Hansen and Markman (2009)
show that children learn labels for parts of objects more readily if they already know a
label for the object itself, i.e., when mutual exclusivity information is available.
A similar effect has been shown for novel words of different classes, in children who
have acquired initial knowledge about linguistic word classes. Children use the lin-
guistic class of a word as a cue regarding potential types of referents. In his pioneer-
ing experiments, Brown (1957) presented children with different linguistic forms of a
novel nonsense word (sib), for example:
(2.1) Do you know what a sib is?
(2.2) Have you every seen any sib?
(2.3) Show me a picture of sibbing.
Children interpreted the novel word as a count noun (2.1), a mass noun (2.2) or an
action (2.3), respectively. This result has been replicated widely and has been shown to
hold for children as young as two years old (Markman, 1994; Hall et al., 1993), and for
words other than nouns: children expect unfamiliar adjectives to relate to properties of
objects, or to fine-grained distinctions on the subordinate level (Gelman and Markman,
1985; Waxman, 1990; Waxman and Markov, 1998). Similar effects have been shown
for compound nouns (such as grapefruit juice; Gelman et al. 1989). The linguistic
form of a novel word raises children’s expectations about possible meanings that word
might carry.
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Words as Invitations to Form Categories1 Given the general connection between
language and concepts, we can now zoom in more closely on the problem addressed
in this thesis: The emergence of superordinate2 level categories such as ANIMAL or
FURNITURE as groups of basic level categories (e.g., dog, chair) from natural language
input. Basic level categories resemble the perceivable structure of the world. As a
consequence, basic level categories (a) tend to refer to concrete objects in the world; (b)
are based on salient immediately perceivable features, such as shape, material or color;
and (c) are internally homogeneous so that members of the same basic level category
share many features while at the same time their features separate them clearly from
members of different basic level categories (Rosch et al., 1976). They are cognitively
most salient, and are acquired earliest by children (Rosch, 1973, 1978).
While non-linguistic (e.g., visual) cues provide a strong signal for the acquisition of ba-
sic level categories, superordinate level categories tend to be abstract groupings which
are less obviously coherent. Their meaning is often explained through underlying
features which are not immediately noticeable (e.g., ANIMALS breathe, TOOLS have
a function). While it seems straightforward to define the basic level category chair
through a set of observable features, it is difficult come up with a succinct set for the
superordinate category FURNITURE. Given this level of abstraction, does language
play a central role in superordinate level category acquisition?
A range of studies have investigated the influence of linguistic labels on the acqui-
sition of different levels of categories and reliably found that labels are particularly
advantageous (and possibly essential) for the acquisition of superordinate level cate-
gories (Waxman and Markow, 1995). Waxman (1990) shows that giving objects noun
labels significantly improves preschoolers’ ability to categorize objects on the super-
ordinate level. 3-4-year old preschoolers were introduced to ‘a very picky doll’ who
likes only objects of a particular kind. The kinds of objects the doll liked were ei-
ther of the same superordinate level category (e.g., all animals), or of the same basic
level category (e.g., all dogs) or of the same subordinate level category (e.g., all col-
lies). Two conditions were compared: either objects the doll likes are not labeled (“she
likes this and this and this”), or the objects are labeled with a ‘novel’ label (a Japanese
1Caption borrowed from Waxman and Markow (1995).
2As mentioned earlier, we refer to superordinate level categories as ‘categories’, and to basic level
categories as ‘concepts’. For the purposes of this thesis the respective terms are considered synonyms
and used interchangeably. We use the traditional terms of basic- and superordinate level categories more
heavily in this chapter so that relations to the literature are clear.
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noun: “she likes dobits”). Three findings emerged. First, children categorize basic
level objects in the unlabeled condition with high accuracy and the availability of a la-
bel did not lead to improved performance. Secondly, noun labels had a negative impact
on subordinate level categorization performance (however, adjective labels (“she likes
dob-ish ones”) were shown to improve subordinate level categorizations (Waxman,
1990, Experiment 3). Finally, children’s superordinate level categorizations improved
significantly with available noun labels for objects. In a similar study, Waxman and
Markow (1995) showed identical effects in 12-13-month old infants: infants were only
able to form superordinate categories when a linguistic label was provided, whereas
they formed basic level categories irrespective of whether objects were labeled or not.
These results suggest that linguistic cues influence the acquisition of abstract concep-
tual knowledge which is not immediately reflected in the learner’s perceptual envi-
ronment. But, does the fact that children are able to group objects into superordinate
categories under some conditions mean that they fully conceptualize the underlying
meaning of that category? Almost certainly not. Much of this representation is highly
structured and dependent on substantial world knowledge (Keil, 1987; Gelman and
O’Reilly, 1988). Chapters 5 and 6 address the emergence and development of featu-
ral representations of concepts and categories. We review prior research on how this
knowledge develops in infants in Sections 5.1.1 and 6.1.1.
In order for these rich representations to emerge, linguistic input likely plays a role that
goes beyond providing labels (Gelman and Keil, 1998). While basic level categories
are remarkably stable across cultures, sub- and superordinate level categories tend to
be culturally informed and are thus more strongly based on conventions rather than on
shared perceptual features (see Malt (1995) for a review of both psychological and an-
thropological perspectives). In order to discover these conventions explicit instruction
may be crucial. For example, it seems intuitively plausible to categorize cars based on
their color or size, however, cars are conventionally categorized based on features such
as their manufacturer, power of their engines, or type of fuel they require. Clearly such
categories are difficult to learn from purely perceptual input. Instead, “[w]e need some
sort of indication from those who participate in the culture of the things they treat as
equivalents and those that are distinguished.” (Brown, 1958, p. 208).
Indeed, adults tend to explicitly explain and point to commonalities of members of
superordinate categories (Callanan, 1990). This study found systematic differences in
descriptions of basic- and superordinate level categories by adults addressing their 2-
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to 4-year old children. While basic level categories were described predominantly in
terms of their perceptual properties, parents explicitly pointed out abstract functions
and relations pertaining to superordinate level categories. We assume that natural lan-
guage stimuli used in experiments throughout this thesis encode this kind of input,
and consequently usefully approximate the environment of a child learning categories.
A second aspect of this learning environment as encoded in linguistic stimuli is the
amount of ‘training’ exemplars children typically encounter. In the labeling studies
discussed above, the influence of linguistic labels might have been over-emphasized
by the scarcity of training data (although the results suggest that labels allow particu-
larly efficient learning under these circumstances (Waxman and Markow, 1995)).
This thesis investigates the acquisition and development of categories and their repre-
sentations from natural language input. We assume that this input encodes a substantial
amount of the information that is necessary to learn categories. The body of work dis-
cussed in this section has shown that conceptual knowledge and language exert mutual
influence, and that language input is particularly important for learning higher-level
conceptualizations. Constraints on potential word meanings are driven by general con-
ceptual constraints and world knowledge (e.g., the tendency for every object to have
only one label parallels the general fact that categories tend to be mutually exclusive).
Conversely, the emergence of higher-level conceptual knowledge is driven by linguis-
tic labels and explanations which guide the learner’s attention to relevant information,
inviting the learner to form categories (Waxman and Markow, 1995).
Clearly, however, language is not the only source of information available to young
children for the category and word learning process. We now widen our scope and
discuss other modalities and cues children exploit for this task. We introduce these
modalities in the context of computational models of category- and word learning
which leverage different subsets of them. We also discuss the influence of different
representations of the learning environment on the scope and kinds of learning phe-
nomena that can be feasibly simulated by computational models.
2.2 Models of Word and Category Learning
Given the substantial body of work on child word and category learning in experimen-
tal psychology and cognitive science, it comes as no surprise that a wide variety of cog-
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nitively motivated computational models have been proposed over the years which aim
to shed light on the process through ‘reverse-engineering’ the learner. Computational
cognitive models implement and simulate a cognitive process, including assumptions
about its mechanism and constraints, and allow to systematically examine the effects
of different constraints or quantities and characteristics of the input.
We discuss models for both word learning and category learning, given their close
relation in both theoretical and computational prior work. Word learning is typically
modeled as inferring a lexicon mapping from words to real-world referents and is thus
conceptually similar to the problem of inducing a categorization. Here, we review
models on a high level, and frame our discussion around the assumptions, motivations
and limitations underlying the models proposed in this thesis. Technical details for
relevant related models are included in Chapters 4–6 in the context of our own models
and experiments. We discuss previous work from two angles: first we look at how
the learning environment of the human learner is captured in the input representations
provided to the computational models, and discuss the impact these representations
have on the scale of the learning problem under investigation. Secondly, we discuss
the process of human learning and ways in which previous computational models have
captured its characteristics and constraints.
2.2.1 Input Modalities in Word and Category Learning
The Multimodal Learning Environment Linguistic input, which was the focus of
the previous section, is not the only source of information children receive when they
learn words and categories; nor does this learning process happen in isolation: the
whole physical environment is rich in cues and highly informative, and together with
linguistic and conceptual expertise infants acquire social and motor skills, which en-
able them to interpret and interact with their environment. In addition, learning is
a long-term endeavor: children exploit the fact that words and scenes are repeatedly
co-observed over time. Words in child-directed speech refer disproportionally often
to objects in the immediate environment. Children use such repeated object-word
co-occurrences as cues towards possible referents for labels – a strategy referred to
as cross-situational learning (Siskind, 1996; Frank et al., 2007; Yu and Smith, 2010;
Kachergis et al., 2014).
A variety of models of cross-situational word learning have been proposed (Siskind,
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(a) Illustration of the stimuli used in Yu (2005). Image and utterance from Yu et al. (2005).
example + “The cow is looking at the
little boy.”
data six adults narrating a picture book
input tuples of
transcribed child-directed utterancesfeatures extracted of images from head-mounted camera
test set lexicon over the set of 12 animals featured in the picture book
(b) Illustration of the stimuli used in Frank et al. (2007, 2009). Image from Frank et al. (2007), utterance
added for illustration.
example + “Oh, look, a book!”
data two 10-minute audio and video recordings of mother-child interactions
involving a fixed set of toy objects
input tuples of

transcribed child-directed utterances
objects visible to the infant (cf., example)
social cues (e.g., gaze of mother and infant; cf., example)
test set lexicon over 12 toy objects
(c) Illustration of stimuli used in this thesis. Concept mentions are highlighted in italics in the examples.
example “is there a train running on this track”, “don’t pull the dog’s tail”,
“the ginger pussy cat’s called fur ball”, “i found the apple in the bowl”
data linguistic mentions of concepts in local context from text corpora
input transcribed child-directed utterances
test set > 40 categories comprising > 300 concepts
Figure 2.1: Overview of stimuli used in selected models of word learning from multi-
modal data (2.1a, 2.1b), and a comparison to the stimuli used in this thesis (2.1c).
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1996; Roy and Pentland, 2002; Yu, 2005; Frank et al., 2007). Yu (2005), for example,
propose a model for cross-situational learning of both words and categories from mul-
timodal data, comprising both language and visual input. Their model is based on a
three-step process involving (1) recognizing visual features from raw images, (2) clus-
tering those features into visual prototypes, and (3) associating visual prototypes with
words from the linguistic input. Input to the model were utterance-image pairs orig-
inating from a data set of adults narrating picture books. Individual utterances were
paired with raw images taken from a head-mounted camera. The model was evaluated
on its ability to induce a lexicon over a set of 12 animals featured in the picture book.
The stimuli are illustrated in Figure 2.1a.
Furthermore, children have access to information that goes beyond signal input in var-
ious modalities. Even pre-verbal infants are remarkably proficient in interpreting and
responding to social cues from the adults they interact with: children interpret intents
and follow pragmatic cues (Akhtar and Tomasello, 2000; Csibra and Gergely, 2006).
Adults make heavy use of such hints when directing children’s attention to objects
of interest, i.e., by establishing joint attention (Yu and Smith, 2016) and employing
different strategies such as prosodic cues, gaze (Yu and Smith, 2007), or actions and
gestures like pointing (Yu et al., 2009; Gogate et al., 2000).
These insights have been incorporated in computational models. Yu and Ballard (2007)
present a model which learns from audiovisual input stimuli of mother-child interac-
tions which includes both statistical cues from cross-situational occurrences as well
as pragmatic cues: each input is labeled with the object of joint attention of mother
and child as well as prosodic saliency of words. Their learning algorithm is based
on techniques from machine translation, assuming that the child learns a mapping (or
translation) from English to an abstract ‘meaning language’. They demonstrate the
benefit of pragmatic information for a computational word learner.
Methodologically more closely connected to our own approach, Frank et al. (2007,
2009) propose a Bayesian model incorporating social cues in cross-situational word
learning. The input to their model consists of transcribed speech from mother-child
interactions paired with a representation of the child’s visual field in the form of a
list of objects present in the environment, as illustrated in Figure 2.1b. Their model
jointly learns words (as a dictionary of word-object mappings) as well as to interpret
the intended meaning of the speaker (i.e., the object in the environment the speaker is
referring to) – without the need to explicitly encode this information in the input as
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in Yu and Ballard (2007). They show that their joint model not only learns precise
lexicons, but also predicts behavioral phenomena such as mutual exclusivity or the use
of learnt words for object individuation.
The models discussed so far learn on the basis of a faithful representation of the child’s
multimodal learning environment, however, the detailed representations come at the
cost of a limited scale: all models are evaluated on test sets involving only a handful
of target referents and highly restricted input vocabularies. We illustrate the quality
and size of the input and evaluation data sets involved in some of the studies discussed
above in Figure 2.1. While the quality of the input resembles a child’s learning en-
vironment, its quantity and complexity does not. Unfortunately, the availability of
multimodal data as discussed above is limited and potential further annotations are
costly (Frank et al., 2013). It is not clear whether the results still hold with learning
problems which are larger in scale, or more complex learning environments such as
cluttered scenes. Multimodal corpora available to-date contain short periods of inter-
action, and consequently do not capture the long-term process of word and category
learning.3
Learning from Natural Language Input In the experiments in this thesis, we take
a step back from a fully, multimodal representation of the learner’s environment and
instead use large-scale text corpora as input data to our models. Corpora of natural
language texts are available in substantial quantities, and the CHILDES database pro-
vides a collection of child-directed speech corpora (MacWhinney, 2000). Much of the
data consists of transcribed speech resulting from natural interactions of children with
their care-takers.
Aside from quantitative motivations, qualitative analyses of linguistic text in gen-
eral, and child-directed language in particular, revealed that a surprising amount of
non-linguistic information is redundantly encoded in language. Riordan and Jones
(2011) compare text-based distributional semantics models against models based on
human-created feature listings on a semantic clustering task. Feature listings en-
code diverse information covering multiple modalities (such as visual and functional
features, McRae et al. 2005). Purely text-based models performed comparatively
3Recent efforts have been made, to create a highly dense longitudinal and multimodal data base
of the linguistic development of a single child, by equipping his home with cameras and microphones
which constantly monitor his (and his caretakers’) development (Roy et al., 2006, 2012). But to this
date the data is not publicly available.
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to feature-based models, even though they lack the advantage of such rich human-
generated knowledge. A comparison of text-based models with models based feature
listings encoding sensorimotor knowledge available to children even showed that both
systems perform on par when evaluated on child-directed speech data. This may be
due to the fact that child-directed speech overwhelmingly addresses the ‘here-and-
now’, i.e., objects, properties or actions of the immediate environment (Veneziano,
2001) and consequently encodes a lot of the information which is also captured in
other input modalities (e.g., the visual scene). Fountain and Lapata (2010) show that
natural language input is informative for the specific problem of category learning.
Fazly et al. (2010) propose a computational model for cross-situational word learning
from large corpora of child-directed utterances, paired with automatically generated
semantic descriptions of the scene. These descriptions are sets of abstract symbols
corresponding to the spoken words, interspersed with slight disturbances to simulate
noise in the learning environment as well as referential uncertainty. Similar to our own
child category acquisition experiments, their input is derived from large, longitudinal
corpora of mother-child interactions, which allows them to train their model on 20,000
utterances which cover a wide variety of words and objects. They can consequently
investigate phenomena such as the developmental process of word learning, or effects
of word frequency in the input data.
Category acquisition has also been modeled on a large scale from natural language
input. Fountain and Lapata (2011) formalize large-scale category acquisition as an in-
cremental graph clustering problem. They propose an incremental graph-based model
of the acquisition of categories comprising more than 500 concepts from both large-
scale corpora of generic text as well as child-directed language data (Fountain, 2013).
The graph-based model treats the acquisition of concept representations and the clus-
tering of concepts into categories as two separate processes. While our own work
leverages a similar representation of the input to the category learner, we formalize
the acquisition of categories and their representations as a single process, and within
the Bayesian framework. Comparison of our own model with the graph-based model
discussed above (Chapter 4) reveals that our Bayesian model qualitatively and quanti-
tatively fits the human category learning process more closely.
In sum, we leverage the support from prior theoretical analyses and computational
studies for the fact that natural language input provides a rich environment for both
word learning and category acquisition. Using natural language corpora allows us to
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Model Stimuli Categories
Medin and Schaffer (1978) 6 binary strings (e.g., 10101, 01000, ...) 2
Anderson (1991) 16 binary strings (e.g., 0111, 1011, ...) 2
Lee and Navarro (2002) 9 colored shapes (e.g., , , N, ...) 2
Bornstein and Mash (2010) 16 physical objects (e.g., , , ...) 2
This work > 300 concepts (e.g., hat, dog, car, ...) > 40
Figure 2.2: Illustration of stimuli used in selected laboratory studies of human category
learning, and the number of stimuli and target categories to be learnt. The bottom line
provides our own test set dimensions for comparison.
evaluate our models in a broader setting. Figure 2.1 compares the test set size of pre-
vious models of word learning from multimodal input (Figure 2.1a–2.1b) with the test
set used in our own studies (Figure 2.1c). We advance previous research by inves-
tigating a range of categorization-related phenomena, such as the joint emergence of
categories and their features or the dynamic nature of featural representations. All our
models are formulated within the Bayesian framework which allows us to express the
involved variables and their dependencies in an explicit and mathematically principled
manner. We motivate the use of Bayesian methods and related learning paradigms for
computational cognitive modeling in the beginning of Chapter 3.
Modeling Human Behavior in the Laboratory Although the process of category
and language learning “in the wild” interacts with a myriad of signals from the envi-
ronment and joint development of other abilities, such as social or sensorimotor skills,
much experimental research investigated this process in a laboratory setting. Labora-
tory studies isolate one phenomenon of interest from as many confounding factors as
possible. This creates an ‘ideal’ data set in the sense that it is free from any confound-
ing factors or idiosyncratic properties of naturalistic data sets. In a typical experiment,
participants are taught the category membership, or word meaning, of a set of training
stimuli and then asked to generalize to a set of test stimuli. A series of computational
models have been developed with the goal to predict the behavioral patterns emerging
from laboratory experiments.
Xu and Tenenbaum (2007) pioneered Bayesian modeling of taxonomic word meaning
acquisition. In particular, they investigate child and adult patterns of word acquisi-
tion for concepts on varying levels of the taxonomic category hierarchy (i.e., subordi-
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nate (dalmatian), basic (dog), superordinate (animal)). They show experimentally that
humans leverage the statistical structure in the set of (isolated and uncontextualized)
examples of word-referent co-occurrences to determine the taxonomic level of a refer-
ent of a new word. Their Bayesian model, which incorporates a formalization of this
tendency as prior knowledge, replicates a variety of related behavioral phenomena.
A variety of studies of category acquisition in the laboratory and models thereof exist.
Anderson’s rational model of categorization (Anderson, 1991), for example, was de-
veloped to replicate the process with which humans learn categories of abstract stimuli
represented by binary features (as illustrated in Figure 2.2) in the laboratory (see also
Sanborn et al. (2006)). The model incrementally learns a categorization over those
stimuli by integrating new observations into already established categories based on
featural similarity. Our model of incremental category learning (Chapter 4) is concep-
tually similar to the models discussed above, but explores their applicability to a larger
number of natural concepts and categories, represented with more complex featural
representations.
While laboratory studies allow to observe phenomena of interest free from unwanted
confounding factors they also have a range of limitations. Given the temporal re-
strictions of the experiment, and thus the learning environment that can be simu-
lated, the complexity of training and test scenarios is limited. Stimuli tend to have
a small number of manually specified features, and either are concrete objects (e.g.,
physical objects (Bornstein and Mash, 2010)) or abstract (e.g, binary strings, colored
shapes (Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Kruschke, 1993; Lee and Navarro, 2002)). Fig-
ure 2.2 illustrates the kind and number of stimuli and categories involved in selected
prior laboratory studies of human category learning. The low problem complexity
comes with the advantage that it typically allows for exact inference in computational
models, avoiding the interference of approximate learning mechanisms. However, it is
not clear to what extent the results transfer to more realistic learning problems involv-
ing complex concepts and situations. The true environment from which children learn
is messy: a multitude of objects, and potential referents are around, and the obser-
vational input might be noisy, e.g., visually constrained or highly untypical. Further-
more, in laboratory category learning studies it is difficult to control for the influence
of prior knowledge of the participants. Most studies involve adult participants who are
equipped with rich knowledge about categorization principles; and even children bring
in experience from their interaction with the real world (Neisser, 1987).
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In this thesis we develop cognitively motivated Bayesian models of the incremental
process of category and feature learning, similar in spirit to Anderson’s rational model
of categorization, and we apply them to large-scale cognitive learning problems. We
show that incremental Bayesian models of category learning explain a range of cate-
gory acquisition-related phenomena when applied at scale – both in terms of the quan-
tity of available input, its complexity, and the size of our evaluation set.
2.2.2 Learning as an Incremental Process
In the previous sections we reviewed the what of computational models of word and
category acquisition: the set of phenomena they aim to model and the scope and com-
plexity of the input data. Now, we turn to the how, the mechanisms and assumptions, of
the learning process.4 There are two prevalent paradigms of (unsupervised) learning:
The batch paradigm where a learner is presented with a set of training data and system-
atically extracts information from it, typically holding the data in memory being able
to access any data point at any time. The learnt knowledge can be employed after the
learning phase is completed. If new data become available, the training phase needs to
be re-run from scratch. The incremental learning paradigm on the other hand assumes
that a learner observes data on-line, over time and integrates extracted information into
its state of knowledge immediately. Excessive memory use is not necessary at the
cost of always learning from an incomplete data set (due to the ignorance about future
observations).
The majority of machine learning algorithms adopt the batch learning paradigm, ex-
ploiting the availability of excessive memory and processing power. Experimental
evidence suggests, however, that (a) human memory is limited and not every observa-
tion is stored in memory; and that (b) humans are able to make immediate use of newly
encountered information.
Bornstein and Mash (2010) examine object category acquisition (toy objects of two
categories differing in color and configuration of their parts) in 5-month old infants.
Infants were familiarized with one of the categories in two conditions: one group was
exposed to objects of a category for two months in their homes prior to a categoriza-
tion test, while the second group was exposed to the objects on the day of the test for
4These two perspectives roughly correspond to Marr’s computational and algorithmic levels of anal-
ysis (Marr, 1982).
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the first time. During the test, both groups went through a familiarization phase with
one category of toys (the same category the home-experience group was already fa-
miliar with). Following this, infants were tested with two previously unseen objects,
one from the familiar category, and one from the unfamiliar one. Results revealed that
infants without prior exposure at home showed signals of learning during the famil-
iarization phase in terms of a change in looking behavior. Their performance in the
following categorization task further revealed that they had acquired the category dur-
ing the familiarization phase. This suggests that their category representations must
have formed on-line during the short familiarization phase of just a few minutes. In-
fants do not require a separate, extended training period in order to be able to make use
of inferred category knowledge.5
Diaz and Ross (2006) investigate incremental category learning in adults. They show
that adults incrementally improve their featural representations of categories, which in
turn leads to a better ability to assign objects to categories. Participants immediately
use the acquired knowledge throughout the learning process such that their category
representations and categorization performance improves over time.
Although the majority of cognitive models of category and word learning rely on tra-
ditional batch machine learning techniques,6 the incremental nature of human learn-
ing has been incorporated into models as well. Anderson’s rational model of anal-
ysis formalizes the incremental categorization process as a non-parametric Bayesian
model (Anderson, 1991). The model predicts category membership of observed stim-
uli based on featural similarity to already established categories. Stimuli are catego-
rized on-line, as they are observed, and once made the categorization decision cannot
be revised. Observations are either assigned to an existing category based on feature
overlap, or initiate a new category.
While Anderson’s incremental learning algorithm involved local approximations, San-
born et al. (2006) derive an asymptotically exact sequential Monte Carlo algorithm
for the same model, in form of a particle filter (Doucet et al., 2001). Without delv-
5This is not to say that a prior and extended familiarization phase had no effect: Children who were
familiarized with one category in their homes for two months expressed familiarity with the known cat-
egory from the start of the familiarization phase in the laboratory, and did not show signals of learning.
6An important argument in favor of using batch algorithms in cognitive modeling is their represen-
tation of an ‘ideal learner’. This decision allows the modeler to investigate the learning process under
the assumption that the learner has perfect access to and makes perfect inferences based on all available
data. Consequently, results can abstract away from inaccuracies in the learning process introduced by
temporal or memory limitations of the learner.
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ing into the technical details (cf., Section 3.3 for this), particle filters incrementally
approximate a target distribution by updating a set of samples from this distribution
(‘particles’) in an on-line fashion with information from new data points, as they be-
come available. Memory constraints can, for example, be modeled by restricting the
number of available samples. Particle filters have become a popular learning mecha-
nism for Bayesian cognitive models in recent years and, beyond categorization, have
been used to model phenomena like incremental parsing (Levy et al., 2009) or word
segmentation (Börschinger and Johnson, 2011, 2012). We develop particle filters to
study large-scale human category and feature learning in Chapters 4 and 5.
Beyond modeling human learning in laboratory settings, longitudinal corpora of child-
directed speech provide an excellent data source for modeling the long-term incremen-
tal process of word learning (Baroni et al., 2007; Fazly et al., 2010) and category acqui-
sition. A graph-based model for incremental category learning from natural language
data has been put forward by Fountain and Lapata (2011). The model sequentially
observes linguistic stimuli, and constructs meaning representations of concepts from
word co-occurrence statistics in the input data. From this representation they infer a
categorization of concepts using an incremental graph-clustering algorithm (Biemann,
2006). They incrementally construct a graph where nodes correspond to concepts,
and their connection strength is determined by distributional similarity of the linguis-
tic contexts the concepts appear in. Nodes of the graph are clustered into categories
based on their connection strength. Constructing semantic concept representations
(through co-occurrence statistics) and inducing a categorization of concepts (through
graph clustering) are treated as two separate processes. We show that our incremen-
tal Bayesian model, while formalizing the process in a unified, and hence cognitively
more plausible, process, fits human category learning more closely than the model
described above.
2.3 Summary
Learning to represent and to communicate about the rich structure of the environment
surrounding us is a fundamental challenge for young infants. In the first part of this
chapter we reviewed experimental evidence suggesting that the two tasks of learning
language, and learning conceptual knowledge in the form of categories are intertwined
and mutually help each other. Building on these findings, in this thesis we model
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category acquisition from linguistic input.
The second part of this chapter reviewed computational models of word- and category
learning. We found that these models are evaluated in limited test settings, comprising
the acquisition of a small lexicon or a small number of categories from often artificial
stimuli, either due to a sophisticated multimodal representation of the learning environ-
ment which is difficult to obtain on a large scale (see Figure 2.1), or due to laboratory
experimental settings which are inherently limited in the complexity of the learning
task participants are confronted with (see Figure 2.2). In this work we use corpora of
natural language to train and test or models on a broader set of categories and features
than done previously. The work presented in this thesis is most closely related to the
rational models of categorization (Anderson, 1991; Sanborn et al., 2006), and natural
language categorization models (Fountain and Lapata, 2011) introduced above. We
will discuss these approaches and their relation to our work in Chapter 4 in the context
of our own category acquisition experiments.
We now move from the discussion of behavioral experiments and their treatment in
computational models, to a technical discussion of the modeling decisions underlying
the work in this thesis, and their mathematical foundations. Chapter 3 motivates the use
of Bayesian statistics for computational cognitive modeling, and technically introduces
its mathematical foundations and algorithms for approximate inference.
Chapter 3
Bayesian Cognitive Modeling and
Approximate Inference
This chapter introduces Bayesian modeling, the mathematical framework underlying
the models developed throughout this thesis. We begin by motivating Bayesian mod-
eling for cognitive phenomena (Section 3.1), before we move on to a more technical
introduction (Section 3.2) and the description of sampling methods for approximate
inference (Section 3.3).
3.1 Cognition as Bayesian Inference
Inference is the process of deriving meaningful conclusions from given (possibly un-
certain) knowledge. Much of human cognition can be formalized as inductive infer-
ence, i.e., generalizing from knowns to unknowns, under uncertainty. Humans use
established knowledge in order to make inferences about the world, for example when
they make decisions (Vul et al., 2014), predictions about everyday phenomena (Grif-
fiths and Tenenbaum, 2006) or learn words (Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007). Categorization
is no exception: When learning about a new category, humans need to infer the struc-
ture of the category from examples of its members. The knowledge acquired through
this process can be ultimately used to make decisions about how to categorize new
stimuli. Anderson (1991) pioneered this formalization of the categorization process as
inductive inference.
The category inference process described above depends on both established (or prior)
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knowledge and on observations of stimuli. If observations are scarce or poor in quality,
inferences can be based more strongly on prior knowledge. If the prior knowledge is
weak or uncertain, the empirical information from the observed data can drive the
inferences.
Bayesian statistics mathematically formalize inductive inference. Using the rules of
probability, it defines a principled way of drawing conclusions from given informa-
tion, and provides a means of reasoning about confidence.1 It assumes that all quanti-
ties which are reasoned about are mathematically modeled by random variables. Our
goal is to learn the joint probability distribution over all random variables involved.
In order to compute this target it is necessary to define a prior distribution (encoding
existing knowledge) and a likelihood (comprising information obtained from observed
data). Any inference about the quantities of interest then involves combining the prior
knowledge with the likelihood into the posterior distribution (encoding our updated
knowledge with information from the observed data). Bayes rule formalizes this pro-
cess and in its intuitive formulation corresponds to,
posterior ∝ prior× likelihood. (3.1)
The prior, posterior and likelihood are all represented stochastically as (conditional)
probability distributions. Slightly more formally, Bayesian inference involves comput-
ing conditional probabilities of quantities we want to predict conditioned on quantities
that have been observed. We derive Bayes’ rule formally in the next section.
The Bayesian inference paradigm has been shown to accurately describe a wide variety
of cognitive phenomena (Chater et al., 2010). While few proponents of the Bayesian
framework would argue that human cognition actually involves manipulating proba-
bility distributions in the brain, the Bayesian paradigm is a useful descriptive model
of human behavior (corresponding to Marr (1982)’s computational level of analysis).
An arguably fundamental point of divergence of Bayesian inference from human cog-
nition is the fact that Bayesian inference is optimal : a learner using Bayes rule (3.1)
to update knowledge will always draw the best possible conclusion from the avail-
able data (Jaynes, 2003). However, human behavior is often suboptimal, intuitive and
impulsive (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006; Goodman et al., 2008).
1Other cognitive modeling paradigms include associative (or connectionist) methods and symbolic
architectures. The former paradigm represents knowledge purely in terms of strength of associations
and is fraught with difficulties when inferring structured knowledge, while the latter is not amenable
to graded, probabilistic representation. See for example Tenenbaum et al. (2011) for a more detailed
comparison.
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Optimal Bayesian inference by exact evaluation of Bayes rule is, however, mathemati-
cally complex and computationally expensive. Although equation (3.1) may appear
straightforward, the involved probability distributions are often complex and high-
dimensional, and the computation of the updates of the prior- to the posterior dis-
tribution quickly becomes intractable (Sections 3.2 and 3.3 technically discuss this
point). Furthermore, exact Bayesian inference conflicts with human behavior: humans
are limited by memory and attention constraints while being able to make inferences
within split seconds. Exact Bayesian inference can take hours or days on powerful
computers, and often requires vast amounts of memory. Finally, it always leads to
the same optimal response under identical conditions, while human behavior exhibits
variation (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006; Vul and Pashler, 2008).
A variety of approximate inference algorithms have been developed over the past
decades which (a) enable tractable Bayesian inference, and (b) better describe human
behavior. In this thesis we use sampling-based approximate inference methods, which
represent probability distributions as a limited set of realizations of random variables
(a sample), with the frequency of realized variable values corresponding to the value’s
probability under the distribution (cf., Section 3.3).
Various properties make sampling-based approximate inference methods amenable as
descriptions of the human inference mechanism. Firstly, they are general methods, in
the sense that they can be used to approximate any measures relating to complex func-
tions, and are in no way tied to specific (cognitive) phenomena. Secondly, sampling-
based methods can approximate functions of arbitrary complexity which makes them
ideal candidates for approximating high-dimensional probability distributions as aris-
ing for use in the large-scale models of cognition developed in this thesis. Finally,
by varying the size of the sample, sampling-based methods provide an explicit way to
approximate the memory-accuracy tradeoff: how many samples are necessary to make
inferences with a quality matching human behavior? We investigate this question in
the context of large-scale incremental category acquisition in Sections 4.5 and 5.4.
In a machine-learning context it is not uncommon to approximate functions using hun-
dreds or thousands of samples. This seems unrealistic in the face of human processing.
Indeed, recent results have shown that in the context of cognitive decision tasks a
small set of possibly even a single sample can lead to high-quality predictions (Vul
et al., 2014). Results presented in Goodman et al. (2008) for rule-based categorization
tasks suggest that individual participants maintain a small sample of rules, leading to
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individually suboptimal behavior (the aggregate behavior of groups, averaging over in-
dividual samples results, however, in optimal responses). Sampling is usually viewed
as a useful description of the algorithmic process underlying human inference (Marr,
1982), rather than assuming that humans physically maintain and manipulate samples
of probability distributions in the brain (but see Huang and Rao (2014) for a neural
implementation of an incremental sampling algorithm).
The remainder of this chapter provides the mathematical foundation underlying Bayesian
statistics and approximate inference. First, we introduce Bayes’ rule from a mathe-
matical perspective, and discuss its use within generative models. Next, we introduce
sampling-based methods for approximate Bayesian inference (Section 3.3). We dis-
cuss Monte Carlo sampling in general (Section 3.3.1), and two specific instantiations:
a Gibbs sampler (Section 3.3.2) and a particle filter (Section 3.3.3).
3.2 Bayesian Statistics
Bayesian statistics provides a principled way for reasoning under uncertainty by treat-
ing both model parameters and observed data as random variables.2 This allows to
learn distributions over model parameters, which in turn allows to reason about con-
fidence in a particular set of parameters. Probabilities are interpreted as degrees of
belief. The ability to reason about uncertainty, or about the degree of belief in a par-
ticular model parameterization (often referred to as hypothesis in Bayesian modeling
terminology), is the fundamental characteristic of Bayesian statistics. Bayesian statis-
tics models the full distribution over parameters. This is in contrast to maximum like-
lihood estimation which aims to estimate a single best hypothesis, i.e., a point estimate
of this distribution. Using the full distribution allows to assess the degree of belief in a
particular parameter setting. A point estimate would place 100% of our confidence on
one particular parameterization which easily leads to overconfident predictions.
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, Bayes rule tells us how to combine prior
belief with empirically observed evidence (likelihood) into posterior belief,
posterior ∝ prior× likelihood.
2This stands in contrast to the second major statistical paradigm, frequentist statistics. Frequentist
statistics treats observed data as random variables, and model parameters as fixed quantities.
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More formally, the prior belief encodes the probability of a particular set of parame-
ters (or a hypothesis) θ, before observing any data (p(θ)). The likelihood encodes the
probability of the observed data y given this hypothesis p(y|θ) , i.e., how likely is it
to observe data y given that hypothesis θ is true? The posterior belief p(θ|y) corre-
sponds to the probability of a hypothesis given both its prior probability, as well as the
likelihood. Updates of the prior beliefs with data-derived likelihoods can be applied
repeatedly: the updated, posterior belief serves as the new prior for further reasoning.
Bayes’ rule is a direct formalization of this process of probability updates:
p(θ|y) = p(y|θ)p(θ)
p(y)
(3.2)
Although this relation is maybe not immediately intuitive, it can be straightforwardly
derived from fundamental principles of probability:
p(θ|y) = p(y,θ)
p(y)
(by definition of conditional probability) (3.3)
=
p(y|θ)p(θ)
p(y)
(by the chain rule) (3.4)
=
p(y|θ)p(θ)∫
θ p(y|θ)p(θ)dθ
(3.5)
Often we are interested in the relative probability of different hypotheses θ. Since the
denominator does not depend on any particular value of θ it can dropped,
pi(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ)p(θ). (3.6)
Alternatively, one is often interested in estimating a distribution over parameters θ
based on a training set y and use it to make inferences about unseen data y˜. Given
that the parameters θ are random variables in our model we do not know their real
value, so we have to average (or integrate) over all possible values. This leads to the
posterior predictive distribution (see Gelman et al. (2014) for an accessible discussion
of predictive evaluation methods for Bayesian models),
p(y˜|y) =
∫
θ
p(y˜|θ)p(θ|y)dθ. (3.7)
The posterior predictive distribution represents the probability of unseen data y˜ given
a hypothesis, weighted by the posterior probability of that hypothesis given the train-
ing data y, averaged over all possible hypotheses. Intuitively, rather than attempting
to predict the future based on a single hypothesis, predictions are made based on all
possible hypotheses, weighted by their probability. This form of reasoning is one of
the main benefits of the Bayesian approach.
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3.2.1 Bayesian Generative Modeling
Bayesian modeling uses the statistical framework introduced above to fit models to
data: given empirical data we want to learn models that explain the data well. Hy-
potheses correspond to statistical models (or parameterizations thereof) which we can
compare and evaluate and our goal is to learn a distribution over models.
Statistical models are systems of probability distributions over sets of random vari-
ables. In Bayesian statistical modeling these variables are:
• Observed variables, or empirical data y,
• Hidden variables θ which conflate all non-observable variables in the model.
These include (a) latent variables z, which are hidden factors used to explain the
structure underlying the observed data; and (b) a vector of parameters φ, which
govern the characteristics of the involved distributions.
The models in this thesis are designed to learn categories from stimuli. Each stimulus
consists of a set of words (observed variables). Our models define processes that induce
a category structure among the stimuli, by assigning each stimulus a category label
(latent variable). Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 discuss distributions we use for modeling
the observed and latent variables.
Generative Bayesian models learn a joint probability distribution over observed and
hidden variables p(y,θ). This allows to both infer parameters θ from observations y,
but also to inverse the process and, assuming θ is known, generate data y from the
model. This generating process is often useful to illustrate the model structure even
though practically the model will be used for inference, i.e., learning the parameters
given the data.
Taking the Bayesian approach we formulate our models in terms of prior probabilities
and likelihoods: we want to learn models that explain the observed data well but we
also want to factor in prior knowledge and intuitions we might have about the prob-
lems we are tackling. From a modeling perspective, prior knowledge can help to (a)
restrict the search space of good hypotheses by directing the model to an a priori likely
subspace; and (b) avoid overfitting, i.e., learning parameters which fit the training data
too closely, and will generalize poorly towards unseen data.
3.2. Bayesian Statistics 35
3.2.2 The Dirichlet-Multinomial Model
In the models developed in this thesis, both observed variables (in our case stimuli
consisting of words) and latent variables (such as category labels) are discrete. We
model observations of discrete variables x as draws from the Multinomial distribu-
tion Mult(φ) (where x may refer to either observed or latent variables).3 Taking the
Bayesian approach we draw the parameters φ themselves from a prior distribution. We
will use the Dirichlet distribution as the prior distribution over Multinomial parameters
which itself takes a parameter α (we explain our choice of prior in Section 3.2.2.1). We
can summarize our model structure as,
x∼Multinomial(φ)
φ∼ Dirichlet(α),
(3.8)
where∼ denotes that the variable on the left is distributed according to the distribution
on the right. We now mathematically justify our choice of distributions.
3.2.2.1 Priors and Conjugacy
The fundamental operation in Bayesian inference consists of updating a prior distribu-
tion with a likelihood function to form a posterior distribution. Combining arbitrary
distributions results in posterior distributions of unknown form which can be difficult
to evaluate or sample from. There is a class of well-known priors which, when com-
bined with a likelihood distribution, result in a posterior distribution which belongs to
the same class as the prior distribution. A prior with this property is called conjugate
prior to the respective likelihood distribution.
The Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior of the Multinomial distribution. To see
this, consider the definition of the Multinomial distribution over a set of c observations
x each of which takes a value k = 1...K under the parameters φ,
p(x|φ,c) = c!
∏k nk!
∏
k
φnkk Multinomial(φ1 ...φK,c), (3.9)
where nk is the number of observations in x that take the value k.
3It is common in Natural Language Processing to conflate the Categorical and the Multinomial
distribution (which generalizes the Categorical distribution to sets of draws) distribution. We will follow
the convention of prior work here, and use the term Multinomial throughout even when referring to
Categorical distributions, unless otherwise specified.
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The Dirichlet distribution is a ‘distribution over distributions’, i.e., over all possible
parameterizations of a K-dimensional Multinomial. A K-dimensional Dirichlet dis-
tribution is parameterized through K concentration parameters α1...αk. It is common
to set all parameters to the same value, the concentration parameter α = α1 = ...αk.
This results in an uninformative prior, reflecting a priori ignorance about the relative
importance of the K outcomes. However, the value of α will support parameterizations
of different forms: a small value of α<< 1 results in Multinomial parameters concen-
trated on a few outcomes (i.e., a ‘peaky’ distribution), whereas larger values result in
closer to uniform distributions. The probability density function (PDF) of the Dirichlet
distribution is:
p(φ|α) = Γ
(
∑kαk
)
∏kΓ
(
αk
)∏
k
φαk−1k Dirichlet(α1 ... αK), (3.10)
where Γ(·) is the Gamma function, a generalization of the factorial to real numbers.
Combining the Multinomial distribution from equation (3.9) with the Dirichlet dis-
tribution from equation (3.10) leads to another Dirichlet distribution, with updated
parameters,
p(φ|x;α) = p(x|φ)p(φ|α)
=
Γ(∑k nk +αk)
∏kΓ(nk +αk)
×
[
∏
k
φnkk
][
∏
k
φαk−1k
]
=
Γ(∑k nk +αk)
∏kΓ(nk +αk)
×∏
k
φnk+αk−1k Dirichlet(n1+α1 ... nK +αK),
(3.11)
where the first term in lines 2 and 3 is a normalizing constant.
Note from equation (3.11) that the Dirichlet parameters (αk) can be interpreted as
hypothetical “pseudo-counts” which are added to observations from the data (nk) and
can be interpreted as “imaginary”, derived from prior knowledge. The Dirichlet prior
thus has a smoothing effect on the data-derived parameters and can help avoid model
overfitting.
3.2.2.2 Predicting Observations
We have derived the form of the posterior distribution over Multinomial parameters
φ under the Dirichlet prior. Often, rather than the distribution over φ itself, we are
interested in the conditional distribution over values of a new observation xt+1 (e.g., the
distribution over category labels for an unseen stimulus) given the distribution over
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over all possible parameters φ. The conditional distribution over values for xt+1 given
all other observations x can be computed by averaging (or integrating) over all possible
values of φ. Due to the mathematical advantages implied by conjugate prior-likelihood
pairs, this integral can be solved analytically. After some algebraic manipulation the
conditional distribution evaluates to a very simple form,
p(xt+1 = k|x,α) =
∫
Multinomial(xt+1 = k|φ) Dirichlet(φ|x,α) dφ
=
∫
φk
Γ(∑k nk +αk)
∏kΓ(nk +αk)
∏
k
φnk+αk−1k dφ
=
nk +α
∑k′ nk′+α
.
(3.12)
For the interested reader, we derive this result in Appendix A. The probability of obser-
vation xt+1 taking value k equals the number of times value k was assigned to any other
observation in x, normalized by the counts of assignments of any value k′ in x. This re-
sult allows the derivation of efficient learning algorithms as discussed in Sections 3.3.2
and 3.3.3.
3.2.3 Intrinsic Gaussian Markov Random Fields
While Dirichlet priors are intuitive and computationally advantageous when combined
with Multinomial likelihood distributions, the kinds of prior intuitions they can encode
are limited. One important limitation is the fact that Dirichlet priors cannot capture de-
pendencies between parameter values. There are however classes of problems which
naturally exhibit such structure, for example spatial or temporal variation of a phe-
nomenon of interest. Consider a model for the spread of an epidemic: the severity
of infection in any area at any time depends on the level of infection at the area’s
geographically neighboring areas (due to their proximity and interaction between in-
habitants), as well as the level of infection in the area at the previous time (due to
epidemics spreading smoothly and continuously). This structure should be captured
by a good model.
Chapter 6 of this thesis is concerned with a problem of similar structure, namely mod-
eling of change of meaning over time: we model meaning change as a gradual process
which goes hand-in-hand with social, economic and generational change in the popu-
lation of language users. Like discussed in Section 3.2.2, we still assume multinomial
likelihoods. However, we use a different family of priors over these distributions which
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allow us to capture gradual, or smooth, parameter changes. In particular, we use in-
trinsic Gaussian Markov Random Fields (Rue and Held, 2005; Mimno et al., 2008):
x∼Multinomial(φ)
φ∼ iGMRF(κ,Q ).
(3.13)
We first define Gaussian Markov Random Fields (GMRFs). Afterwards, we introduce
their intrinsic version (iGMRFs), as well as properties which make them suitable for
capturing smooth parameter dependencies in priors in Bayesian models. Our descrip-
tion is based on various introductions and tutorials on (intrinsic) GMRFs, most notably
Rue and Held (2005), Paciorek (2009) and Vivalt (2014). We focus on structures di-
rectly relevant to modeling temporal development. However, GMRFs can model a
wide variety of structured dependencies between parameters. For a thorough introduc-
tion please refer to one of the above references.
GMRFs are undirected graphical models over relations between variables. They are
represented by a graph G = (E,V ) consisting of a set of nodes V representing vari-
ables, and edges E between pairs of nodes, which indicate a dependency relation. Mul-
tivariate normal distributions (MVN) define distributions over n-dimensional random
vectors φ= [φ1...φn]. They are parameterized through a n-dimensional mean vector µ,
and a n×n co-variance matrix which encodes dependencies between variables φi,
φ∼N (µ,Σ). (3.14)
MVNs can be represented graphically through a graph G as described above: each ran-
dom variable φi corresponds to a node in the graph, and edges represent dependencies
between φi. The inverse of Σ is the precision matrix Q = Σ−1 which explicitly captures
the dependency structure between variables φi, and consequently the graph structure
of G . Formally, a random vector φ= [φ1...φn] is a GMRF if it follows the distribution
p(φ) = (2pi)−n/2|Q|1/2exp(− 1
2
φT Qφ
)
, (3.15)
by definition of the MVN, and assuming that the mean µ = 0. It is also a GMRF with
respect to the graph G if there is a non-zero entry in Qi j if and only if there exists an
edge between nodes i and j in G ,
Qi j 6= 0 ⇔ {i, j} ∈ G ∀i 6= j. (3.16)
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(a) Graph-representation G of a first-order GMRF on the line.
φ1 φi−1 φi φi+1 φI
(b) The corresponding Precision matrix Q = κR (with κ= 1).
1 -1 0 0 0 ... 0
-1 2 -1 0 0 ... 0
0 -1 2 -1 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ... 0
0 0 0 -1 2 -1 0
0 0 0 0 -1 2 -1
0 0 0 0 0 -1 1
Figure 3.1: A first-order GMRF on the line with corresponding precision matrix.
For many problems the dependencies between variables are sparse, such that Q has
many zero entries, and G is sparsely connected, which allows for efficient computa-
tions. Figure 3.1 displays a graph G (3.1a) and precision matrix Q (3.1b) representing
a structure corresponding to first-order parameter dependencies on the line. Without
worrying too much about the values in Q (for now), we can see that that only ele-
ments Qi j such that j− i <= 1, i.e., immediate neighbors, contain non-zero values,
mirroring the graphical dependencies in G . This structure is reminiscent of temporal
dependency structure, i.e., each variable in time is connected to (i.e., depends on) its
immediate neighbors, and is indeed the structure adopted by the models in this thesis.
The intrinsic Gaussian Markov Random Field (iGMRF) is an improper version of
the GMRF. Mathematically, this means that the prior is not normalizable (the nor-
malizing constant evaluates to infinity), i.e., it is not a proper probability distribu-
tion. While this sounds intuitively unappealing4 these models have desirable prop-
erties which make it a common prior in hierarchical Bayesian models. We discuss the
iGMRF of first-order dependencies on the line as shown in Figure 3.1.
The iGMRF of first-order dependencies on the line is defined in terms of independent,
4The impropriety of the iGMRF has a lot of theoretical consequences which we will not discuss
here, but have been discussed extensively, e.g., in Rue and Held (2005). Most importantly, the iGMRF
is usually proper (i.e., normalizable) on a subregion of its probability space, and the posterior distribution
arising from combining the iGMRF prior with the likelihood function is also typically proper.
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normally distributed, increments between connected variables,
∆φi ∼ N (0,κ−1) i = 1...n−1, (3.17)
with ∆φi = φi+1−φi. We write the variance in terms of the inverse precision κ−1 (just
like we used the precision matrix Q instead of the variance-covariance matrix Σ above).
The density over φ can then be derived, in analogy to (3.14),
p(φ|κ) ∝ κ(n−1)/2exp(− κ
2
n−1
∑
i=1
(∆φi)2
)
= κ(n−1)/2exp
(− κ
2
n−1
∑
i=1
(φi+1−φi)2
)
= κ(n−1)/2exp
(
φT Qφ
)
,
(3.18)
with an appropriately defined scaled precision matrix Q = κR (with R being a matrix
capturing the dependencies among the random variables) which turns out to be defined
as shown in Figure 3.1b, with
Qi j = κ

ni if i = j
−1 if i∼ j
0 otherwise.
(3.19)
Here, ni refers to the total number of nodes connected to node i, and i ∼ j indicates
that nodes i and j are connected.
Why is this particular model structure convenient? Conceptually, in priors of Bayesian
models which capture the development of some measure over time (or space), it is
desirable to be able to only model the development itself without the need to make any
claim on the concrete values the measure takes at any time. Often this development is
measured as a smooth process over time (or space). Since the iGMRF models the local
differences in parameter values (between any individual pair of connected variables)
but not the values of those variables, we can achieve exactly this.5
5This property is mathematically enabled by the impropriety of the iGMRF. The precision matrix Q
is not full-rank, which means that there exists at least one vector y 6= 0 such that Qy = 0. For the matrix
in 3.1b exactly one such vector exists (Q has nullity k = 1), namely the vector y = 1, because all rows
in Q sum to zero: ∑ j Qi j = 0 ∀i. Conceptually, these vectors correspond to directions that the iGMRF
“has nothing to say about”. Mathematically it means that iGMRFs with nullity k are invariant to the
addition of a polynomial of degree < k. An iGMRF with k = 1 is consequently invariant to the addition
of polynomials of degree 0, i.e., constants. The degree of a polynomial is the maximum of all exponents
of its variables. A polynomial without variables is a constant and necessarily has degree zero. And
practically, for the iGMRF on the line with first-order dependencies (Figure 3.1) it means that no global
mean of the parameter values exists – the iGMRF has nothing to say about their values, only about their
relative difference.
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The full conditional distributions of the iGMRF illustrate the model’s invariance to the
addition of a constant to the global mean,6
φi|φ(−i),κ∼N
(1
2
(φi−1+φi+1),
1
2κ
)
1 < i < n, (3.20)
where φ(−i) denotes the vector φ except element φi. The value of any variable φi is
normally distributed around the weighted average of the values of its neighboring pa-
rameters. The allowed flexibility between values between connected variables (i.e., the
“tightness” of the normal distribution) is regulated through the precision parameter κ.
3.3 Bayesian Inference
So far, we have introduced the framework of Bayesian statistical modeling, and dis-
cussed the types of distributions which are commonly used as priors or likelihood func-
tions in Bayesian models, and play a central role in the models presented throughout
this thesis. While we demonstrated characteristics and limitations of these distribu-
tions we did not yet discuss how their parameters can be estimated from data. We now
introduce algorithms for Bayesian parameter estimation.
Given a data set y and a model specified in terms of a set of parameters θ, the goal
of Bayesian inference is to estimate a distribution over values for θ given the data y.
Bayesian inference estimates the full posterior distribution over all possible parame-
ter values (rather than the best value) and consequently captures uncertainty about a
particular set of values.
Bayes’ rule provides a mathematical definition for how to compute this quantity,
p(θ|y) = p(y|θ)p(θ)∫
θ p(y|θ)p(θ)
. (3.21)
Practically, however, for all but trivial models exact computations of these quantities
is infeasible because the integrals involved become increasingly difficult to compute
with a growing parameter space.
Below, we introduce Monte Carlo sampling which provides a way to work with com-
plex probability distributions indirectly, by representing them through a set of sam-
ples. Sophisticated versions of Monte Carlo methods have been developed which allow
6With ‘global mean’ we refer to some value µ such that µ = Eφ1 = Eφ2 = ....
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working with unnormalized distributions,
pi(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ)p(θ), (3.22)
avoiding the need to compute the integrals involved in the normalizing constant in (3.21).
We will provide a brief introduction into approximation through Monte Carlo integra-
tion. We then present two instantiations of Monte-Carlo samplers which we will use
for parameter inference for our models throughout the thesis:
• A Gibbs sampler, which is a batch inference algorithm that produces parameter
samples through repeated iterations over the data, repeatedly updating its param-
eters according to the unnormalized pi(θ|y).
• A Particle filter, which is an incremental inference algorithm and sweeps over
the training data only once. It propagates a set of samples (called particles)
and immediately updates each sample independently with information extracted
from newly encountered data points.
Gibbs samplers are popular inference algorithms which are frequently used for approx-
imating high-dimensional posterior distributions arising in Bayesian models like those
discussed in this thesis. The batch procedure underlying the Gibbs sampler, however,
seems at odds with characteristics of human learning: humans have memory limita-
tions – they do not memorize large sets of data and perform systematic inference on
them. Instead, they use the information of individual observations to make inferences
immediately or to update their knowledge (Bornstein and Mash, 2010; Diaz and Ross,
2006). The particle filter resembles this procedure more closely. Chapters 4 and 5 will
compare the category acquisition process emerging from our models under the batch
Gibbs sampler and the incremental particle filter.
3.3.1 The Monte Carlo Method
The Monte Carlo (MC) method (Hammersley and Handscomb, 1964; MacKay, 2002,
Ch., 29) provides a way of approximating complex functions (such as probability dis-
tributions) which are impossible or infeasible to evaluate directly. Functions of interest
are approximated by simulation: a set of samples from the distribution is simulated,
and all further computations are carried out on the sample. This works because the
expected value of any function, irrespective of its complexity, can be approximated
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arbitrarily accurately through the mean of independent and identically distributed (iid)
samples from the function,
E f (θ) =
∫
p(θ) f (θ)dθ (3.23)
≈ 1
N
N
∑
i=1
f (θi) θi ∼ p(θ). (3.24)
By definition7 (given in (3.23)) the expected value of a function f (θ) with respect to
random variable θ which is distributed according to p(θ) is the average of all values θ
can take weighted by their probability p(θ). In line (3.24), the computation of the inte-
gral is avoided by instead computing the mean of the function of interest evaluated on
a set of N samples {θ(i)}Ni=1 from the distribution p(θ). The strong law of large num-
bers guarantees that this mean will converge to the expected value with increasingly
many samples. Thus, with N→ ∞ the Monte Carlo approximation of any expectation
becomes exact.
We are interested in using the Monte Carlo method for approximating complex prob-
ability distributions, i.e., posterior distributions in Bayesian models. How does that
relate to the MC definition in terms of expectations above? We can formulate the
probability of any value (e.g., θ= 5) in terms of an expectation,
p(θ= 5) = E I{5}(θ). (3.25)
where I{5}(θ) is an indicator function which evaluates to 1 if θ= 5 and is 0 otherwise.
A Monte Carlo approximation of a probability distribution over all possible values z
within the support of p(θ) can thus be written as,
p(θ= z)≈ 1
N
N
∑
i=1
I{z}(θ(i)) θ(i) ∼ p(θ). (3.26)
This rather abstract procedure of approximation by simulation is actually very intuitive.
In the context of Bayesian inference, simulation refers to generating values from an
underlying probability distribution, but it equally works for real physical simulation
of events. Imagine, for example, one wants to find out whether a die is fair or not,
i.e., whether the distribution p(θ) over all possible outcomes of die rolls θ ∈ {1...6} is
uniform. This distribution can be approximated by rolling the die N times (i.e., drawing
N samples from p(θ)), recording the outcomes, and computing the distribution over
7We use p(θ) as a generic distribution, which may of course depend on further variables, but we
drop those here for ease of notation.
44 Chapter 3. Bayesian Cognitive Modeling and Approximate Inference
outcomes using (3.26). The estimate for p(θ) is guaranteed to become increasingly
accurate with more samples (i.e., rolls of the die).
Unfortunately, plain Monte Carlo simulation as discussed above is often practically
infeasible. The complex functions of interest cannot be simulated (or sampled from)
efficiently (or at all). A wide range of sophisticated sampling techniques based on the
Monte Carlo principle have been developed which avoid the explicit evaluation of the
function of interest, and we discuss two of them below: Markov chain Monte Carlo (in
the context of Gibbs sampling; Section 3.3.2) and importance sampling (in the context
of particle filtering; Section 3.3.3).
3.3.2 Gibbs Sampling
Gibbs samplers provide a way to obtain samples from distributions which can be only
evaluated up to a constant, employing the strategy of Markov chain Monte Carlo sam-
pling. We first describe the idea underlying Markov chain Monte Carlo, and then
describe the Gibbs sampler.
3.3.2.1 Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Direct iid. sampling from the posterior distribution as required in plain Monte Carlo
sampling is often intractable. Rather than generating truly independent and identi-
cally distributed samples, it is often more straightforward to draw samples {θ1, ...,θN}
which are slightly dependent. Samples can be drawn according to a Markov Chain
defined according to p(θ) (Hastings, 1970). A Markov chain is essentially a random
walk over a graph, where vertices (called ‘states’) correspond to possible values of θ,
and the outgoing edges from each vertex define a probability distribution over all next
states conditioned on the current state. It satisfies the Markov property in the sense that
the following state is independent of all previous states given the current state. We can
perform a random walk over this graph in steps n = {1...N}, and draw θn conditioned
on the previous draw θn−1:
θn ∼ p(θn|θn−1). (3.27)
Note that (a) we generate samples through repeated evaluation of local probability
distributions, or state transitions, and thus avoid to evaluate the complex distribution
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p(θ) (which prevented us from using plain Monte Carlo simulation); and (b) that the
draws from p(θ) are no longer independent and identically distributed so that the strong
law of large numbers used in the motivation of Monte Carlo methods no longer holds.
Under some circumstances the sequence of states {θ1, ...,θn} visited in the random
walk corresponds to a sample from p(θ), i.e., each state is visited with a probability
proportional to p(θ), which means that p(θ) is the stationary distribution of the chain.
Conceptually, these conditions include:
• The random walk must be initialized in some way, but the sample resulting from
a (long enough) random walk should be independent of the starting point. More
formally, after an initial period, the probability of reaching any state θ does not
depend on the initial state θ0.
• In order for a state sequence of a long random walk to be a valid sample from
p(θ) we must make sure that we can in principle visit all areas under the support
of p(θ) at any time during the walk, i.e., we do not want to “get stuck” in a
particular sub-space of the distribution. Consequently, our random graph must
be highly connected, and guarantee for an infinitely long walk started at any
particular state z that the probability to re-visit z in the future is 1.
Concretely a valid Markov chain must be ergodic, which means that it must be ape-
riodic, irreducible and positive recurrent. However, we will leave our introduction on
this conceptual level, and invite the interested reader to learn more about these concepts
in excellent mathematically rigorous introductions to Markov chains and MCMC such
as Bishop (2006) and Murphy (2012).
We will now introduce the Gibbs sampler which is one method for constructing a valid
Markov chain for sampling from a target distribution p(θ).
3.3.2.2 The Gibbs Sampler
The Gibbs sampler (Geman and Geman, 1984; Bishop, 2006) is a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo method, which is particularly suitable for sampling from probability distributions
over high-dimensional parameters θ = {θ1, ...,θI} (i.e., when I is large), as it is the
case in the models developed in this thesis. We focus on Gibbs sampling for sampling
from the posterior distribution over parameters given data p(θ|y). The Gibbs sampler
constructs an ergodic Markov chain over parameter samples from p(θ|y) as a sequence
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Algorithm 1 The Gibbs Sampler.
1: Initialize the sampler to a random starting point θ0←{θ01,θ02, ...,θ0I }
2: repeat
3: Run the sampler for b burn-in iterations
4: for each iteration n = [b+1...] do
5: for each dimension i = [1..I] do
6: θni ∼ p(θni |θ−i) = p(θni |θn1, ...θni−1,θn−1i+1 ,θn−1I )
7: if lag > ` then
8: return a sample from the joint posterior distribution
θn = {θn1,θn2, ...,θnI }
9: until the desired number of samples has been collected.
of samples from full conditional distributions of each individual parameter θi. The full
conditional distribution for parameter θi defines the distribution over values for this
parameter conditioned on the current values of all parameters other than θi. We denote
this set as θ−i:
θi ∼ p(θi|θ−i,y) = p(θi|θ1, ...,θi−1,θi+1, ...,θI,y). (3.28)
The full conditional distributions must be normalized, because it must be possible to
draw samples from them. Luckily they are one-dimensional by definition, which typ-
ically allows for proper normalization. In our case these full conditionals are discrete
distributions over a finite probability space, so normalization is feasible.
Why is this sequence of full conditional distributions a valid approximation of the
target posterior distribution, i.e., the joint distribution over θ = {θ1, ...,θI}? It turns
out that the full conditional distribution of any parameter θi is proportional to the joint
distribution over parameters θ:
p(θi|θ1, ...,θi−1,θi+1, ...θI) = p(θ1, ...,θI)p(θ1, ...,θi−1,θi+1, ...θI) ∝ p(θ1, ...,θI). (3.29)
The complete algorithm of the Gibbs sampler is displayed in Algorithm 1. The sampler
starts with a randomly initialized parameter vector θ0. It then repeatedly iterates over
the components of θ and resamples each θi individually from its full conditional dis-
tribution (equation (3.28)). Periodically, the current value of θ is returned as a sample.
The algorithm terminates when the required number of samples are obtained. There
are a few practical intricacies which arise with MCMC samplers in general and the
Gibbs sampler in particular:
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• The values of parameters θ are usually randomly initialized, which means that
the sampler starts off at an arbitrary position in the state space, probably some
distance away from the high-probability region under the posterior distribu-
tion p(θ|y). Although it is guaranteed through the ergodicity property that the
sampler will ultimately produce samples distributed according to the posterior
distribution, it needs a number of iterations to reach this distribution. This initial
period is called burn-in period. It is difficult to exactly determine the point at
which the stationary distribution is reached, and it is common practice to discard
a safely large set of initial samples.
• Recall that MCMC samples are generated from a Markov chain producing sam-
ples from p(θn|θn−1,y) and hence locally correlated. To obtain a set of samples
which are as close to iid as possible in an efficient way8 it is common practice to
include a lag ` and only collect every `th sample (a process called “thinning”).
Again setting ` to an appropriate value is more of an art than a science.
3.3.2.3 Collapsed Gibbs Sampling for Dirichlet-Multinomial Models
How does this relate to the models presented in this thesis? Recall that we sample
values from the posterior distribution over parameters θ. Recall also, that parameters
in Bayesian models comprise both variables (e.g., the category of an observation), as
well as the parameters governing the distributions from which latent- and observed
variables are generated (φ).
As discussed in Section 3.2.2.1 we are often not interested in the distribution-governing
parameters φ themselves9, but rather in the distribution over value assignments to latent
variables of observations x (e.g., in assigning a category label i ∈ {1...I} to an obser-
vation x j). We showed in Section 3.2.2.1 (equation (3.12), page 37) that the conjugate
pair of the Dirichlet and the Multinomial distribution allows to analytically integrate
over parameters φ.
In the context of a Gibbs sampler, analytically integrating (or collapsing or marginal-
izing) Multinomial parameters means that we do not need to resample their value ex-
plicitly, but that they are implicitly represented through the sufficient statistics of value
8This method can be useful to reduce computational and/or memory requirements of computing
estimates, but it will not improve the accuracy of the estimates (Link and Eaton, 2012).
9Although they can be recovered given an estimated model.
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assignments to variables. Collapsing parameters of a model constrains the state space
and often leads to more efficient samplers.
Collapsed Gibbs sampling then corresponds to repeatedly sampling each individual
latent variable from its full conditional distribution, i.e., the distribution over values
assigned to variable x j conditioned on the values assigned to all other variables x− j
in the model, while implicitly marginalizing over the data-generating distribution φ.
These full conditional distributions evaluate to a very simple form:
p(x j = i|x− j,α) =
∫
p(x j = i|φ)p(φ|x− j,α)dφ (3.30)
∝
n− ji +α
∑i′ n
− j
i′ +α
, (3.31)
where n− ji is the count of assignments of value i to any observation, excluding counts
related to observation x j. The probability that observation j has value i is proportional
to the number of times value i is assigned to any other observation x− j. In this way
values are repeatedly re-assigned to variables without ever explicitly representing the
parameter φ in the sampler. See Appendix A for a detailed derivation.
3.3.3 Particle Filtering
Markov chain Monte Carlo methods, like the Gibbs sampler introduced above, iterate
repeatedly over the entire input data set in order to produce samples from the posterior
distribution. This can be undesirable for various reasons. The available data might
grow over time and updating the posterior estimate requires to re-run the sampler,
which can be expensive. Furthermore, a (vanilla) MCMC sampler holds the entire data
set in memory, which is implausible from a cognitive point of view. For learning to
occur it is not necessary to have access to all available information or hold it in memory.
In this section we introduce particle filters, a method for incrementally estimating a
posterior distribution.
Chapters 4 and 5 in this thesis introduce Bayesian models for investigating the incre-
mental process of human category learning, where novel information from observed
stimuli is immediately used to update the category representation (Bornstein and Mash,
2010; Diaz and Ross, 2006). Particle filters provide a mathematically principled way
to model incremental learning of Bayesian model parameters (Sanborn et al., 2006).
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Particle filters estimate the posterior distribution over unobserved parameters (e.g., pos-
sible categorizations of stimuli) p(θ|y) in real time, as data is observed. Each time
point t corresponds to an observation of a data point (e.g., stimulus) yt . We use θt
to denote a concrete parameterization at time t (e.g., a specific categorization of all
stimuli y1:t observed up to time t). At each time t, we want to estimate the posterior
distribution over parameters given all data observed up to that time p(θt |y1:t). Particle
filters maintain an approximation of these distributions as a set of weighted samples:
p(θt |y1:t)∼
{(
θ(i)t ,w
(i)
t
)}N
i=1
, (3.32)
where (θ,w) refers to a (sample, weight) tuple, {·}N1 denotes a set of N such tuples,
and ∼ (by slight abuse of notation) means “is represented as”. This set of particles is
updated incrementally from a representation at time t−1 to a representation at time t,
with every incoming stimulus yt ,
p(θt−1|y1:t−1)∼
{(
θ(i)t−1,w
(i)
t−1
)}N
i=1
yt−−−→ p(θt |y1:t)∼
{(
θ(i)t ,w
(i)
t
)}N
i=1
. (3.33)
Particle filters use sequential importance sampling (SIS) for efficiently and repeatedly
computing this update. SIS approximates Bayesian optimal filtering which defines the
exact way for recursively estimating a Bayesian posterior distribution but is compu-
tationally infeasible (see e.g., (Särkkä, 2013)). A well-known property of SIS is that
the approximation of the target distribution decreases in quality over time. In order to
alleviate this problem, particle filters involve an additional resampling step. Resam-
pling provides a way to periodically re-position the filter to high-probability areas of
the sample space.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the particle filtering process, and Algorithm 2 displays it algo-
rithmically. We derive importance sampling (Section 3.3.3.1) and sequential impor-
tance sampling (Section 3.3.3.2), before we discuss resampling (Section 3.3.3.3). Sec-
tion 3.3.3.4 concludes with a brief discussion of Rao-Blackwellized particle filtering.
3.3.3.1 Importance Sampling
At each time t the particle filter maintains a sample from the posterior distribution
p(θt |y1:t). As discussed previously, exact sampling from Bayesian posterior distribu-
tions is often impossible. Instead, particle filters use importance sampling (IS; Geweke
1989; Bishop 2006) which approximates a complex target distribution p(θ|y) with
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samples from a simpler importance distribution q(θ|y). It uses the following identity
of the Monte Carlo principle,∫
f (θ)p(θ|y)dθ ≈ 1
N
N
∑
i=1
f (θ(i)) θ(i) ∼ p(θ|y) (3.34)
=
∫
f (θ)
p(θ|y)
q(θ|y)q(θ|y) ≈
1
N
N
∑
i=1
p(θ(i))|y)
q(θ(i)|y) f (θ
(i)) θ(i) ∼ q(θ|y) (3.35)
=
N
∑
i=1
w(i) f (θ(i)). (3.36)
Equation (3.34) repeats the Monte Carlo principle as introduced in Section 3.3.1. In
(3.35) we multiply and divide by the same factor, thus not changing the equation, but
reformulating it such that the sampling distribution is now q(θ|y). In the last step
we rewrite the approximation (3.35) in a way that introduces importance weights w(i).
Importance weights w(i) correct for the discrepancy between the importance and the
target distribution. In order make (3.36) a valid approximation, the importance weights
must be defined as,
w˜(i) =
p(y|θ(i))p(θ(i))
q(θ(i)|y) , (3.37)
and subsequently normalized such that they sum to one:
w(i) =
w˜(i)
∑ j w˜( j)
. (3.38)
And as a result, it is no longer necessary evaluate or sample from the complex target
distribution p(θ|y).
In sum, importance sampling consists of three steps: (1) draw N samples {θ(i)}Ni=1
from the importance distribution q(θ|y); (2) compute the unnormalized importance
weights (equation (3.37)); (3) normalize the importance weights to sum to one (equa-
tion (3.38)).
3.3.3.2 Sequential Importance Sampling
Particle filtering uses the importance sampling procedure described above repeatedly,
for obtaining an estimate of the target distribution at each time t. Instead of generating a
new sample from scratch at each time, the existing sample from time t−1 is recursively
updated with new information. Sequential importance sampling (Doucet et al., 2001)
defines an efficient way for recursively updating samples and their associated weights.
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The process underlying sequential importance sampling is illustrated in Figure 3.2
(top). Parameters develop through a first-order Markov Process, i.e., at any time the
distribution over θ depends only on θt−1, and observations yt are independent given
parameters θt . The posterior distribution over parameters p(θ1:t |y1:t) can be defined
recursively, by updating an existing distribution over parameters p(θ1:t−1|y1:t−1),
p(θ1:t |y1:t) (3.39)
∝ p(θ1)p(y1|θ1)
t
∏
n=2
p(θn|θn−1)p(yn|θn) (3.40)
= p(θ1)p(y1|θ1)
[
t−1
∏
n=2
p(θn|θn−1)p(yn|θn)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p(θ1:t−1|y1:t−1)
p(θt |θt−1)p(yt |θt) (3.41)
= p(θ1:t−1|y1:t−1)p(θt |θt−1)p(yt |θt). (3.42)
where we use the Markov properties introduced above in (3.40). We get (3.41) by
separating out the last observation t. We then re-collapse times t = [1...t−1] obtaining
one factor corresponding to the posterior distribution at time t− 1, which is updated
with the new information from time t (equation (3.42)).
In order to be able to sequentially estimate this target, we need a recursive definition
of the importance distribution,
q(θ1:t |y1:t) = q(θ1:t−1|y1:t−1)q(θt |θ1:t−1,y1:t). (3.43)
Following the idea of importance sampling (Section 3.3.3.1) and using (3.42) as the
target distribution and (3.43) as the importance distribution, we can define importance
weights. It turns out that the importance weights can also be defined recursively. We
obtain the weight of the ith particle at time t, w(i)t , by updating its previous weight at
time t−1, w(i)t−1,
w(i)t ∝
p(θ(i)1:t−1|y1:t−1)
q(θ(i)1:t−1|y1:t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(i)t−1
p(θ(i)t |θ(i)t−1)p(yt |θ(i)t )
q(θ(i)t |θ(i)1:t−1,y1:t)
= w(i)t−1
p(θ(i)t |θ(i)t−1)p(yt |θ(i)t )
q(θ(i)t |θ(i)1:t−1,y1:t)
.
(3.44)
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Figure 3.2: Schematic illustration of the particle filtering algorithm. A set of N = 6
particles incrementally approximates the target distribution (graph). Particles are de-
noted as circles, and circle size represents the particle weights. At each time t, the
existing set of particles from t− 1 is updated with new incoming information, and the
particle weights are updated (top; Sequential Importance Sampling). Periodically ‘bad’
(low weight) particles are replaced with ‘good’ (high weight) particles (resampling; mid-
dle). After resampling, resampled particles are slightly perturbed to increase sample
diversity (rejuvenation; bottom).
The Optimal Importance Distribution. The importance distribution q(θ1:t |y1:t) can
be chosen at liberty, and is usually defined such that it is easy to sample from. The (se-
quential) importance sampler is most efficient, however, when the importance distribu-
tion is as similar to the target distribution as possible. The ‘optimal’ importance distri-
bution is defined such that it minimizes the variance among importance weights (Zarit-
skii et al., 1976), and is given by,
q(θ1:t |θ1:t−1,y1:t) = p(θt |θt−1,yt). (3.45)
Note that this distribution is locally optimal because it is conditioned on the fact that
the sequence of sampled parameters remains unchanged. Otherwise the algorithm
would cease to be sequential. It corresponds to the posterior distribution over parame-
3.3. Bayesian Inference 53
ters θt considering both prior information from the parameter estimate θt−1 as well as
information from the current observation yt . Under the optimal importance distribu-
tion, the sample weights correspond to the predictive likelihood of observation yt :
w(i)t = w
(i)
t−1
p(θ(i)t |θ(i)t−1)p(yt |θ(i)t )
q(θ(i)t |θ(i)1:t−1,y1:t)
copy (3.44)
= w(i)t−1
p(θ(i)t |θ(i)t−1)p(yt |θ(i)t )
p(θ(i)t |θ(i)t−1,yt)
(3.46)
= w(i)t−1 p(θ
(i)
t |θ(i)t−1)p(yt |θ(i)t ,θ(i)t−1)
p(yt |θ(i)t−1)
p(yt |θ(i)t−1,θ(i)t )p(θ(i)t |θ(i)t−1)
(3.47)
∝ w(i)t−1 p(yt |θ(i)t−1) (3.48)
= w(i)t−1
∫
p(θt |θ(i)t−1)p(yt |θt)dθt (3.49)
We we substitute the definition of the optimal importance distribution in (3.46); and
apply Bayes rule to p(θt |θ(i)t−1,yt) in (3.47); cancel terms in (3.48), and substitute the
definition of predictive likelihood in equation (3.49) (as introduced in Section 3.2,
p. 33). The resulting predictive likelihood is the probability of the observation at time t
given the model state at time t−1. Computing this involves integrating over all possi-
ble parameter values at time t. In models with a discrete and finite state space this is
usually possible (the integral becomes a finite sum). We will use the optimal impor-
tance function in the particle filters developed in this thesis, which we can do efficiently
because we use a collapsed representation of the state space (see Rao Blackwellized
particle filtering, Section 3.3.3.4).
In sum, sequential importance sampling in particle filtering proceeds as follows (cf., Al-
gorithm 3 lines 1–8, and our illustration in Figure 3.2). We assume some initial set of
particles θ0. Then at each time t we first update our particle sample by drawing from
the recursive importance distribution (which is approximated through as sample as our
current set of available particles from time t − 1). Secondly, we update the particle
weights according to (3.44), and finally normalize the weights to sum to one.
Unfortunately, the method as described above tends to be ineffective: even under the
optimal importance distribution, the approximation of the target distribution quickly
decreases in quality due to the repeated approximations through a limited number of
samples from an importance distribution. Practically, a poor approximation manifests
in degenerate particle weights: after a few iterations, few or only one particle accu-
mulates the vast majority of particle weight. The set of weighted particles at time t
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Algorithm 2 The Particle Filtering Algorithm.
1: for particle i = {1, ...,N} do . Initialization
2: θ(i)0 ∼ q0(θ)
3: for time t = {1, ...T} do
4: for particle i = {1, ...,N} do . Sequential Importance Sampling
5: sample θ(i)t ∼ q(θ1:t |θ1:t−1,y1:t)
6: update samples θ(i)1:t ←{θ(i)1:t−1,θ(i)t }
7: update weights w˜(i)t ∝ w
(i)
t−1
p(θ(i)t |θ(i)t−1)p(yt |θ
(i)
t )
q(θ(i)t |θ(i)1:t−1,y1:t)
8: normalize weights w(i)t =
w˜(i)t
∑ j w˜
( j)
t
9: if ESS < threshold then . Resampling
10: draw with replacement θ˜1:t ∼
{
Multinomial(wt)
}N
k=1
11: new sample θ1:t ← θ˜1:t
12: re-set weights wt = 1N
in Figure 3.2 (center) illustrates degenerate particle weights. The posterior distribution
is then effectively approximated through a point estimate. We now discuss methods to
alleviate this problem.
3.3.3.3 Resampling
Resampling is an effective and widely used method for recovering from a degenerate
set of samples (Gordon et al., 1993; Doucet and Johansen, 2008). It can be straight-
forwardly integrated into sequential importance sampling, leading to the sequential
importance resampling (SIR) algorithm. All particle filters derived in this thesis use
SIR. Intuitively, whenever the weight variance exceeds a threshold (i.e., few particles
have accumulated too much weight), a subset of high-weight particles is probabilisti-
cally selected from the full set of particles, and only this set will be propagated further.
Given a set of N particles and their associated weights, a new set of particles is sampled
by drawing N times with replacement from a Multinomial distribution parameterized
by the particle weights. Any particle which is not sampled in this process ‘dies out’,
and will not be propagated further. After the resampling step, weights are set uniformly
to 1N , which is valid since the old weights are implicitly represented in the sample.
Resampling is displayed in lines 9–12 in Algorithm 2, and illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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It is common to define a threshold for acceptable variance among the particle weights,
and resample the set of particles whenever this threshold is crossed. A common choice
of threshold is the Effective Sample Size (ESS) which measures the number of particles
which effectively contribute to the sample, i.e., have non-negligible weight:
ESS =
1
∑i(w
(i)
t )
2
, (3.50)
where ESS decreases with increasing variance among the particle weights. Whenever
the ESS falls below a threshold, a resampling step is executed.
Resampling allows to replace low-weight particles with high-weight particles by re-
positioning the sample in high probability space under the posterior distribution. How-
ever, it introduces additional noise to the sampling process. After all, samples from the
posterior distribution might be pruned which seem poor at time t but may become more
fitting in the future after more data was observed. Furthermore, it leads to copies of
identical particles being propagated. While focusing the sampler on high-probability
areas under the target distribution, it does so at the cost of diversity in the sample.
Resampling can consequently result in an impoverished set of samples.
Rejuvenation Sample impoverishment can be minimized by keeping resampling
steps to a minimum, e.g., by choosing an appropriate threshold for the effective sample
size. In addition, impoverished samples can be improved by ‘disturbing’ each resam-
pled particle slightly, enhancing the diversity in the set of resampled particles. This
approach is called rejuvenation, and is part of widely used variants of particle filters
such as the resample-move algorithm (Gilks and Berzuini, 2001). Rejuvenation is il-
lustrated in the bottom part of Figure 3.2. Immediately after resampling, a limited
number of MCMC steps are executed individually within each resampled particle. The
MCMC sampler (e.g., a Gibbs sampler) is constructed such that its stationary distri-
bution corresponds to the target distribution of the particle filter. Consequently, after
rejuvenation the particles are still a valid sample from the target distribution. We use
rejuvenation as described above in the particle filters developed in this thesis.
3.3.3.4 Rao-Blackwellized Particle Filtering
Some models allow to analytically integrate over subsets of their parameters. We
discussed this marginalization in the context of Dirichlet-Multinomial models (Sec-
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tion 3.2.2.2), and the collapsed Gibbs sampler (Section 3.3.2.3). The same idea can
be used with particle filters, which results in Rao-Blackwellized particle filters. Rao-
Blackwellized particle filters sequentially estimate only the remaining model parame-
ters, which cannot be marginalized (Liu and Chen, 1998; Doucet et al., 2000a).
The Rao-Blackwellized particle filter is generally advantageous to use because it oper-
ates on a reduced state space which has been shown to lead to improved efficiency and
robustness (Liu and Chen, 1998; Doucet et al., 2000b). Rao-Blackwellized particle
filters have been employed for incremental clustering problems which are similar to
those discussed in this thesis (Sanborn et al., 2006; Canini et al., 2009).
We use Rao-Blackwellized particle filtering throughout this thesis. Intuitively, our par-
ticle filters will incrementally assign discrete latent labels (e.g., categories) to observa-
tions over time. The continuous parameters underlying the Multinomial distributions
in our models are collapsed, i.e., not estimated explicitly, but implicitly represented
through their sufficient statistics.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we reviewed the mathematical background underlying the models de-
veloped in this thesis. We began by motivating Bayesian modeling as a framework
for computational investigations of cognitive phenomena which formulates inductive
inference under uncertainty in a mathematically principled way. We also motivated
sampling-based approximate Bayesian inference as a flexible and general method to
explore the processes and limitations underlying human cognition. The second part of
the chapter formally introduced Bayesian statistical modeling, discussed prior distri-
butions and likelihood functions relevant to the models of this thesis, and demonstrated
their characteristics and limitations. The final part introduced the Monte Carlo method
in the context of approximating the posterior distribution of hierarchical Bayesian
models. Two concrete instantiations were introduced: a Gibbs sampler, which uses
the Markov chain Monte Carlo technique and operates in a batch fashion, and a parti-
cle filter, which approximates the posterior distribution sequentially.
In the following chapters will introduce cognitively motivated models of category
learning and meaning development which make use of the theoretical framework out-
lined in this chapter.
Chapter 4
Incremental Bayesian Category
Learning
The task of categorization, in which people cluster stimuli into categories and then use
those categories to make inferences about novel stimuli, has long been a core problem
within cognitive science. Understanding the mechanisms involved in categorization,
particularly in category acquisition, is essential, as the ability to generalize from ex-
perience underlies a variety of common mental tasks, including perception, learning,
and the use of language. As a result, category learning has been one of the most ex-
tensively studied aspects in human cognition, both from an empirical and modeling
perspective. In a typical experiment, participants are taught the category membership
of a set of training stimuli and then asked to generalize to a set of test stimuli. Com-
putational models are then evaluated on their ability to predict the resulting patterns of
generalization (Anderson, 1991).
Categorization is a classic example of inductive inference, i.e., extending knowledge
from known to novel instances. When learning about a new category of objects, hu-
mans need to infer the structure of the category from examples of its members. The
knowledge acquired through this process can ultimately be used to make decisions
about how to categorize new stimuli. Categorization presents a difficult inference
problem: the learner is faced with limited data (e.g., a few concept observations),
and has to evaluate several categorization hypotheses given this data without know-
ing exactly which category structure is correct. Furthermore, inference proceeds in-
crementally, learners encounter data and update their beliefs over time, making new
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generalizations when new information becomes available (Bornstein and Mash, 2010;
Diaz and Ross, 2006). To complicate matters, categorization is an example of a joint
inference problem. For instance, experimental evidence suggests that the development
of categories and their characteristic features emerge simultaneously in one process
(Goldstone et al., 2001; Schyns and Rodet, 1997). It is also well-known that children’s
word learning improves when they form some abstract knowledge about what kinds of
semantic properties are relevant to what kinds of categories (Jones et al., 1991; Col-
unga and Smith, 2005; Colunga and Sims, 2011). This abstract knowledge is argued
to emerge by generalizing over the learned words. So, words that have been learned
contribute to generalized abstract knowledge about word meanings and semantic cate-
gories, which then guide subsequent word learning.
In this chapter, we present a computational model which tackles the problem of learn-
ing categories and their characteristic features from natural language text. Our model
is presented with concepts such as {parrot, seagull, chocolate, sausage} and their local
context, and groups them into categories (BIRD and FOOD in this example) based on
their contextual similarity. Although concepts like parrot and seagull might rarely co-
occur together explicitly, they do occur in similar contexts (e.g., {croak,lay-eggs}1).
Analogously, the concepts chocolate and sausage might rarely be observed together in
text, however, they share contexts such as {eat,breakfast,healthy}. We thus ap-
proximate category-specific features with natural language context, and show that our
model learns meaningful categories as well as descriptive features for them.2 More
technically, our model of category acquisition is based on the key idea that learners
can adaptively form category representations that capture the structure expressed in
the observed data. We model category induction as two interrelated sub-problems:
(a) the acquisition of features that discriminate among categories, and (b) the grouping
of concepts into categories based on those features. Our model learns incrementally
as data is presented and updates its internal knowledge state locally without systemat-
ically revising everything known about the situation at hand.
We formulate our categorization model in a probabilistic Bayesian setting. Probabilis-
tic approaches provide a computational framework for modeling inductive problems,
1Throughout this thesis we will use small caps to denote CATEGORIES, italics to denote their mem-
bers, and typewriter fonts for their features.
2We use the terms concepts and categories to refer to basic level and SUPERORDINATE categories,
respectively. Our model in turn infers superordinate categories based on the features of their basic level
category members.
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by identifying ideal or optimal solutions to them and then using algorithms for ap-
proximating these solutions (cf., Section 3.1 for an extended discussion of Bayesian
cognitive modeling). Several probabilistic category learning models have been pro-
posed in the literature (Anderson, 1991; Ashby and Alfonso-Reese, 1995; Griffiths
et al., 2008; Sanborn et al., 2010; Canini, 2011), essentially viewing category learning
as a problem of density estimation: determining the probability distributions associ-
ated with different category labels. Our model learns categories using a particle filter
(Doucet et al., 2001), a sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) inference mechanism which
allows to update a probability distribution over time, while sequentially integrating
newly observed data. Section 3.3.3 contains a technical introduction to particle filters.
Monte Carlo algorithms offer a plausible proxy for modeling human learning and have
been previously used (Börschinger and Johnson, 2011, 2012; Levy et al., 2009; San-
born et al., 2010; Griffiths et al., 2008) to explain how humans might be performing
probabilistic inference, essentially reducing probabilistic computations to generating
samples from a probability distribution.
Historically, the stimuli involved in categorization studies (either laboratory experi-
ments or computational simulations) tend to have a small number of manually speci-
fied features, and are either concrete objects (such as physical objects, Bornstein and
Mash 2010) or highly abstract ones (such as binary strings, colored shapes, Medin and
Schaffer 1978; Kruschke 1993; Lee and Navarro 2002). Most existing models focus on
adult categorization, in which it is assumed that learners have developed categorization
mechanisms and a large number of categories have already been learnt. Those models
are typically evaluated against behavioral data elicited in laboratory experiments from
adult participants who are assumed to have acquired and are able to make use of rich
prior world knowledge. A notable exception is Anderson’s (1991) rational model of
categorization (see also Griffiths et al. 2007a) where the learner starts without any pre-
defined categories and stimuli are clustered into groups as they are encountered. Our
model is based on the same assumption (i.e., it learns categories directly from data),
but instead uses natural language stimuli (i.e., words).
The idea of modeling categories using words as a stand-in for their referents has been
previously used to explore categorization-related phenomena such as semantic priming
(Cree et al., 1999) and typicality rating (Voorspoels et al., 2008), to evaluate prototype
and exemplar models (Storms et al., 2000), and to simulate early language category ac-
quisition (Fountain and Lapata, 2011). The idea of using naturalistic corpora as a proxy
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for people’s representation of semantic concepts has received little attention. Instead,
featural representations, called feature norms, have played a central role in psycholog-
ical theories of semantic cognition and knowledge organization and many studies have
been conducted to elicit detailed knowledge of features (Smith et al., 1974; McRae
et al., 2005; Vinson and Vigliocco, 2008; Rogers and McClelland, 2004). In a typi-
cal procedure, participants are presented with a word and asked to generate the most
relevant features or attributes for its referent concept (e.g., McRae et al. 2005). Our
approach replaces feature norms with representations derived from words’ contexts in
corpora. We assume that words whose referents exhibit differing features are likely
to occur in correspondingly different contexts and that these differences in usage can
provide a substitute for featural representations.
While this is an impoverished view of how categories are acquired – it is clear that
they are learnt through exposure to the linguistic environment and the physical world
– perceptual information relevant for extracting semantic categories is to a large extent
redundantly encoded in linguistic experience (Riordan and Jones, 2011). Besides, there
are known difficulties with feature norms such as the small number of words for which
these can be obtained, the quality of the attributes, and variability in the way people
generate them (see Zeigenfuse and Lee 2010 for details). Focusing on natural language
categorization allows us to build models with theoretically unlimited scope. Moreover,
the corpus-based approach is attractive for modeling the development of linguistic
categories. If simple distributional information really does form the basis of a word’s
cognitive representation (Harris, 1954; Redington and Chater, 1997; Braine, 1987), this
implies that learners are sensitive to the structure of the linguistic environment during
language development. As experience with a word accumulates, more information
about its contexts of use is encoded, with a corresponding increase in the ability of the
language learner to use the word appropriately and make inferences about novel words
of the same category.
In the remainder of this chapter, we review previous research on categorization plac-
ing emphasis on natural language categories and Bayesian models. Next, we present
our categorization model and its incremental learning mechanism, and describe sev-
eral experiments assessing its performance when applied to a large corpus as well as
to a smaller corpus of child-directed speech. Experimental results show that our incre-
mental learner obtains meaningful categories which yield a closer fit to behavioral data
compared to related models whilst at the same time acquiring features which character-
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ize the learnt categories. In all cases, we evaluate the induced categories by comparing
model output against a gold standard set of categories and concepts created by humans.
4.1 Category Learning from Natural Language
Numerous theories as to how humans categorize objects have been proposed and exten-
sively tested, and here we highlight those relevant to our modeling approach. Prototype
theory (Rosch, 1973) represents categories through an idealized prototypical member
possessing the features which are critical to the category. Membership in the cate-
gory is determined by comparing the observed features of a possible member against
those of the prototype. For example, the characteristic features of FRUIT might include
contains seeds, grows above ground, and is edible.
Prototype theory has been challenged by the exemplar approach (Medin and Schaffer,
1978). In this view, categories are defined not by a single representation but rather
by a list of previously encountered members. An exemplar model simply stores those
instances of fruit to which it has been exposed (e.g., apples, oranges, pears). A new
object is grouped into the category if it is sufficiently similar to one or more of the
FRUIT instances stored in memory. Practically, exemplar models and prototype models
can account for the same range of phenomena. Our Bayesian model of categorization
resembles an exemplar model: information from all encountered concept observations
is stored and contributes to the representation of their particular category.
The knowledge approach to categories takes a somewhat different standpoint assert-
ing that categories are formed on the basis of people’s general knowledge about the
world. This view is perhaps best illustrated by what Barsalou (1985) calls goal-derived
categories, i.e., categories that are designed based on how their members fill some
externally-determined role. For example, the category of BREAKFAST FOODS, con-
sisting of concepts like bacon, eggs, or grits is quite clearly a category people can and
do form, and about which they can make meaningful judgments, yet there is very lit-
tle similarity between members, making it difficult to account for using an exemplar
model or a prototype model. Our own model learns from large corpora which can be
viewed as a rich source of world knowledge. It makes use of the knowledge encoded
in a a word’s context to form abstractions that are qualitatively different from those
that can be encapsulated by either exemplars or prototypes. We show in our experi-
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ments that the kinds of categories and features our model induces are representative of
background knowledge.
Models and Modalities of Language Acquisition In this work we formulate a cat-
egorization model which learns from exposure to the distributional properties of the
linguistic environment. However, it is clear that when children learn language, they
are not only exposed to linguistic input but also to various types of perceptual input,
including visual context, prosody, gaze and body movement. Additionally, learning is
cross-situational – children learn words or concepts through repeated co-occurrence of
clues from different modalities in the environment (such as objects and their linguis-
tic labels) – which implies that learners combine information from both linguistic and
nonlinguistic context. Here, we briefly overview the ways in which various modalities
have been incorporated in computational models of language acquisition, and position
our own model in the context of this work. A more thorough discussion of this line of
prior work is presented in Chapter 2.
A variety of models on cross-modal word learning have been proposed. Word learning
is the process of creating a “mental lexicon” from linguistic input, identifying words
and their referents, and as such is a form of categorization. These models range from
combining raw speech with visual input (Roy and Pentland, 2002), or concrete objects
with words (Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007), to eliciting cross-situational co-occurrence
patterns of linguistic input and objects in speakers’ attention (Frank et al., 2009).
Acquisition of visual categories is an important and notoriously hard problem in the
area of computer vision, where large-scale systems require thousands of training ex-
amples with sophisticated features in order to be able to recognize classes of objects in
images. This stands in sharp contrast to humans who quickly and robustly recognize
objects regardless of scale or perspective. Fei-Fei et al. (2003) propose a Bayesian
model for category learning from purely visual image data incorporating prior knowl-
edge in the model and show that information based on previously acquired categories
boosts learning of new categories.
Another line of work investigates the joint process of word learning and object cate-
gorization showing that linguistic cues facilitate object recognition and vice versa (see
also Lupyan et al. 2007). Yu (2005) develops a joint model of lexical acquisition and
object categorization based on experimental evidence indicating that the two problems
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are interrelated. The model learns from linguistic and visual data (simplified as color,
shape and texture features). Specifically, subjects were asked to narrate a picture book
wearing a head-mounted camera to capture a first-person point of view while their
acoustic signals were being recorded (using a headset microphone). Similarly, Yu and
Ballard (2004) simulate joint word and object learning in adults based on descriptions
of nine objects paired with images from a head-mounted camera.
The models introduced above require complex and controlled multimodal input data,
which inherently limits their scope. While their aim is to support fundamental char-
acteristics of language acquisition it is unclear whether the models generalize to other
tasks or types of data. In this work we adopt a complementary approach. While we
consider a qualitatively coarser approximation of the learning environment, in the form
of linguistic corpora, this has the advantage of being able to test our models on a larger
scale. Below, we discuss our approach in more detail contrasting it to related work
focusing exclusively on categorization.
Natural Language Categorization Most experimental work on category modeling
and acquisition has revolved around laboratory experiments involving either real-world
objects (e.g., children’s toys; Starkey 1981), perceptual abstractions (e.g., photographs
of animals; Quinn and Eimas 1996), or abstract, artificial stimuli (e.g., dot patterns
or geometric shapes; Posner and Keele 1968 and Bomba and Siqueland 1983, respec-
tively). In most cases researchers using abstract or artificial stimuli to explore human
categorization would not assert that participants possess a distinct mechanism for dis-
tinguishing between categories of (for example) binary strings, but rather that the task
invokes a single, global mechanism for learning and applying categories. Our own
approach is no different, in that we treat word meaning as a proxy for conceptual
structure (Murphy, 2002) and do not suggest that (semantic) categories of words differ
significantly from the categories involving their real-world referents. We refer to this
task, of organizing words into categories based on their semantics, as natural language
categorization. While the idea of modeling categories using words as a stand-in for
their referents is of course not a new one, explicitly viewing categorization as the task
of organizing words into categories based on meaning allows us to make use of pow-
erful ideas from artificial intelligence and computational linguistics. Previous work
that could be described as natural language categorization has a recurring theme: the
use of feature norms to construct semantic representations for word meaning. Feature
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norms are traditionally collected through norming studies, in which participants are
presented with a word and asked to generate a number of relevant features for its ref-
erent concept (The most notable of these is probably the multi-year project of McRae
et al. (2005), which collected and analyzed features for a set of 541 common English
nouns). The results of such studies can be interesting in their own right, as the fre-
quency and distribution of generated features can provide considerable insight into the
nature of participants’ categories — but they can also provide material for evaluating
prototype and exemplar models.
Existing research into natural language categorization has used such featural represen-
tations to explore a wide range of categorization-related phenomena. Heit and Barsa-
lou (1996) demonstrated their instantiation principle within the context of natural lan-
guage concepts, Storms et al. (2000) contrasted exemplar and prototype models using
a task-based evaluation, Cree et al. (1999) used feature-based representations to model
semantic priming, and Voorspoels et al. (2008) model typicality ratings for natural lan-
guage concepts. In all of these models words are used as a proxy for real-world stimuli,
and feature norms as a proxy for people’s perceptual experiences of those stimuli. Our
approach is to replace feature norms with representations derived from words’ con-
text in corpora, i.e., to use distributional semantics to approximate people’s perceptual
representations of real-world stimuli. While this approach represents only a partial
view of how people acquire and use categories, experimental comparisons of feature-
based and corpus-based categorization models indicate that the latter represent a viable
alternative to the feature norms typically used (Fountain and Lapata, 2010).
Our work is closest to Fountain and Lapata (2011) who also develop a corpus-based
model of natural language categories drawing inspiration from semantic networks
(Collins and Loftus, 1975). In this framework, each node is a word, representing a
concept (like BIRD). With each node is stored a set of properties (like can fly or
has wings) as well as links to other nodes (like CHICKEN). A node is directly linked
to those nodes of which it is either a subclass or superclass (i.e., BIRD would be con-
nected to both CHICKEN and ANIMAL). High-level nodes representing large categories
are connected (directly or indirectly) to many instances of those categories, whereas
nodes representing specific instances are at a lower level, connected only to their su-
perclasses. A word’s meaning is expressed by the number and type of connections it
has to other words. Semantic networks constitute a somewhat idealized representation
that abstracts away from real word usage. The model on its own does not specify how
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the representations are learned and the latter are traditionally hand-coded by model-
ers who have to a priori decide which relationships are most relevant in representing
meaning.
The model presented in Fountain and Lapata (2011) is distributional, i.e., it represents
the meaning of words by their patterns of co-occurrence with other words. They also
organize concepts in a semantic network that is not, however, structured hierarchi-
cally. They consider a simpler formulation of semantic networks in which a network
is composed of a graph with edges between word nodes. Such a graph is unipartite:
there is only one type of node, and those nodes can be interconnected freely. Edges
between nodes do not represent subsumption but similarity or relatedness and can be
easily quantified in a distributional framework (words that are similar in meaning will
tend to behave similarly in terms of their distributions across different contexts). Their
model is an incremental version of Chinese Whispers (Biemann, 2006), a randomized
graph-clustering algorithm. The latter takes as input a graph which is constructed from
corpus-based co-occurrence statistics and produces a hard clustering over the nodes in
the graph. Their model treats the tasks of inferring a semantic representation for con-
cepts and their class membership as two separate processes. This allows to experiment
with different ways of initializing the co-occurrence matrix (e.g., from bags of words
or a dependency parsed corpus), however at the expense of cognitive plausibility. It is
unlikely that humans have two entirely separate mechanisms for learning the meaning
of words and their categories. We formulate a more expressive model which captures
word categories and their predictive features in one, unified process.
Bayesian Models Incremental Bayesian category learning was pioneered by An-
derson (1991) who developed a non-parametric model able to induce categories from
abstract stimuli represented by binary features. According to this model, category
learning amounts to Bayesian density estimation, where the number of clusters to be
used in representing a set of objects is selected automatically. Sanborn et al. (2006)
and Sanborn et al. (2010) present a fully Bayesian adaptation of Anderson’s original
model, which yields a better fit with behavioral data. Specifically, borrowing ideas
from nonparametric Bayesian statistics, they propose two algorithms for approximate
inference in this model: Gibbs sampling (a “batch” procedure where density estima-
tion assumes that all data are available at the time of inference) and particle filtering
(where density estimation proceeds incrementally over time, as stimuli become avail-
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able). A separate line of work examines the processes of generalizing and generating
new categories and concepts (Jern and Kemp, 2013; Kemp et al., 2012) which are again
modeled as samples from probability distributions.
In this work, we also present a probabilistic Bayesian model of categorization which is
conceptually similar to Sanborn et al. (2010). However, our model was developed with
(early) language acquisition in mind. They focus on adult categorization and use rather
simplistic categories representing toy-domains. It is therefore not clear whether their
approach generalizes to arbitrary stimuli and data sizes. Moreover, they are primar-
ily interested in how to approximate the intractable ideal solution to the partitioning
problem. Our work differs in two respects: firstly, we are interested in large-scale cat-
egorization. We investigate the question whether it is possible to learn categories from
a large number of observations of concepts covering a wide variety of categories, thus
approaching the scale of the problem that a child is faced with. Secondly, we are in-
terested in learning the representations for real-world, semantic categories of concrete,
observable objects (for example, that a dog is an ANIMAL or that a chair is FURNI-
TURE).
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA; Blei et al. (2003)) is a popular Bayesian model for
discovering latent topics in text. LDA assumes that a document is generated from an
individual mixture over topics, and each topic is characterized by a distribution over
words. LDA learns topics from longer documents whereas we argue that a limited
local context is appropriate for category induction since a target concept’s features
are best represented through its immediately surrounding words. Fountain and Lapata
(2011) further show that LDA cannot be applied effectively to shorter contexts ap-
propriate for category acquisition. From a cognitive point of view, focusing on local
contexts of target concepts approximates limitations of attention and memory faced
by young learners. Finally, it is unclear how to naturally define longer contexts when
the input given to the model consists of streams of child-directed speech. Our model
infers a grouping of words into semantic categories based on the assumption that lo-
cal linguistic context can provide important cues for word meaning and by extension
category membership. In this sense, it is loosely related to Bayesian models of word
sense induction (Brody and Lapata, 2009; Yao and Durme, 2011) which also make use
of short local contexts. However, the above models focus on performance optimiza-
tion and learn in an ideal batch mode, while incorporating various kinds of additional
features such as part of speech tags or syntactic dependencies. In contrast, we develop
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a cognitively plausible (early) language learning model and show that categories can
be acquired purely from linguistic context, as well as in an incremental fashion.
From a modeling perspective, we learn categories using a particle filtering algorithm
(Doucet et al., 2001). As explained in Section 3.3.3, Particle filters are a family of
sequential Monte Carlo algorithms which update the state space of a probabilistic
model with newly encountered information. Particle filters have been previously used
to explain behavioral patterns in several tasks such as associative learning (Daw and
Courville, 2007), change-point detection (Brown and Steyvers, 2009), word segmenta-
tion (Börschinger and Johnson, 2011), and sentence processing (Levy et al., 2009). As
mentioned earlier, Sanborn et al. (2006) also use particle filters for small-scale catego-
rization experiments with artificial stimuli. To the best of our knowledge, we present
the first particle filtering algorithm for large-scale category acquisition from natural
language text.
4.2 Bayesian Natural Language Categorization
We begin by formalizing the general problem of Bayesian categorization and then de-
rive our model as an instance of this formulation. In this framework, the learner is faced
with a partitioning problem, i.e., to group observed concepts into categories based on
their features. We use the term stimuli to denote linguistic observations of concepts
and their features. A common assumption is that concepts with sufficiently similar
features will be assigned to the same category. During this learning process, categories
are not directly observed but are instead inferred from their observable features. Once
categories are established, the learnt category-specific features can be used to predict
the category of new concepts.
More formally, given a stimulus d, a Bayesian model of categorization predicts a la-
tent category zd based on the observable features xd of the stimulus, as well as the
information observed from previously encountered stimuli xd−1, and the latent cat-
egory assignment zd−1. Based on this information, we compute for stimulus d the
probability of being assigned category j:
P(zd = j|xd,zd−1,xd−1) = P(zd = j|zd−1)×P(xd|zd = j,xd−1,zd−1)
∑Jj′=1 P(zd = j′|zd−1)×P(xd|zd = j′,xd−1,zd−1)
. (4.1)
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The Bayesian formulation of this problem computes the posterior probability of the
category assignment P(zd = j) based on two factors. The first term of the numerator
in equation (4.1) is the prior probability of selecting category j based on the category
assignments of the previously assigned concept observations. A common choice for
this prior is a ‘rich-get-richer’ scheme: categories which have been chosen frequently
in the past, are more likely to be selected again. The second term of the numerator
in equation (4.1) is the likelihood term, which considers xd , the observed features of
stimulus d, and computes the probability that they were generated from category j.
By assigning each stimulus to exactly one category, the learning process discovers a
partition of stimuli into categories consistent with the observable data. In order to find
the optimal partitioning, it would be necessary to iterate over all possible partitionings
of the data, which is intractable for any data set of non-trivial size. Several approxi-
mation algorithms for this problem have been proposed, one of which, namely particle
filtering, we will describe later in this section.
The model presented above is very general and as such can be applied to many different
types of stimuli and features. For example, Sanborn et al. (2010) (following Medin and
Schaffer 1978) use a small number of artificial stimuli, each with four binary features
(e.g., 1111, 0101, 1010). In another experiment, they use 12 stimuli with continuous
features, varying in brightness and saturation. Other work focusing on natural language
categorization has assumed that abstract cognitive representations of concepts can be
represented as sets of features obtained from norming studies. Table 4.1 (top) provides
examples of concepts and their elicited features.
In our work we learn the semantic representations of concepts from large-scale lin-
guistic corpora without relying on explicit human judgment. In this framework, infor-
mation about the meaning of words can be derived by analyzing the co-occurrences
between words and the contexts in which they occur. Many cognitive models of word
meaning (Landauer and Dumais, 1997; Griffiths et al., 2007b; Lund and Burgess, 1996)
subscribe to this distributional hypothesis which states that a word’s meaning is pre-
dictable from its context (Harris, 1954). By extension, we further assume that a word’s
context is predictive of its category and that category features can be derived from
the linguistic context. Our model (incrementally) learns semantic categories based on
the linguistic features of their context, and can be tested on a large scale. Table 4.1
(bottom) shows examples of the linguistic features we consider for different concepts.
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strawberry grape apple snail dog cat
has_a_taste X X X
contains_seeds X X X
is_edible X X X
can_be_a_pet X X X
is_alive X X X X X X
Fe
at
ur
e
N
or
m
s
eats X X X
strawberry grape apple snail dog cat
ripe X X X
hungry X X X X X X
lemon X X X
owner X X X
bark X
C
on
te
xt
Fe
at
ur
es
shepherd X X
Table 4.1: Concepts and their features for the categories FRUIT and ANIMAL. Features
are shown as feature norms (top) and as context words (bottom).
4.3 A Bayesian Model of Large-scale Incremental Cate-
gory Learning
In this section we present our Bayesian model for large-scale semantic category acqui-
sition from natural language text (BayesCat for short). For now we focus on the com-
putational level (Marr, 1982) of the problem definition of categorization, and present
a model with which we can (in principle) learn semantic categories. In the following
section we turn to the algorithmic dimension of the problem, and introduce two learn-
ing algorithms for our model: a batch algorithm, which learns by repeated iterations
over the entire training data set (Section 4.3.1); and a more cognitively plausible incre-
mental inference algorithm which accumulates information in real time, as stimuli are
observed (Section 4.3.2).
Intuition The input BayesCat receives is natural language text, and its final output
is a set of categories (aka clusters) as discovered from the input stimuli. We use the
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linguistic context of observed concepts as a proxy for their characteristic features, and
assume that concepts with sufficiently similar features are assigned to the same cate-
gory. The model is exposed to linguistic stimuli, each consisting of a target concept t
and a set of context words c from a symmetric window of length n:
[c−n ... c−1 t c1 ... cn]. (4.2)
Each induced category will be characterized by a set of concepts which are members
of the category, as well as a set of category-specific features. We assume a global
distribution over categories θ, from which all stimuli are generated. Each category k
has two associated multinomial distributions over words: (1) a distribution over con-
cepts (i.e., target words) φk and (2) an independently parametrized distribution over
context words ψk. The separation of concepts from context words allows us to learn
features together with category members. We furthermore argue that, while members
of the same category tend to appear in the same contexts, they do not necessarily co-
occur. For example, the concepts parrot and seagull are both members of the category
BIRD, but are rarely mentioned together, however, they frequently occur with the same
features, e.g., they both fly, croak, lay eggs, and so on.
Model Description A graphical overview of the BayesCat model in form of a plate
diagram is shown in Figure 4.1b. Figure 4.1a displays the generative process of the
BayesCat model which proceeds as follows.3 First, we draw parameters θ for a global
distribution over categories from a Dirichlet distribution with parameter α. Then, for
each category k, we draw (1) parameters φk for a category-specific concept distribu-
tion (from a Dirichlet distribution with parameter β), as well as (2) parameters ψk
for a category-specific context word (or feature) distribution (from a separate Dirich-
let distribution parametrized by γ). Using these global parameters, we can generate
stimuli d. First, draw a category zd ∼ Mult(θ). Then, draw a target word from the
category-specific concept distribution wdt ∼ Mult(φzd); and finally, independently for
each context position i, we draw a context word from the category-specific feature
distribution wd,ic ∼Mult(ψzd).
The full joint distribution over data and model parameters as defined by our model (see
the independence assumptions in the plate diagram in Figure 4.1b) can be factorized
3We refer to the Dirichlet distribution as Dir and to the Multinomial distribution as Mult.
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(a) Generative story of BayesCat.
Draw distribution over categories θ∼ Dir(α)
for category k do
Draw target word distribution φk ∼ Dir(β)
Draw context word distribution ψk ∼ Dir(γ)
for stimulus d do
Draw category zd ∼Mult(θ)
Draw target word wdt ∼Mult(φzd)
for context position i = {1...I} do
Draw context word wd,ic ∼Mult(ψzd)
(b) Plate diagram of BayesCat.
wt
wc
zθ φ
ψ
α β
γ
i
d
k
k
Figure 4.1: Top (a): The generative story of the BayesCat model. Observations (wt
and wc) and latent labels (z) are drawn from Multinomial distributions (Mult). Parame-
ters for the multinomial distributions are drawn from Dirichlet distributions (Dir). Bottom
(b): The plate diagram representation of the BayesCat model. Observed variables
(target concepts and context words) are shown as shaded nodes, white solid nodes
represent the latent variables to be estimated, and fixed hyper-parameters are shown
as white dashed nodes. Plates indicate repetition of the variables they contain with the
subscript indicating the number of repetitions (e.g., the model contains an individual
distribution over concepts φ for each category k).
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as:
P(y,z,θ,φ,ψ;α,β,γ) =
P(θ|α)×
K
∏
k=1
P(φk|β)P(ψk|γ)×
D
∏
d=1
P(zd|θ)P(wdt |φzd)
I
∏
i=1
P(wd,ic |ψzd),
(4.3)
where y refers to all observed data, z refers to the hidden category labels, and k,d
and i are indices ranging over categories, stimuli, and context positions, respectively.
The parametrization of our model allows us to further simplify the joint distribution.
Due to the conjugacy of the Dirichlet and Multinomial distribution, we can analyti-
cally integrate over all possible values of the model’s parameter distributions θ,φ and
ψ (see Section 3.2.2 for the technical details). Dirichlet-Multinomial distributions en-
code a “rich-get-richer” scheme: if a category has been frequently assigned to previ-
ously encountered stimuli, it is more likely that it will be observed again. Intuitively,
this triggers learning of multinomial parameters which distribute most of their mass
over few words, i.e., inferring a targeted vocabulary for each individual category. The
simplified posterior distribution is:
P(y,z,θ,φ,ψ;α,β,γ) ∝
∏kΓ(nk +αk)
Γ(∑k nk +αk)
×
K
∏
k=1
∏rΓ(nkr +βr)
Γ(∑r nkr +βr)
×
K
∏
k=1
∏sΓ(nks + γs)
Γ(∑s nks + γs)
,
(4.4)
where r ranges over target concepts, s ranges over context words (or features), and Γ(·)
is the Gamma function. Note that the model parameter distributions do not appear on
the right-hand side of equation (4.4). Instead, the model is represented purely through
occurrence counts of categories nk as well as co-occurrence counts of categories with
observed concepts and features, nkr and n
k
s , respectively. For the interested reader, we
derive this result, in Appendix A.
Having motivated and derived a cognitive model for inferring semantic categories from
natural text, we now turn to the problem of how these categories are actually learnt
(Marr’s (1982) algorithmic level of analysis) and introducing two learning mecha-
nism. Equation (4.3) defines a probability distribution over all possible partitionings
of the concept observations into categories. Exact computation of this density is both
computationally intractable an cognitively implausible. It is unrealistic to assume that
human learners perform optimal inference (Sanborn et al., 2010). Memory limitations
prevent them from enumerating extraordinarily high numbers of hypotheses. Addi-
tionally, they make mistakes during learning, and often revisit past decisions in the
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light of new information. Intuitively, the BayesCat model must approximate the target
posterior density over all possible partitionings of the concept observations.
We now derive two sampling-based approximate learning algorithms for the BayesCat
model, a batch learner (Gibbs sampler; Section 4.3.1), and a cognitively more plausible
incremental learner (particle filter; Section 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Batch Learning
We derive a Gibbs sampler for learning the parameters of the BayesCat model in a
batch fashion. Gibbs sampling (Geman and Geman, 1984) is a Markov chain Monte
Carlo technique for approximating complex joint probability distributions (see Sec-
tion 3.3.2 for a technical introduction). It operates in batch-mode by repeatedly iterat-
ing through all data points (linguistic stimuli in our case) and assigning the currently
sampled document d a category zd conditioned on the current labelings of all other
documents z−d:
zd ∼ P(zd|z−d,W−d;α,β,γ), (4.5)
using equation (4.4) but ignoring information from the currently sampled document in
all co-occurrence counts.
The Gibbs sampler can be seen as an ideal learner, which can access and revise any
relevant information at any time during learning. From a cognitive perspective, this
setting is implausible. Humans do not learn in a “batch” fashion, repeatedly and sys-
tematically revisiting all information available. Instead, they update their beliefs or
knowledge state over time, drawing inferences every time new information arrives.
Category learning is no exception and indeed experimental evidence suggests that both
children and adults learn categories incrementally (Bornstein and Mash, 2010; Diaz
and Ross, 2006).
4.3.2 Incremental Learning
Particle filters are a class of incremental, or sequential, Monte Carlo methods which
can be used to model aspects of the human learning process more naturally. The parti-
cle filter approximates the target posterior density over all possible partitionings of the
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concept observations through a set of samples in an incremental fashion. Each sam-
ple will correspond to one possible categorization of the observed concepts, and each
sample will be individually and incrementally updated with information from newly
observed stimuli. As is the case in human categorization, the computation time of
the updates must stay fixed irrespectively of the number of previously observed con-
cepts. We achieve this by committing to past categorization decisions made by the
learning algorithm, and thus integrate a new concept observations given the category
assignments of all previously encountered concepts (however, we will relax the strict
incrementality assumption in the following section).
In the following section we formally describe our learning algorithm, and illustrate
it schematically using the example in Figure 4.2a. The full incremental algorithm is
displayed in Algorithm 3. A technical introduction to the principles underlying particle
filtering can be found in Section 3.3.3 of this thesis.
4.3.2.1 A Particle Filter for the BayesCat Model
Incremental inference algorithms are designed to update estimates of the target dis-
tribution with new data becoming available over time. Incremental Monte Carlo al-
gorithms in particular propagate a set of N hypotheses, or samples (called particles)
through time and update them with new information. We introduce time into our learn-
ing process by treating the observation of each stimulus as one time point. In the ex-
ample in Figure 4.2a, we show the learning update at time point 4, i.e., after the model
has observed stimuli 1–4. The algorithm performs one iteration over the complete set
of input stimuli. Our algorithm is based on sequential importance sampling (SIS; Gor-
don et al. 1993), where the true target distribution is approximated through a simpler
importance distribution, and the discrepancy between the distributions is counterbal-
anced through a weight (called importance weight) which is assigned to each sample.
A technical introduction to particle filtering and sequential importance sampling can
be found in Section 3.3.3.
During learning, we incrementally approximate the target density, i.e., the probability
distribution over all possible categorizations of all concept observations p(z1:T |y1:T )
through a cascade of local importance distributions p(z1:t |y1:t). At each time t, p is
the distribution over clusterings z1:t of observed concepts y1:t , represented through the
current set of particles. In order to compute the exact posterior distribution, the cat-
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Figure 4.2: (a) Visualization of the particle filtering procedure in the BayesCat model
using an example of a 3-particle filter. Each particle corresponds to a clustering of
the observed stimuli up to time t (left), and the collection of weighted particles serves
as the current approximation of the posterior distribution over clusterings (right). The
5 concepts observed by the filter are shown in the tables. We show one update step for
all particles with stimulus 5, and one subsequent resampling and rejuvenation step. In
the resampling step the highest-weight (red) particle is duplicated, replacing the lowest-
weight (green) particle. In the rejuvenation step each particle revisits one previous
categorization decision in light of all available evidence (e.g., the blue particle removes
apple (from stimulus 1) from the {bird, dog} cluster); (b) a zoom into the blue particle
at time t=4 (left) and time t=5 after rejuvenation (right). Each particle consists of a
distribution over categories, and category-specific distributions over target types and
over context types.
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Algorithm 3 The particle filter for the BayesCat model.
1: Initialize particles by randomly partitioning first d stimuli . Initialization
2: Initialize weights wd = 1N
3: for stimulus t = [d+1 . . .T ] do
4: for particle n = [1 . . .N] do
5: . Particle Updateztn ∼ q(z1:t−1n |y1:t−1)q(ztn|zt−1n ,yt)
= p(zt = i|z−t ,W−d;α,β,γ) Equation (4.5)
Stn←(St−1n ,ztn)
6: . Weight Updatew˜tn = w
t−1
n ×P(yt |zt−1)
= wt−1n ×∑
i
p(zt = i|z−t ,W−d;α,β,γ)
7: wt ← normalize(w˜t)
8: if ESS(wt)≤ thresh then . Resampling
9: P (i)←{Mult(wt)}Ni=1
10: wt = 1N
11: for particle n ∈ P (i) do . Rejuvenation
12: for rejuvenation point o = [1 . . .O] do
do ∼ uni f orm(1 . . . t)
zd
o
n ∼ P(zd
o
n |ztn\−do,yt) Equation (4.5)
egorization of observations y1:t−1 would need to be re-computed for each time step
considering all observed evidence. The exact posterior distribution is, however, not
incremental, because the computation time of the re-estimation of the density over all
previous category assignments is not constant in the number of observed concepts. It is
not tractable to sample from the local target distribution, and not cognitively plausible
either since it assumes re-organization of semantic knowledge with every new obser-
vation. Figure 4.2a displays the estimation of the posterior density through weighted
particles (indicated by the size of the circles) on the right-hand side; the current state
of the corresponding particles is shown on the left-hand side.
Following the importance sampling framework, we choose a proposal distribution q(·)
with which we can approximate the local target distribution more efficiently, and which
has a constant computation time with respect to the number of observed concepts. In
particular, we assume that once a concept has been assigned a category, this category
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is fixed:
q(z1:t |y1:t) = q(z1|y1)
t
∏
k=2
q(zk|z1:k−1,y1:k)
= q(z1:t−1|y1:t−1)q(zt |z1:t−1,y1:t)
= q(z1:t−1|y1:t−1)q(zt |zt−1,yt),
(4.6)
Importantly, this distribution depends only on the label assignments in the previous
time step zt−1 since all previous category assignments are fixed and encoded in this
state. This process corresponds to lines 5–6 in Algorithm 3. In the final line of equa-
tion 4.6, the first term corresponds to the distribution over clusterings of the first t−1
observations, as represented by the current set of particles (i.e., the result of the pre-
vious iteration). The second term denotes the probability distribution over categories
for the current input yt , i.e., over all different ways in which the concept can be in-
tegrated into the current samples. We compute this distribution individually for each
particle, sample its category from this distribution, and update the particle state with
the new information. Figure 4.2a illustrates how each particle is updated individually
after observing input stimulus 5.
The remaining question is the definition of the distribution over categories for the new
observation. Importance sampling affords flexibility in selecting the proposal distribu-
tion qt(zt |zt−1,yt). We sample category zt for the current concept observation yt from
its posterior distribution over categories:
qt(zt |zt−1,yt) = p(zt |z1:t−1)p(yt |zt), (4.7)
taking into account prior information about category probability and the features of
the observed concept. We finally weigh each sample n by its importance weight wn
which can be shown to correspond to the predictive likelihood of the current stimu-
lus yt , and the weights are normalized to sum to one (see lines 7–8 in Algorithm 3). A
more detailed explanation of particle filtering can be found in the technical background
Section 3.3.3.
Resampling By repeatedly sampling from local approximations to the target den-
sity, inaccuracies will inevitably accumulate. This phenomenon, called degeneracy,
is a common problem with particle filters, and manifests in highly varying particle
weights. For our model this means that many particles, or sampled categorizations,
will not be representative of the categories present in the data. Ideally, however, a
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learner should focus on “good” hypotheses in order to use its capacities effectively. The
“goodness” of a sample is indicated by its importance weight. A common approach
to counteract accumulating errors, called resampling, is to replace low-weight parti-
cles with copies of high-weight particles based on some pre-determined schedule (see
Section 3.3.3.3 for more information.). This way, memory resources can be allocated
on high-probability particles, individual copies of which can be further propagated.
We incorporate a threshold-based resampling scheme, using the effective sample size
(ESS):
ESS(wt) =
(
1
∑n(wtn)2
)
, (4.8)
which is inversely correlated with the variance of the current set of particle weights.
A resampling step is executed whenever the ESS falls below a set threshold. This
threshold-based resampling provides a means of modeling memory limitations based
purely on the learner’s internal state. From a modeling perspective, this provides us
with a statistically sound learning procedure, which is defined purely with respect to
the current state of “confidence” of the learner, without the need to resort to external
cues or heuristics. Figure 4.2a shows one resampling step following the particle up-
dates. The red particle with the highest weight is duplicated and replaces the green
particle with the lowest weight (see the different-sized circles on the right-hand side).
Technically, resampling consists of drawing N times with replacement from a multi-
nomial distribution over particles parametrized by the current set of particle weights.
Weights are re-set to uniform after resampling (see lines 9–11 in Figure 3). The result-
ing set of particles is an empirical estimate of the current approximation, in that the
weights are now implicitly represented in the number of instantiations of the sampled
particles. We use systematic sampling (Cochran, 1977) to obtain a new set of particles
from the multinomial distribution, which has been shown to produce samples with less
variance than simple multinomial sampling (Hol et al., 2006).
Relaxing Strict Incrementality The learning algorithm presented above approxi-
mates the target distribution over categorizations of observed concepts in a strictly
incremental way. In other words, while it simulates human memory restrictions and
uncertainty by learning based on a limited number of current knowledge states, it never
reconsiders past categorization decisions. However, in many linguistic tasks, learn-
ers revisit past decisions (Frazier and Rayner, 1982) and intuitively we would expect
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categories to change based on novel evidence, especially in the early learning phase
(Colunga and Smith, 2005; Landau et al., 1998; Borovsky and Elman, 2006). Children
clearly revise and refine their early hypotheses of the world in light of new information.
We incorporate this intuition into our particle filter, by allowing it to reconsider past
decisions to some extent, while keeping the algorithm incremental and computation
time constant. We employ a technique called rejuvenation (Gilks and Berzuini, 2001).
Specifically, after the resampling step for each particle, we individually reconsider the
category assignment for a fixed number of previously observed concepts (see lines 13–
15 in Figure 3). Aside from being cognitively plausible, rejuvenation also brings a
theoretical advantage: it enhances the representativeness of the sample, by “jiggling”
the resampled particles and thus introduces diversity among descendants of the same
particle. Figure 4.2a illustrates rejuvenation for the bottom set of particles. Each parti-
cle revisits one previous categorization decision (e.g., the blue particle, places concept
observation 1 into a previously empty cluster). Note that the previously identical copies
of the red particle contain distinct clusterings after rejuvenation, such that the sample
space is explored more effectively. See Section 3.3.3.3 for more information.
4.4 Experiment 1: Large-Scale Category Learning
In the following we present a series of experiments assessing the performance of
BayesCat. Our experiments are designed to examine whether the model produces
meaningful categories but also to investigate the learning process itself and its char-
acteristics. In the first experiment (Section 4.4.1) we assess the quality of the semantic
categories induced by our model and compare it against an ideal batch learner and
Fountain and Lapata’s (2011) incremental graph-based model. We continue with two
experiments which explore category acquisition in children using a corpus of child-
directed speech (Sections 4.5.1–4.5.2). Finally, Section 4.5.3 presents a typicality rat-
ing experiment. All our experiments evaluate the categories produced by the models
against gold standard categories created by humans.
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4.4.1 Quality of Learnt Categories
Our first goal was to examine whether any meaningful categories emerge when our
incremental model is trained on a large corpus. We compare BayesCat against a re-
lated graph-based incremental learner, and a batch learning version of our own model.
All models are trained on the British National Corpus (BNC), a 100 million word
collection of samples of written and spoken British English.4 Each model’s result-
ing clustering is compared against a human-produced gold standard. In the following,
we describe how this gold standard was created, discuss how model parameters were
estimated and explain how model output was evaluated.
Data Our model was evaluated based on its clustering of words into semantic cate-
gories and its output was compared against similar clusters elicited from human par-
ticipants. A gold standard set of categories was created by collating the resources
developed by Fountain and Lapata (2010) and Vinson and Vigliocco (2008). Both data
sets contain a classification of (concrete) nouns into (possibly multiple) semantic cat-
egories produced by human participants. Examples from the data set are provided in
Table 4.2. The former data set is an extension of McRae et al.’s (2005) feature norms
with category information. The original feature norms were collected through a major
effort spanning multiple years and involving more than 700 participants. Norms were
collected for a set of 541 target concepts consisting of living (e.g., cow) and non-living
(e.g., blender) things, each corresponding to a single English noun. Concepts were
selected so as to cover a broad range of generally familiar basic level concepts used in
previous studies on semantic memory.
Fountain and Lapata (2010) augmented McRae et al.’s (2005) concepts with category
labels (and typicality ratings). They collected this information using Amazon Me-
chanical Turk, an online labor marketplace which has been used in a wide variety of
elicitation studies and has been shown to be an inexpensive, fast, and (reasonably)
reliable source of non-expert annotation for simple tasks (Snow et al., 2008). Partic-
ipants were presented with 20 randomly selected concepts from the McRae data set,
and asked to write down the superordinate category they thought applied (rather than
select one from a list). Each concept was labeled by ten participants. Based on the set
of collected labels, the concepts were grouped into 41 categories (allowing for multi-
4The British National Corpus, version 3 (BNC XML Edition). 2007. Distributed by Oxford Univer-
sity Computing Services on behalf of the BNC Consortium. URL: http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/
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BUILDING
church, garage, skyscraper, tent, shack, wall, door, basement, house, pyramid, brick,
cathedral, chapel, hut, apartment, cabin, bungalow, stone, barn
VEHICLE
yacht, unicycle, boat, raft, bus, train, bike, trailer, submarine, sled, truck, rocket, jet,
van, subway, tractor, skateboard, trolley, helicopter, buggy, jeep, motorcycle, ship,
canoe, ambulance, sailboat, airplane, limousine, sleigh, taxi, car, scooter, tank.
WEAPON
cannon, gun, machete, rifle, bayonet, harpoon, bazooka, tomahawk, whip, catapult,
sword, revolver, knife, missile, bow, crowbar, shotgun, dagger, tank
Table 4.2: Example categories and their concepts taken from our gold standard.
category membership). The reliability of the annotations was assessed through label-
ing correlation between random splits of the data, and amounts to an average of 0.72
across all categories (ranging from 0.91 (FURNITURE) to 0.13 (STRUCTURE)). Given
the elicitation procedure described above, we assume that the feature norms represent
psychologically salient categories which the cognitive system is in principle capable
of acquiring.
In order to evaluate category acquisition models on a large scale, we further merged
McRae et al.’s (2005) data set with the concepts used in Vinson and Vigliocco (2008).
The latter data set covers concrete basic level objects, event-related objects, and verbs,
however in this work we only used the subset of 169 concrete objects. Category labels
for these objects are provided by the authors and largely overlap with those elicited
in Fountain and Lapata (2010). For this reason, we did not elicit additional category
labels empirically. After removing duplicates, we obtained 42 semantic categories
for 555 nouns. We split this gold standard into a development (70%; 41 categories,
492 nouns) and a test set (30%; 16 categories, 196 nouns).5 The size and nature of this
evaluation data set is in sharp contrast to those used in previous categorization studies
which consist of a small number of artificial concepts.
The input to all models comprises the same set of linguistic stimuli, each of which
5The data set is available from www.frermann.de/data.
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BNC CHILDES
Stimuli 1.37M 170K
Concepts (target word types) 555 312
Features (context word types) 6,584 2,756
Table 4.3: Number of stimuli, target concepts, and features retrieved from BNC and
CHILDES.
consists of one target word t, surrounded by a symmetric window of n context words
[c−n ... c−1 t c1 ... cn]. The target words are defined by the set of concepts included
in our gold standard. Some corpus statistics are given in Table 4.3 (column BNC).
The corpus was lemmatized and stopwords were removed. Infrequent context words
(occurring less than 800 times) were also eliminated, which leads to a reduction of
context word types from 306,746 to 6,584 (by close to 98%) 6. We used a window of
size n = 5 for stimuli extracted from the BNC.
Model Comparison We optimized the parameters of the incremental BayesCat model
on the development set. We obtained best results with the following parameters α =
0.7,β = 0.1,γ = 0.1. Our model is parametric in the sense that the form of the model
distributions are fixed to be K-multinomial. We set the maximum number of categories
our model can learn to K = 100. However, the number of categories present in the data
is much smaller, and the model reliably converges to using a subset of the 100 cate-
gories. For learning, we use a particle filter with N = 100 particles. We set the ESS
threshold to 0.5 ∗N = 50. After each resampling step we rejuvenate 100 randomly
chosen previous categorization decisions, independently in each resampled particle.
We compare our BayesCat model against Fountain and Lapata’s (2011) incremen-
tal model which adopts a graph-based approach to category learning. Concepts are
represented as vertices in a graph and categories are inferred by grouping together
distributionally similar vertices. The graph is partitioned into categories using an in-
cremental variant of Chinese Whispers (Biemann, 2006), a non-parametric clustering
algorithm (henceforth we refer to this model as CW). Their model implements cate-
gory learning in the following steps. First, a semantic space is learnt — concepts are
6This drastic reduction follows from the fact that word type frequency in natural language follows a
power law distribution, in particular Zipf’s law. This implies that relatively few word types occur with
high frequency and a large number of word types occur with low frequency.
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represented as high-dimensional vectors, where each component corresponds to some
co-occurring contextual element. Next, an undirected weighted graph G = (V,E,φ) is
constructed with vertices V , edges E, and edge weight function φ. Concepts are added
to the graph as vertices. Then, for each possible pair of vertices (vi,v j), their vector
similarity φ(vi,v j) is computed and if the weight exceeds a threshold, an undirected
edge e = (vi,v j) is added to the graph. Finally, the graph serves as input to CW which
produces a hard clustering over the graph vertices. The algorithm iteratively assigns
cluster labels to vertices by greedily choosing the most common label amongst the
neighbors of the vertex being updated. During this process, CW adaptively determines
an appropriate number of clusters to accommodate the data. Both the semantic space,
and the resulting graph are constructed incrementally, using co-occurrence counts col-
lected from sequentially encountered input. Following Fountain and Lapata (2011),
we transform co-occurrence counts into positive PMI values, and encode edge weights
in the graph as cosine similarity values. We trained the CW model on the same set
of stimuli as the BayesCat model, extracted from the BNC using a ±5 context win-
dow centered around the target concept mention. Edge weights must exceed a certain
threshold in order for any two vertices to be clustered together. We tuned this threshold
experimentally on the development data and obtained best performance with t = 5. We
used this value in all our experiments.
The CW model treats semantic category acquisition and semantic knowledge repre-
sentation as two different processes, even though it seems unlikely that humans have
separate mechanisms for learning the meaning of words and their categories. More-
over, in contrast to BayesCat which learns category-specific features together with the
categories, CW does not provide a straightforward way of recovering category-specific
features from the clustered graph. We compared the learning behavior as well as the
output clusters produced by the two models.
We also compared our incremental model against a batch learner which observes all
input data from the start, as described in Section 4.3.1 The batch model (henceforth
Gibbs) differs from the incremental BayesCat model only in its learning strategy and
can thus be viewed as an ideal learner: it has access to all the training data at any
time and can revisit previous categorization decisions systematically. We compare our
incremental learner against an ideal batch learner, in order to investigate whether dif-
ferent learning strategies influence the quality of the estimated categories. Our experi-
ments used the same model parametrizations for Gibbs as for the incremental BayesCat
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model. We run the sampler for 200 iterations without burn-in or lag, and take the state
at the final iteration as our sample.
Method BayesCat produces soft cluster assignments, however, CW returns a set of
hard clusters. In order to compare the two models directly, we transform soft clusters
into hard clusters by assigning each target concept w to its most likely category z:
cat(w) = max
z
P(w|z) ·P(z|w) (4.9)
The output clusters of an unsupervised learner do not have a natural interpretation.
Cluster evaluation in this case involves mapping the induced clusters to a gold stan-
dard and measuring to what extent the two clusterings (induced and gold) agree (Lang
and Lapata, 2011). Purity (pu) measures the extent to which each induced category
contains concepts that share the same gold category. Let G j denote the set of concepts
belonging to the j-th gold category and Ci the set of concepts belonging to the i-th
cluster. Purity is calculated as the member overlap between an induced category and
its mapped gold category. The scores are aggregated across all induced categories i,
and normalized by the total number of category members N:
pu =
1
N∑i
max
j
|Ci∩G j| (4.10)
Inversely, collocation (co) measures the extent to which all members of a gold category
are present in an induced category. For each gold category we determine the induced
category with the highest concept overlap and then compute the number of shared
concepts. Overlap scores are aggregated over all gold categories j, and normalized by
the total number of category members N:
co =
1
N∑j
max
i
|Ci∩G j| (4.11)
Finally, the harmonic mean of purity and collocation can be used to report a single
measure of clustering quality. If β is greater than 1, purity is weighted more strongly
in the calculation, if β is less than 1, collocation is weighted more strongly:
Fβ =
(1+β) · pu · co
(β · pu)+ co (4.12)
In addition to purity and collocation and their harmonic mean, we report results us-
ing a fuzzy variant of the well-known V-Measure (Utt et al., 2014; Rosenberg and
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Hirschberg, 2007) which is more appropriate for evaluating model output against the
soft gold standard clusters.7 V-Measure (VM) is an information-theoretic measure,
designed to be analogous to F-measure, in that it is defined as the weighted harmonic
means of two values, homogeneity (VH, the precision analogue) and completeness
(VC, the recall analogue):
VH = 1− H(G|C)
H(G)
(4.13)
VC = 1− H(C|G)
H(C)
(4.14)
VM = 1− (1+β) ·V H ·VC
(β ·V H)+VC (4.15)
where H(·) is the entropy function; H(C|G) denotes the conditional entropy of C
given G and quantifies the amount of additional information contained in C with re-
spect to C. The various entropy values involve the estimation of the joint probability
of induced class C and gold standard class G:
pˆ(C,G) =
µ(C∩G)
N
(4.16)
The fuzzy V-Measure distributes the mass of any object which is member of more
than one cluster equally over all its clusters. Then, µ(C∩G) is the total mass of the
objects in the data shared by C and G and N the total mass of the clustering. As a
result, N will be equal to the total number of objects to be clustered, which is trivially
the case when comparing hard clusterings (but not for soft clusterings when the mass
distribution step of the fuzzy V-measure is omitted, as in standard V-measure). Fuzzy
VM thus allows us to directly evaluate the output of our models against our soft gold
standard clustering, avoiding biases through the normalization constant, as implied in
the standard V-Measure.
Results Table 4.4 reports results on the performance of our incremental BayesCat
model (PF), its batch version (Gibbs), and Chinese Whispers (CW), all trained on
the BNC. We present results on the test set (16 categories, 196 nouns) and the larger
development set (41 categories, 492 nouns). We quantify model performance using
7Some categories such as ANIMAL and FOOD, or FRUIT and FOOD naturally share concepts in our
gold standard.
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Development Set
pu co F0.5 VH VC VM
Random 0.24 0.05 0.13 0.39 0.30 0.34
PF 0.59 0.31 0.50 0.47 0.42 0.44
Gibbs 0.63 0.24 0.47 0.51 0.43 0.47
CW 0.35 0.55 0.37 0.18 0.32 0.23
Test Set
pu co F0.5 VH VC VM
Random 0.52 0.11 0.30 0.67 0.39 0.50
PF 0.69 0.42 0.61 0.68 0.50 0.58
Gibbs 0.76 0.28 0.57 0.78 0.50 0.61
CW 0.40 0.55 0.42 0.26 0.36 0.30
Table 4.4: Performance of the particle filter (PF), its Gibbs sampling variant (Gibbs),
Chinese Whispers (CW), and a random baseline (Random) on the British National Cor-
pus (BNC). Boldface highlights the best performing model under each evaluation metric.
purity (pu) collocation (co), and their harmonic mean (with β set to 0.5) as well as the
fuzzy version of V-measure (VM) and its homogeneity (VH) and completeness (VC)
components. All scores are averaged over 10 runs.
In addition, we report performance on the same metrics for a baseline which assigns
concepts to K categories at random (Random). The score reflects average performance
of 10 random categorizations. K is set to the same value for all systems. Note that the
V-measure scores for the baseline are surprisingly high, often beating CW. V-Measure
is known to favor sparse clusterings of few gold instances (e.g., Vlachos et al. (2009);
Rosenberg and Hirschberg (2007)). Throughout our experiments we set K to a high
value (higher than the known number of categories in the gold standard), and set hy-
perparameters such that models are encouraged to induce the number of categories by
themselves as a subset of K. A random baseline will populate all K categories (there’s
no incentive to leave some unpopulated) and thus produce a large number of cate-
gories with relatively few members each. Thus, random categorizations in this setting
are quite precise, but recall will be low. V-measure has been shown to score such sparse
solutions favorably (even if they are rated worse by humans), and the effect becomes
stronger with fewer gold standard instances relative to K as is the case in many of our
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experiments.8
Comparison of the two incremental models, namely PF and CW, shows that our model
outperforms CW under most evaluation metrics both on the test and development set.
Under the VM evaluation metric, PF consistently outperforms CW. Gibbs, the non-
incremental model version of our model, performs best overall. This is not entirely
surprising. When BayesCat learns in batch mode using a Gibbs sampler, it has access
to the entire training data at any time and is able to systematically revise previous
decisions. This puts the incremental variant at a disadvantage since the particle filter
encounters the data piecemeal and only periodically resamples previously seen stimuli.
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 4.4, PF’s performance is close to Gibbs using VM.
Although the general pattern of results is the same on the development and test sets,
absolute scores for all systems are higher on the test set. This is expected, since the
latter contains fewer categories with a smaller number of concepts and more accurate
clusterings can be (on average) achieved more easily.
Table 4.5 shows example categories learnt by the incremental BayesCat model. Each
induced category is characterized by a set of concepts (top), as well as a set of features
representing different aspects of the meaning of the category (bottom). For example,
train, bus, and boat are members of the category VEHICLE. Induced features for this
category refer to users of vehicles (e.g., passenger, driver) and the actions they perform
on them (e.g., drive, ride, park, travel, arrive) as well as locations where vehicles are
found (e.g., road, railway, station). Another category the model discovers corresponds
to BUILDING with members such as house, cottage, skyscraper. Some of the features
relating to buildings also refer to their location (e.g., city, street, village, north ), archi-
tectural style (e.g., modern, ancient), and material (e.g., stone).
In addition to the final categories produced by the models, we are interested in their
learning behavior. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the learning curves for the two incremen-
tal models, PF and CW. The learning behavior of the CW algorithm does not resemble
a steady learning curve. This can can be explained by the fact that categories are
built based on co-occurrence counts of target- and context words. With an increasing
number of observations, these counts become less distinctive between target concepts.
Inspection of the output of the CW algorithm, reveals that it induces one very big cat-
8Technically this is the case because the distribution over gold classes within each induced cluster
becomes peakier (precision gets better), while the distribution over induced clusters for each gold class
does not change as drastically (recall decreases at a slower rate). This has been noted repeatedly (e.g.,
Rosenberg and Hirschberg (2007); Vlachos et al. (2009); Reichart and Rappoport (2009)).
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BUILDING
house, building, wall, stone, bridge, cottage, gate, brick, inn,marble, hut, corn, pier,
cellar, basement, canary, skyscraper, beehive
house, building, build, street, town, century, village, stone, garden, city, london, live,
centre, modern, hall, family, site, design, ancient, north, tower, bridge, mill, museum
VEHICLE
train, bus, boat, wheel, van, truck, taxi, helicopter, garage, wagon, fence, bicycle, shed,
trailer, cabin, tractor, cart, jeep, trolley, motorcycle, subway, escalator, airplane
car, road, drive, train, park, station, driver, bus, hour, line, fire, mile, vehicle, engine,
passenger, boat, railway, travel, speed, arrive, track, traffic, route, yard, ride, steal
WEAPON
bomb, crown, knife, ambulance, bullet, shotgun, grenade, machete
police, court, home, hospital, die, kill, yesterday, attack, death, wife, injury, charge,
officer, murder, shoot, suffer, arrest, victim, accident, parent, damage, injure, trial
INSTRUMENT
guitar, rock, piano, drum, violin, flute, clarinet, trumpet, cello, stereo, trombone, harp,
harpsichord, rocker, accordion, saxophone, tuba, baton, bagpipe, harmonica
play, music, guitar, sound, band, bass, song, piano, instrument, sing, album, string,
pop, drum, tune, violin, orchestra, dance, recording, solo, musical, performance, flute,
mozart
Table 4.5: Examples of categories learnt from the BNC with the incremental BayesCat
model. Category concepts (upper row) are shown together with their most likely fea-
tures (lower row).
egory, comprising almost all of the target concepts, and a few rather small, but mean-
ingful categories. On the contrary, the learning curves produced by the incremental
BayesCat model show steady improvement of the acquired categories over time.
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Figure 4.3: Learning curves for PF and CW on the BNC using (a) purity, (b) collocation,
and (c) F0.5.
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Figure 4.4: Learning curves for PF and CW on the BNC using (fuzzy) homogeneity
(a), completeness (b), and V-measure (c).
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4.4.2 Discussion
In this experiment, we performed a large-scale comparison among three models of
natural language categorization. The incremental BayesCat model performs compa-
rably to a batch version of the same model, showing a slightly worse performance.
This seems to indicate that the Gibbs sampler provides a better fit to the cognitive gold
standard and is to be preferred over the incremental learner. The learning process of
the Gibbs sampler is, however, not cognitively plausible. While the latter is an ideal
learner, with access to all data points at any time, and the ability to revise decisions sys-
tematically, it does not have a significant advantage over our incremental model. The
Gibbs sampler can explore the search space more exhaustively than the incremental
learner and can draw more accurate conclusions. Incremental learning highly depends
on sufficient training data, and one would anticipate the particle filter’s performance to
increase with more observations.
Overall, the competitive performance of the particle filter is an encouraging result un-
derlining the efficiency of the incremental learning paradigm as a basic characteristic
of human cognitive behavior. Previous work (Fearnhead, 2004) has shown that Particle
Filters outperform Gibbs samplers in Bayesian mixture models similar to the one pre-
sented here. Intuitively, the particle filter estimates a distribution over categorizations
by means of its N ≥ 1 incrementally constructed particles, or samples, which explore
the probability space independently and simultaneously. A Gibbs sampler produces
samples from a distribution by moving between different (high-probability) regions.
This can be a very slow process, especially with many hidden variables involved, so
that in practice a point estimate of the posterior distribution is often obtained.
We furthermore showed that the Bayesian models outperform a graph-based model
of category acquisition. The categorizations learnt by CW reliably consist of one big
category, comprising the vast majority of concepts, and very few small categories. The
reported collocation and F0.5 scores for CW are therefore misleadingly high: one large
category results in a very high collocation score, while cluster purity remains very low
throughout (see Figure 4.3a). For the incremental BayesCat model, however, the purity
of categories improves constantly as well as well their completeness (see Figures 4.3a
and 4.3b). The fuzzy V-measure does not overestimate CW’s completeness score, and
thus lends itself as a more suitable evaluation metric (see Figure 4.4).
In addition to its superior performance, we argue that BayesCat is also more cogni-
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tively plausible compared to CW. Firstly, on account of its architecture all information
is represented in the same space as probability distributions over words and categories.
In contrast, CW represents information as a co-occurrence matrix which needs to be
transformed into a graph in order to learn categories. Secondly, the BayesCat model
naturally induces category features during the process of category learning. Since fea-
tures have been established as a good proxy for category representations in human cog-
nition, it is inevitable that these representations evolve and change jointly while form-
ing categories. CW only considers features in its first representation, the co-occurrence
matrix, and there is no natural way of recovering category-specific features from the
graph after categories have been learnt. From a cognitive point of view this separation
is implausible. Experimental studies show that category and feature learning mutu-
ally influence each other (Goldstone et al., 2001; Schyns and Rodet, 1997): concepts
are categorized based on their features, and the perception of features is influenced by
already established categories. Like categories, features also evolve over time.
4.5 Experiment 2: Child Category Acquisition
The primary goal of the preceding experiment was to explore how effectively our
model captures large-scale category information. Of equal interest, however, is model-
ing children’s performance on an acquisition task — determining whether the linguistic
input to which children are exposed enables learning of high-level semantic categories
such as those seen in experiment 1. To answer this question, we applied our incremen-
tal model to a corpus of child-directed language and evaluated the resulting categories
against the gold standard clusters used previously.
4.5.1 Quality of Learnt Categories
Data The CHILDES corpus (MacWhinney, 2000) was used to construct training
stimuli for our model. CHILDES consists of a large number of transcripts in a multi-
tude of languages, each recording a free-form interactive session between a child and
one or more adults (parents); we used the XML portion of the corpus, consisting of
American and British English transcripts.9 All child produced utterances were ex-
cluded from the final set of stimuli. We extracted 170,000 child-directed stimuli which
9http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/data-xml/.
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pu co F0.5 VH VC VM
Random 0.29 0.05 0.16 0.46 0.35 0.40
PF 0.62 0.21 0.45 0.50 0.42 0.45
Gibbs 0.74 0.19 0.47 0.59 0.46 0.51
CW 0.39 0.54 0.41 0.22 0.37 0.27
Table 4.6: Performance of the Particle Filter (PF), its Gibbs-based variant (Gibbs), in-
cremental Chinese Whispers (CW), and a random baseline (Random) on the CHILDES
corpus. Boldface highlights the best performing model under each evaluation metric.
we grouped according to the age of the child the speech was directed at.10 The data was
presented to the models in chronological order. Details about the size of CHILDES are
provided in Table 4.3.
The corpus was lemmatized and stopwords were removed. Some concepts in the gold
standard are very specialized and occur very infrequently or not at all in CHILDES. We
only extracted stimuli containing target concepts occurring 50 times or more within the
corpus. Analogously, we filtered low-frequency context words with the same thresh-
old (leading to a reduction of context word types from 24,008 to 2,756 (by 89%)).
Compared to the models trained on the BNC, we used a smaller context window size
of n = 2. Child-directed utterances in CHILDES are relatively short and thus a small
context window is necessary to capture linguistic features relevant to the meaning of
the target concept.
The hyper-parameters of the BayesCat model were optimized on the BNC corpus (de-
velopment set). We did not re-tune model parameters for CHILDES, and thus used the
entire gold standard for evaluation (42 categories, 312 concepts). Model performance
was assessed similarly to Simulation 1 using purity, collocation and their harmonic
mean as well as the analogous information theoretic measures of homogeneity, com-
pleteness, and V-measure.
Results Table 4.6 presents our results on the CHILDES corpus. Again, we com-
pare our incremental BayesCat model using a particle filter (PF), a batch version of
the same model (Gibbs), incremental Chinese Whispers (CW), and a random baseline
(Random). Please refer to Section 4.4.1 (page 86) for an explanation of the baseline
10Stimuli were binned in intervals of six months.
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CLOTHES
hat, shirt, dress, pant, trouser, slipper, coat, suit, vest, jacket, glove, scarf, bow, tie
hat, wear, shirt, blue, daddy, color, dress, yellow, pant, slipper, coat, vest, got, scarf,
short, button, clothes, bow, change, glove, cold, lovely, pretty, party, warm, suit, pocket
BODY PARTS
head, eye, nose, mouth, leg, tongue, chin, lip, shoulder
your, my, eye, nose, head, mouth, hurt, bump, pull, bite, blow, funny, silly, kiss, careful,
tongue, chin, sore, ah, tickle, hard, touch, hole, fell, cry, matter, tire, body, shoulder
FRUIT
apple, cup, orange, strawberry, pear, plum, grape, banana, peach, saucer, lemon, rasp-
berry, mug
eat, apple, hungry, cup, pear, orange, strawberry, grape, banana, green, wednesday,
thursday, tuesday, fruit, plum, peach, monday, friday, peel, saucer, lemon, saturday
VEHICLE
car, train, truck, bridge, ambulance, van, tractor, crane, garage, trailer, taxi
car, oh, train, truck, thomas, drive, red, police, driver, engine, track, bridge, race,
happen, people, ambulance, choo, park, road, station, mean, digger, saw, carry, trailer
Table 4.7: Examples of categories learnt from the CHILDES corpus with the incremen-
tal BayesCat model. Category concepts (upper row) are shown together with their most
likely features (lower row).
and its misleadingly high V-measure scores. All scores are averaged over 10 runs. The
results are broadly comparable to those obtained from the BNC. Again, we observe
that Gibbs performs overall best, however, the incremental model is only slightly less
accurate while being more cognitively plausible. Our model outperforms CW under
most evaluation metrics. Examples of the semantic categories induced by BayesCat
are shown in Table 4.7.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show how the clusterings evolve over time for the two incremental
models (PF and CW). Again, CW does not show a meaningful learning curve, un-
der any measure. The completeness of clusters increases over time, however, at the
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Figure 4.5: Learning curves for PF and CW on the CHILDES corpus using (a) purity,
(b) collocation, and (c) F0.5.
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Figure 4.6: Learning curves for PF and CW on the CHILDES corpus using (fuzzy) (a)
homogeneity, (b) completeness, (c) and V-measure.
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Figure 4.7: Emergence of selected categories over time for the incremental BayesCat
model on the CHILDES corpus.
expense of purity. This effectively means that CW tends to learn one very big clus-
ter comprising of the majority of target concepts. PF, on the other hand, shows clear
learning curves across metrics, with increasingly clean (Figures 4.5(a) and 4.6(a)) and
complete clusters (Figures 4.5(b) and 4.6(b)).
In addition to our quantitative evaluation against a gold standard, we investigated the
learning process more qualitatively by inspecting the emergence of individual cate-
gories over time. Figure 4.7 shows how the categories BODYPARTS, FOOD, FURNI-
TURE, and WEAPON develop in the course of 66 months. We can see that the category
BODYPARTS emerges earliest and is acquired with high quality. The same is true for
the category CLOTHES (not shown in the figure to avoid clutter). Slightly later, the
categories FOOD, VEHICLES (also not shown), and FURNITURE evolve. Categories
like, WEAPONS, however, are not acquired from the CHILDES corpus, presumably
because care takers rarely talk about or use concepts from this category in the presence
of young children. In contrast, the WEAPONS category is acquired from the BNC (see
Table 4.5), which, again, emphasizes the ability of our model to adapt to and learn
from empirical data.
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4.5.2 Analysis of Memory Constraints
In this experiment we delve deeper into our incremental inference algorithm and its
appropriateness for cognitive learning. While humans are generally very successful
learners, their memory and computing power is clearly constrained. Particle filters
provide us with a flexible way for investigating memory constraints. The number of
particles, or hypotheses, available to the filter during learning directly correlates with
its memory usage. We expect that, while humans do not have the means to enter-
tain an exceeding number of hypotheses at any time, constraining the learner to one
hypothesis will have a negative impact on the learning outcome. A second indicator
of memory usage is rejuvenation, the extent to which past categorization decisions
are being re-considered in the light of new evidence. Rejuvenation in the BayesCat
model is tightly coupled with resampling, replacing low-probability particles with
high-probability ones, which is yet another an indicator of cognitive load. Resam-
pling (and rejuvenation) is driven by a learner-internal state of “confidence”, where the
model state is re-considered whenever the learner falls below a confidence threshold
about earlier categorization decisions in the light of new evidence. A learner’s con-
fidence w.r.t. to the learnt categorization should increase over time, so that revisions
of the model state occur less frequently. To summarize, in this set of experiments, we
investigate two questions: (1) How do the number of particles and the extent of rejuve-
nation influence the learning process and the quality of the learnt categorization; and
(2) how does the extent of resampling evolve over time.
Method We compare particle filters with different numbers of particles n, where
n ∈ {1,5,20,50,100}. The number of particles is the only varying experimental vari-
able, and the particle filters are set up as described in the previous experiments. Re-
sampling takes place if the ESS falls below a pre-specified threshold; rejuvenation (of
100 stimuli) occurs after every resampling step. For the sake of brevity, we present
results on CHILDES only, noting that a very similar picture emerges on the BNC.
The training corpus used in this set of experiments is identical to the one used in the
category quality evaluation in the previous section.
We compare the performance of the particle filters using two different metrics. First,
we report learning curves based on model log-likelihood. The log-likelihood is a com-
mon model-internal metric used for measuring convergence, even though it does not
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necessarily correlate with the usefulness or interpretability of the estimated solution
(Chang et al., 2009). A higher log-likelihood indicates a better model. In order to
directly measure the quality of the categorizations induced by the particle filters, we
additionally report the F0.5 measure. Moreover, we are interested in teasing apart how
the number of particles and rejuvenation influence the learning behavior of our model.
To this end, we compare particle filters with differing numbers of particles, but with
rejuvenation disabled.
Results Figures 4.8a and 4.8b show the log-likelihood-based learning curve pro-
duced for particle filters with a varying number of particles. While the shape of the
curve is very similar across particle filters, a substantial improvement from the one-
particle filter to multiple-particle filters can be observed. However, the improvement
decreases with more particles, although a slight advantage is still observable. A very
similar picture emerges for the learning curves based on category quality (Figure 4.8c).
The categorizations inferred by the one-particle filter are less accurate than those in-
ferred by multiple-particle filters. This suggests that the one-particle filter found a
local maximum, from which it could not escape. The advantage of the Gibbs sampler
as an ideal learner becomes apparent with the log-likelihood metric (see the red point
Figure 4.8a). The BayesCat model using Gibbs sampling achieves significantly better
log-likelihood scores compared to the incremental model. In general, we see an ini-
tial improvement in the learning curve, but a subsequent drop which is caused by the
increasing number of input stimuli which need to be integrated into a coherent catego-
rization. The log-likelihood flattens out towards the end of the learning curve. While
ideally it should eventually improve, we suspect that the size of the stimuli set used in
this experiment was too small.
Figure 4.9 compares the learning curves for different particle filters with rejuvenation
disabled. Across filters and evaluation metrics a clear decrease in performance is ob-
served, which is unsurprising given that the filters now are bound to categorization
decisions, and unable to revise past decisions in the light of new experience. It is still
evident, however to a lesser extent, that the one-particle filter performs worse com-
pared to filters with more than one particle. Especially in the early learning phase, the
ability to explore multiple hypotheses in parallel is advantageous (see Figure 4.9b).
Figure 4.10 illustrates the resampling behavior of the particle filters. On the one hand,
we observe that filters with more particles tend to resample more frequently, i.e., the
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Figure 4.8: Learning curve for the BayesCat model on CHILDES with varying number
of particles. Model log-likelihood curve (a), model log-likelihood curve for the early
learning phase (b), and F0.5 learning curve (c).
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Figure 4.10: Resampling behavior of the BayesCat model learnt with a varying number
of particles. Points correspond to executed resampling steps at time x.
weights of the particles tend to diverge more with an increasing number of particles.
On the other hand, across different filters resampling frequency decreases over time,
confirming our intuition that a learner’s knowledge state should become increasingly
confident over time, and reconsiderations of past decisions decrease in frequency.
4.5.3 Typicality Rating
An important finding in the study of natural language concepts is that categories show
graded category-membership structure. For example, humans generally judge a trout
to be a better example of the category FISH than eel. In the same way, an apple intu-
itively seems to be a better example of the category FRUIT than olives. Several experi-
mental studies underline the pervasiveness of typicality (or “goodness of example”) in
a wide variety of cognitive tasks such as priming (Rosch, 1977), sentence verification
(McCloskey and Clucksberg, 1979), and inductive reasoning (Rips, 1975). Because of
its importance, typicality is also an evaluation criterion for models of categorization
and concept representation. Any such model should be able to give an account of the
graded category structure and correctly predict differences in the typicality of category
members.
We therefore assessed our model on a typicality rating task (Voorspoels et al., 2008).
In this task, the model is presented with concepts of a category and must predict the
degree to which the concepts are typical amongst members of that category.
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Method Previous work on semantic categorization has shown that exemplar models
perform consistently better compared to prototypes across a broad range of linguistic
tasks (Voorspoels et al., 2008; Fountain and Lapata, 2010; Storms et al., 2000). This
finding is also in line with studies involving artificial stimuli (e.g., Nosofsky 1992).
For the typicality rating task we therefore adopted an exemplar-based model which
is broadly similar to the generalized context model (Nosofsky, 1984, 1986). In this
model, a measure of the typicality of a concept is derived by summing the similarity of
that concept to all concepts in the category. More formally, the typicality of concept w
for category G is given by:
TG(w) = ∑
v∈G
ηw,v (4.17)
where ηw,v is the similarity of concept w to concept v, with v also belonging to cate-
gory G. The similarity function ηw,v can vary depending on how concepts and cate-
gories are represented (e.g., spatially or probabilistically). Within our Bayesian frame-
work it is relatively straightforward to specify a probabilistic quantity that corresponds
to the strength of association between w and v (Griffiths et al., 2007b):
ηw,v = P(v|w) =∑
k
P(v|k)P(k|w)
=∑
k
P(v|k)P(w|k)P(k)
P(w)
(4.18)
Here the probability of a category given concept w and the probability of concept v
given that category are averaged across all categories k.
In this set of experiments, we compared BayesCat against a simple co-occurrence
based model, essentially identical to the semantic space used as input to CW. In this
space each target concept is represented as a vector with dimensions corresponding to
its co-occurring context elements. As in previous experiments, we transformed raw co-
occurrence counts into PMI values. A typicality value for each member of a category
was computed using (4.17) and summing the cosine similarity of the concept vector−→w
to the all other vectors representing its co-members −→v :
ηw,v = cos
(−→w ,−→v )= −→w ·−→v|−→w ||−→v | (4.19)
Our experiments used the data set produced by Fountain and Lapata (2010) who elicited
typicality ratings11 (and category labels) for all concepts contained in the feature norms
11Publicly available from http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s0897549/data/.
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Figure 4.11: Rank correlations (Spearman’s rho) between the gold typicality ranking
and the model produced rankings over the set of all gold standard categories.
of McRae et al. (2005). In the evaluation, we present the models with the set of gold
members of each gold category, and compare the rankings produced by the models with
the gold typicality ranking elicited from humans. We report Spearman’s ρ correlation
co-efficients for the global ranking across all categories in this data set. We present
results on the CHILDES corpus (41 categories, 689 concept-category pairs) and the
BNC (41 categories, 1,226 concept-category pairs). Typicality ratings were produced
with the incremental variant of the BayesCat model trained with 100 particles. Our
results are averaged over 10 runs. The co-occurrence based model is deterministic,
hence we only report one run for that model.
Results Our results are summarized in Figure 4.11 which illustrates model perfor-
mance (as measured by Spearman’s rho) on the BNC and CHILDES. The incremental
BayesCat model is consistently better at predicting typicality ratings compared to the
simpler co-occurrence based model. All correlation coefficients in Figure 4.11 are
statistically significant (p < 0.01). We should also point out that the typicality rating
task is generally difficult even for humans. Fountain and Lapata (2010) measured inter-
subject agreement in their elicitation study to 0.64. BayesCat fits the experimental data
better when trained on the BNC. This is not unexpected since the BNC is much larger
than CHILDES by a factor of almost 10. Table 4.8 shows some qualitative examples
of concepts which BayesCat rated as most typical/atypical for a particular category.
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category most typical concepts least typical concepts
FOOD cake, bread∗, strawberry, cheese owl∗, lobster, snail∗, deer∗
ANIMAL elephant, horse, cow∗, duck bat, pickle, chipmunk, tuna∗
CLOTHING shirt∗, shoe, sock, dress∗ necklace∗, cap, cape, hose∗
VEHICLE car, train∗, truck∗, bus∗ ship, tank, motorcycle, trolley
category most typical concepts least typical concepts
FOOD cheese, bread∗, cake, potato honeydew, blueberry, eggplant,
zucchini
ANIMAL dog, bear, horse, cat∗ chipmunk∗, chickadee, bluejay,
groundhog
CLOTHING dress∗, shirt∗, shoe, jacket nightgown, mitten, earmuff, paja-
mas
VEHICLE car, train∗, bus∗, ship surfboard∗, sled∗, sleigh, unicycle
Table 4.8: Qualitative examples of typicality judgments as predicted from the incremen-
tal BayesCat model trained on CHILDES (top) and the BNC (bottom). The four most
typical concepts, and the four least typical concepts are displayed for selected cate-
gories. Superscript ∗ indicates whether the concept was deemed highly typical/atypical
in Fountain and Lapata’s (2010) elicitation study.
4.5.4 Discussion
The preceding series of experiments investigated category learnablility from a corpus
of child-directed language and showed that meaningful categories emerged from the
BayesCat model. Compared to our large-scale experiments on the BNC, our model
was presented with a smaller amount of stimuli, and yet was able to recover semantic
categories without any corpus specific optimization. This highlights the robustness
of our model with respect to the chosen hyper-parameters or training corpus. Note,
however, that the runtime of the incremental filter is linear in the number of input
stimuli, and thus is efficiently applicable to data sets of increasing size.
The qualitative examples of the categories and features learnt by BayesCat (Table 4.7)
demonstrate that the categories and their associated features are coherent and easily
interpretable. Note that concepts and features are not clearly separated: frequent mem-
bers of a category also appear in its feature set. We do not treat concepts and their
features differently. From a cognitive point of view this is plausible: concepts of the
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same category can be co-observed (e.g., one may wear a hat and coat or eat an apple
and a banana) which seems like a useful signal in category learning.
Beyond the quality of learnt categories, our experiments also analyzed the effect of
memory resources on the learning behavior of the incremental BayesCat model (Sec-
tion 4.5.2). We examined the effect of the number of particles available to the particle
filters, as well as the effect of rejuvenation.
Across experimental settings, we showed that the one-particle filter is outperformed
by filters which explore multiple hypotheses simultaneously. Our results thus suggest
that having access to one hypothesis at a time, during learning, is not sufficient for
our category acquisition task. However, we also observe that an increased number of
particles does not necessarily lead to increased performance. A filter with five particles
is able to substantially outperform a filter with one particle, while not being much
worse than a filter with 100 particles. In the literature it has been argued, following the
singularity principle, that humans have a strong tendency to consider only the one most
likely category in reasoning at any time (Evans, 2007; Murphy et al., 2012), which is at
odds with our observations above. However, we point out that BayesCat is a model of
child category acquisition whereas the research investigates categorization of objects
in lab experiments with adult participants. It would be interesting investigate whether
the singularity principle holds in a learning setting similar to ours.
We further showed that our model resembles human learning in the sense that the
learner’s uncertainty decreases over time, as measured by the frequency of resampling.
Intuitively, would expect that early state representations in human learning are more
uncertain than later ones. With more observed stimuli, the learnt knowledge should
become more stable, and revisions of the knowledge state should occur less frequently.
We observe this behavior in our particle filters as well: in the initial learning phase
resampling is very frequent, but the frequency decreases over time (cf., Figure 4.10).
Our final set of experiments (Section 4.5.3) compared two models in their ability to
rank concepts with respect to typicality, against a human created gold standard. We
showed that our model successfully captured the typicality of concepts within a given
category. The typicality ratings produced by BayesCat (Table 4.8) largely correspond
to human intuitions. We should also point out that this is a large-scale study over
hundreds of concepts. Previous work on the same task has only used a few dozens
(Storms et al., 2000; Voorspoels et al., 2008; Connel and Ramscar, 2001). BayesCat
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outperforms a simpler vector space model which is nonetheless non-incremental. Our
model learns statistical information about observed concepts incrementally, whereas
the vector spaced model has all information available at once for constructing concept
representations. BayesCat exhibits better typicality performance, which suggests that
(a) the learnt concept representations are meaningful and (b) the incremental learn-
ing procedure does not put the model at disadvantage. Finally, we should note that
BayesCat was not optimized or tuned for the typicality rating task in any way. Typi-
cality follows naturally from the model structure without any additional assumptions
on the task or learning strategy.
A common problem for models based on co-occurrence patterns in text (like BayesCat)
is the fact that word type distributions follow a power law, and are consequently highly
skewed. The induced information from raw text tends to be dominated by function
words which occur with high frequency, but do not carry meaning themselves. While
sophisticated priors can help alleviate the problem (Wallach et al., 2009), a more com-
mon strategy is to filter very high-frequent and low frequent words from the input to
reduce the ‘skewness’ of the data. We apply this filtering to all input corpora used in
experiments in this thesis. Without input filtering, we would expect the interpretability
and relevance of the learnt categories and, in particular, features to decrease. Espe-
cially the incrementally updated representations induced by the particle filter would
be likely dominated by high-frequency words early on. In addition, vocabulary fil-
tering reduces the dimensionality of some of the model distributions, which ensures
tractability of learning and inference. From a cognitive point of view, input filtering
can be interpreted as an approximation of attention: through information beyond pure
speech, such as prosody or gaze as well as cross-situational experience, children’s at-
tention is guided to the relevant words and objects in their environment (Dominey and
Dodane, 2004), i.e., meaning-bearing words in the linguistic input.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we have presented BayesCat, a Bayesian model of category acquisi-
tion. Our model learns to group linguistic concepts into categories as well as their
features (i.e., context words associated with them). Category learning is performed
incrementally, using a particle filtering algorithm which is a natural choice for model-
ing sequential aspects of language learning. Our experiments were designed to answer
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several questions with respect to the robustness of the proposed model, the quality
of its output, and adopted learning mechanism. (1) How do the induced categories
fare against gold standard categories? (2) Are there performance differences between
BayesCat and Chinese Whispers, given that the two models adopt distinct mechanisms
for representing lexical meaning and learning semantic categories? (3) Does our learn-
ing mechanism predict human performance and is it cognitively plausible? We now
summarize our findings in the light of the above questions.
Firstly, we observe that our incremental model learns plausible linguistic categories
when compared against the gold standard. Secondly, these categories are qualita-
tively better when evaluated against Chinese Whispers, a closely related graph-based
incremental algorithm. Thirdly, analysis of the model’s output shows that it simulates
category learning in two important ways, it consistently improves over time and can
additionally acquire category features. Overall, our model has a more cognitively plau-
sible learning mechanism compared to CW, and is more expressive, as it can simulate
both category and feature learning. Although CW ultimately yields some meaning-
ful categories, it does not acquire any knowledge pertaining to their features. This
is somewhat unrealistic given that humans are good at inferring missing features for
unknown categories (Anderson, 1991). It is also symptomatic of the nature of the al-
gorithm which does not have an explicit learning mechanism. Each node in the graph
iteratively adopts (in random order) the strongest class in its neighborhood (i.e., the
set of nodes with which it shares an edge). We also explored how memory resources
affect the learner’s performance and showed that it is beneficial to entertain multiple
hypotheses (i.e., numbers of particles) during learning. Furthermore, our model is able
to revisit past decisions via rejuvenation. We experimentally showed that the learner
revisits past decisions more frequently in the initial stages of learning when knowl-
edge is being acquired and there is more uncertainty. Our final experiment showed
that our model performs well on a typicality rating task when compared against a non-
incremental semantic space.
In our experiments, the BayesCat model learnt with Gibbs sampling yielded a cate-
gorization which is a closer fit to the cognitive gold standard compared to the particle
filter. Does this mean that the Gibbs sampler is a more plausible algorithm? From a
learning perspective, the answer is no: aside from the fact that humans acquire knowl-
edge incrementally, processing limitations do not permit revisiting past decisions ex-
haustively, by iterating over past experiences, as is the case for the Gibbs sampler. In
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view of this limitation, the incremental particle filters perform competitively through-
out our experiments.
Overall, our results highlight the advantages of the Bayesian framework for modeling
inductive problems and their learning mechanisms. Particle filters in particular suggest
a class of psychologically plausible procedures for learning under cognitive constraints
(e.g., memory or computational limitations). Although our experiments focused exclu-
sively on categorization, we believe that some of the inference algorithms employed
here could be easily adapted to other cognitive tasks such as word learning, word seg-
mentation, phonetic learning, and lexical category acquisition. Importantly, we have
shown that incremental learning in a Bayesian setting is robust and scalable in the face
of large volumes of data, and the resulting models perform competitively compared to
batch optimal learners.
Taken together our results further provide support for the important role of distribu-
tional information in categorization. We have demonstrated that co-occurrence in-
formation can be used to model how categories are learnt. Moreover, our typicality
experiments indicate that the responses people provide in typicality experiments are to
a certain extent reflective of the distributional properties of the linguistic environments
in which concepts are found. Although our focus in this chapter has been primarily
on the learning mechanisms of categorization, our experiments suggest that language
itself is part of the environment that determines conceptual behavior. Furthermore, the
fact that our models learn plausible categorizations from linguistic data alone would
seem to indicate that information relating to the perceptual experience of objects and
artifacts is encoded (albeit implicitly) in linguistic experience. In future work, it would
be interesting to tease the contributions of linguistic and perceptual experience apart. It
seems likely that no grounding is necessary for some concepts (or categories), whereas
for others grounding is essential.
In the future we would also like to relax some of our simplifying assumptions regard-
ing the learning environment which considers a single modality, namely language. It
is possible to augment the set of features our model is exposed to with information
from other modalities, such as the visual features of a scene, while leaving the model
structure and learning algorithm unchanged. Another potential extension would in-
volve augmenting the learning domain of the BayesCat model. In our experiments, the
set of target concepts was constrained to those present in our gold standard. This was
expedient for evaluation purposes, however there is no inherent limitation in the model
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which restricts its application to a specific domain or number of words. It would be
interesting to see whether the features learned by a model trained on a larger set of
target words differ qualitatively from those inferred from more limited domains.
We showed that BayesCat induces meaningful categories under a cognitively plausi-
ble learning mechanism. However, it learns unstructured bags-of-features for each
category. This is in conflict with results from prior research which suggest that hu-
mans represent category knowledge in structured ways, resembling the structure of the
world they represent (Murphy and Medin, 1985; McRae et al., 2005). The features
learnt by BayesCat emerge as a by-product of category acquisition – they are not op-
timized themselves during learning. Experimental evidence suggests, however, that
categories and features are learnt jointly, in a single process and mutually influence
each other (Schyns and Rodet, 1997; Goldstone et al., 2001). We address these short-
comings in the following chapter, where we develop a Bayesian model which learns
categories and structured featural representation jointly in a single process.
Chapter 5
Joint Acquisition of Categories and
their Structured Feature
Representations
Categorization is one of the most basic cognitive functions. It allows individuals to
organize subjective experience of their environment by structuring its contents. This
ability to group different concepts into the same category based on their common char-
acteristics underlies major cognitive activities such as perception, learning, and the use
of language. Global semantic categories (such as FURNITURE or ANIMAL) are shared
among members of societies, and influence how we perceive, interact with, and argue
about the world.
Given its fundamental importance, categorization is one of the most studied problems
in cognitive science. The literature is rife with theoretical and experimental accounts,
as well as modeling simulations focusing on the emergence, representation, and learn-
ing of categories. Most theories assume that basic level concepts such as dog or chair
are characterized by features such as {barks, used-for-sitting}, and are grouped into
categories based on those features. Although the precise grouping mechanism has been
subject to considerable debate (including arguments in favor of exemplars (Nosofsky,
1988), prototypes (Rosch, 1973), and category utility (Corter and Gluck, 1992)), it is
fairly uncontroversial that categories are associated with featural representations.
Less effort has been dedicated to the question of where those features come from.
Much theoretical and computational work on categorization assumes a fixed, readily
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available set of adequate features for categorization-related tasks. Recent theoretical
work, however, has challenged these assumptions. Experimental studies show that the
development of categories and feature learning mutually influence each other (Gold-
stone et al., 2001; Schyns and Rodet, 1997; Spalding and Ross, 2000): concepts are
categorized based on their features, but the perception of features is influenced by al-
ready established categories, and, like categories, features evolve over time. There is
also evidence that features such as {barks, runs} are grouped into types like behavior
(Ahn, 1998; McRae et al., 2005; Wu and Barsalou, 2009), and the distribution of fea-
ture types varies across categories (McRae and Cree, 2002). For instance, living things
such as ANIMALS have characteristic behavior, whereas artifacts such as TOOLS have
characteristic functions, and both categories have characteristic appearance.
Previously proposed models for category learning have largely considered the prob-
lems of category and feature learning in isolation, focusing either on category learning
given a limited set of simplistic features (Anderson, 1991; Sanborn et al., 2006) or fea-
ture learning (Austerweil and Griffiths, 2013; Baroni et al., 2010; Kelly et al., 2014),
but not both; or they learn from restricted, task-specific data sets (Shafto et al., 2011).
Moreover, influential models of categorization (such as Anderson (1991)’s rational
model of categorization, or ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) among many others) rely on
the availability of a pre-defined and fixed set of informative features associated with
every observed concept, such that “[...] the modeler, not the model, [... chooses]
the appropriate features for the considered categorizations” (Schyns and Rodet, 1997,
p. 684). Such models furthermore assume that features are independent and combine
linearly rather than being correlated or structured.
Our own BayesCat model, introduced in Chapter 4, learns categories from more realis-
tic input data in the sense that it is exposed to occurrences of concept mentions in their
natural language context, which may be noisy or contain information irrelevant to the
concept. BayesCat learns relevant features as sets of terms which are highly associ-
ated with specific categories from unfiltered input. Nevertheless, these features are (a)
flat, unstructured sets; and (b) emerge as a by-product of the category learning process,
but are not optimized themselves. In this chapter, we address these shortcomings and
tackle the problem of jointly learning categories and their structured representations.
We induce categories (e.g., ANIMALS) and their feature types (e.g., behavior) from
observations of target concepts (e.g., lion, dog, cow) and their co-occurring contexts
(e.g., {eats, sleeps, large}). Specifically, our model induces a set of categories and their
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representations in a single process by learning (a) categories as clusters of concepts;
(b) feature types as probability distributions over context words; and (c) category-
feature type associations as category-specific distributions over feature types.
We apply our model to large-scale collections of encyclopedic text, assuming that fea-
tural information is particularly explicit in this data set. Evaluation results show that
our cognitively motivated joint model learns accurate categories and feature types,
achieving results competitive with highly engineered approaches focusing exclusively
on feature learning. In line with our BayesCat evaluation in Chapter 4, we also inves-
tigate the behavior of our model under cognitively more plausible learning conditions.
We (a) expose our model to data resembling the input a child has access to when
learning categories and their features; and (b) model the human learning process more
faithfully through an incremental learning algorithm. Our model observes training data
sequentially and is subject to cognitive constraints in terms of memory limitations. We
show that our model acquires meaningful categories and features from child-directed
language, and analyze the influence of memory constraints on the learning process.
We begin this Chapter with a review of previous work (Section 5.1). We continue
with a detailed description of our joint model (Section 5.2) and introduce two learn-
ing algorithms: an “ideal” batch learner, and an incremental learner (particle filter).
Section 5.3 presents our large-scale evaluation based on encyclopedic data. In Sec-
tion 5.4, we evaluate our incremental learner on child-directed language. We discuss
our findings in Section 5.5 and draw conclusions from our results.
5.1 Categories and Structured Featural Representations
This section provides an overview of prior research in cognitive science which chal-
lenges the assumptions underlying many theories and models of categorization. We
review work supporting the claims that (a) featural representations are structured into
types of features and that the distribution of those types is category-specific (Sec-
tion 5.1.1); and (b) that category and feature acquisition are a joint process and the
two parts exert a mutual influence (Section 5.1.2). We also review relevant computa-
tional models of human category and feature learning from cognitive data and systems
for feature extraction from text (Section 5.1.3).
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5.1.1 Featural Representations of Concepts and Categories
Even though much empirical research glosses over this observation, there is strong
evidence that human conceptual representations are structured (see Rips et al. (2012)
for a recent critique and overview of cognitive studies of categorization). Categories
mentally represent the complex structure of the environment. They allow to make
inferences about concepts or categories that go beyond their perceived similarities
capturing abstract and potentially complex properties of categories (for example the
nutritional value of FOOD items, or the emotional benefits of PETS). Much
research on human categorization is based on laboratory experiments where subjects
are presented with artificial stimuli represented by a restricted set of task-relevant fea-
tures. Observations of natural concepts, however, are often noisy or incomplete so that
a notion of systematic relations among features might be more beneficial here than un-
der artificial conditions in the lab (Malt and Smith, 1984). The authors also discuss that
structure among features might be particularly important for superordinate level cate-
gories such as ANIMAL since they are represented by a much more heterogeneous set
of features than basic level categories (e.g., dog or fish). Our model induces structured
feature representations for superordinate level categories.
The existence of structured features has received support through behavioral results
from a variety of categorization related tasks, such as typicality rating (Malt and Smith,
1984) or category-based inductive inference (Heit and Rubinstein, 1994; Spalding and
Ross, 2000). Experimental evidence suggests that categories which on the surface do
not seem to contain a coherent set of members (e.g., the category PETS) are represented
by an underlying set of abstract features which explain the coherence of the category
(e.g., {keeps_company, lives_in_the_house}). Subjects’ categorical inferences suggest
that observed surface features of category members systematically activate associated
underlying features of newly observed concepts of the same category (Spalding and
Ross, 2000).
Varying the types of available features (e.g., providing functional information in
addition to objects’ appearance) leads to different categorization behavior both in
adults (Heit and Rubinstein, 1994) and children (Trauble and Pauen, 2007), and dif-
ferent feature types vary in their predictive value across categories. Jones et al. (1991)
show that children as young as 2-3 years old possess a notion of relations between
feature types and categories: otherwise identical stimuli were presented either with
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eyes (suggesting an ANIMATE category) or without. Children categorized stimuli with
eyes based on both their shape and texture, and stimuli without eyes based on their
shape only. Similarly, Macario (1991) showed that 2-4-year old children categorize
FOOD items based on their color, however, TOYS are classified based on their shape.
Gelman and Markman (1986) and Gelman and O’Reilly (1988) showed that children
are able to make category-related inferences that go beyond surface similarities of the
involved concepts. For example, children were presented with two stimuli, e.g., (1)
a tropical fish and (2) a large, gray dolphin. They were then presented a third stimu-
lus, e.g., a large gray shark, which was perceptually similar to (2) but was labeled with
the same name as (1) (i.e., fish) by the experimenter. Children made stronger infer-
ences based on shared category labels than on surface similarity. Apart from investi-
gating children’s behavior in a category-related inference task, Gelman and O’Reilly
(1988) also asked children to justify their inference decisions in an open-ended in-
terview paradigm. Children were indeed aware of the fact that members of the same
category shared important properties such as behaviors and structures irrespective
of shared visual features.
Another line of work has investigated children’s understanding of the fundamental
defining characteristics that determine the category membership of concepts. Keil
(1989) exposed participants to highly modified instances of ARTIFICIAL (e.g., chair)
and NATURAL (e.g., squirrel) categories and asked whether the modified concept still
belonged to the same category. He showed that surface manipulation changed category
judgments of ARTIFACTS (glueing leg extensions onto a chair and sawing off its back
changes its category into a stool), whereas similar manipulations do not change cat-
egory membership judgments for animates (dying a raccoon’s fur, fluffing up its tail,
and enabling it to release a smelly secretion when scared, leaves the animal’s identity
unchanged).1 Conversely, modifying molecular structure changed category member-
ship judgments for animates but not for artifacts (e.g., a chair made out of a material
which is used for making windsurfers remains a chair; but a discovery of a fundamen-
tal mistake in the analysis of a plant’s DNA will presumably change its category).
The structured nature of category features manifests itself in feature norms. Feature
norms are verbalized lists of properties that humans associate with a particular con-
1These patterns reliably emerge from judgments collected from adults and older children, however,
responses from younger children are less reliable and suggest the development of featural representa-
tions during concept and category acquisition in young children. We return to this phenomenon in detail
in Chapter 6.
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cept (McRae et al., 2005). Features collected in norming studies naturally fall into dif-
ferent types such as behavior, appearance or function. This suggests that structure
also emerges from verbalized representations of concepts and features such as men-
tions in natural language corpora, as used as stimuli throughout this thesis. McRae
et al. (2005) collected a large set of feature norm for more than 500 concepts in a
multi-year study, and classified their feature norms using a variety of theoretically mo-
tivated schemata, including the feature type classification scheme developed in Wu and
Barsalou (2009) and Barsalou (1999). Wu and Barsalou’s work suggests that humans
perform a “mental simulation” when describing a concept, they scan the mental image
they create as well as situations associated with that image, and then verbalize it when
producing features.
These rather theoretical motivations have received support from behavioral data col-
lected from patients with brain damage and impaired categorization abilities (Warring-
ton and Shallice, 1984; Humphreys and Forde, 2001). In their seminal study, War-
rington and Shallice (1984) systematically observed category-specific impairments:
groups of patients showed impaired categorization skills for ARTIFACTS, but also
BODYPARTS, while performing normally on the categorization of ANIMATES and MU-
SICAL INSTRUMENTS, and vice versa. While these observations are difficult to explain
on the category level, the authors suggest an interpretation on the featural level: AR-
TIFACTS and BODYPARTS, are strongly associated with functional features (such
as, {used_for_eating, used_for_walking}). On the other hand ANIMATES, like MUSI-
CAL INSTRUMENTS, are associated with perceptual or behavioral features (such
as, {makes_sounds}). A local representation of the respective feature types in sepa-
rate brain areas would provide an explanation of the observed behavior. Although the
authors offer no empirical evidence for their category-feature association hypothesis,
subsequent work revealed that descriptions of ARTIFACTS in dictionary entries contain
more functional features, whereas description of ANIMATES contain more perceptual
features (Farah and McClelland, 1991).
Further empirical evidence was provided by McRae and Cree (2002), who show that
feature type information extracted from a large collection of feature norms (discussed
above) explains not only the binary perceptual vs functional dichotomy found
by Warrington and Shallice (1984), but also a number of additional category-specific
deficits observed in brain-damage patients. Categories were represented in terms of
feature types created from a large set of human-produced feature norms using Wu and
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Barsalou (2009)’s coding scheme, which was developed and motivated independently
of explaining categorization deficits. Categories were then clustered using average-
link agglomerative clustering and groups of categories which were treated identically
(either impaired or non-impaired) by patients emerged. The results support the cen-
trality of feature types in category representations, providing further evidence that they
underly category representations in the brain.
The model we present in this chapter aims to capture the evidence summarized above,
and represent categories as structured sets of associated features. Category-specific
features are structured into types which relate to a particular kind of property of a
category (e.g., the behavior of ANIMALS). We also capture the observation that fea-
tures are defining for different categories to a varying degree (Keil, 1989; McRae and
Cree, 2002) in terms of category-feature type associations (e.g., the feature function
is highly defining for (or associated with) the category ARTIFACT not for the category
ANIMAL).
5.1.2 Joint Learning of Categories and their Features
Although the majority of models of categorization assume a fixed set of features under-
lying the category acquisition and categorization process, there is increasing evidence
that “[...] a significant part of learning a category involves learning the features en-
tering its representations.” (Schyns and Rodet, 1997, p. 681). Experimental evidence
suggests that not only do features underly the categorization process but features them-
selves are susceptible to change over time and can be modified by the categories which
emerge. Evidence ranges from changing featural perception as a result of expert edu-
cation (e.g., wine tasters or doctors learning to interpret X-ray images) to neurological
evidence revealing enhanced neural activity in experts when presented with pictures of
their area of expertise (see Goldstone et al. (2008) for an overview).
The influence of category learning on the perception and use of features has been stud-
ied extensively using visual stimuli of varying degree of naturalness and familiarity.
Pevtzow and Goldstone (1994) experiment with drawings of 2-dimensional line seg-
ments, and show that participants who were exposed to categorization training prior to
a feature identification task identified the presence of category-defining features faster
than participants without prior training. Goldstone et al. (2001) and Goldstone and
Steyvers (2001) presented participants with photographs of human faces, which were
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systematically manipulated. Participants were then asked to categorize the faces, and
after the categorization task showed higher sensitivity to the features which were rele-
vant for the categorization.
In contrast to the work discussed above which uses familiar concepts, Schyns and
Rodet (1997); Schyns et al. (1998) computer-generate visually complex 2-d images
of “Martian cells”, demanding substantial familiarization from their participants thus
minimizing the influence of prior knowledge which enables them to study the emer-
gence of features and change of their perception in isolation. Their experiments show
that (a) knowing the categorization of perceptual stimuli changes the perceptual units
on which the analysis of those stimuli are based; and (b) a change in the order of
category learning (based on change of order of stimulus presentation) influences the
perception of stimuli and leads to the emergence of different features.
Other work has explicitly investigated the incremental learning process of categories
and the ways how evidence encountered later in the learning process changes category
structure (Ross, 1997, 2000). In contrast to the work mentioned above, such experi-
ments involve conceptual rather than perceptual stimuli: participants learn classes of
diseases based on symptoms. They show that using learnt categories in categorization
tasks alters category representations, both when learning and usage are interleaved but
also when the learning process precedes usage.
Diaz and Ross (2006) investigate the incremental process of learning category struc-
ture. They show that interleaving inference questions on feature correlations with
categorization tasks mutually improves performance on both tasks over time. While
the previous experiment was conducted with adult participants, Bornstein and Mash
(2010) show that 5-months old infants are capable of learning categories of unfamiliar
objects on-line as new information becomes available.
Our model is the first model which learns categories and their features jointly in one
process from naturalistic input data. We show that meaningful categories as well as
relevant structured features emerge in an incremental manner, capturing characteristics
of the human learning process.
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5.1.3 Computational Models of Category and Feature Induction
We conclude our background section with a review of prior work on computational
models of category and structured feature induction. We begin with an overview
of cognitive models which aim to replicate behavioral data. Afterwards we review
knowledge-heavier approaches for feature extraction from text corpora.
The problems of category formation and feature learning have been considered largely
independently in the literature. Bayesian categorization models pioneered by Anderson
(1991) and recently re-formalized by Sanborn et al. (2006) are aimed at replicating
human behavior in small scale category acquisition studies, where a fixed set of simple
(e.g., binary) features is assumed. Our BayesCat model presented in Chapter 4 of this
thesis is similar in spirit, but was applied to large-scale corpora, while investigating
incremental learning in the context of child category acquisition (see also Fountain
and Lapata (2011) for a non-Bayesian approach). BayesCat associates sets of features
with categories as a by-product of the learning process, however these feature sets are
independent across categories and are not optimized during learning.
A variety of cognitively motivated Bayesian models have been proposed for the ac-
quisition of complex domain knowledge. Shafto et al. (2011) present a joint model
of category and feature acquisition in the context of cross-categorization, i.e., the
phenomenon that concepts are simultaneously organized into several categorizations
and the particular category (and features) that are relevant depend on the context
(e.g., concepts of the category FOOD can be organized based on their nutritional
or perceptual properties). They develop Bayesian models for category and feature
learning and find that only a joint model for both processes explains the emergence of
cross-cutting categories. In addition to a series of experiments based on small data sets
(comprising 8 concepts, 6 features and 2 categorization systems), Shafto et al. (2011)
also evaluate their model in a more naturalistic setting on a cross-categorization task
of ANIMALS and MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS based on human-produced feature norms.
This work is similar to our work in terms of the attempt to learn categories and features
jointly. However, while Shafto et al. (2011) present their model with category-specific
data sets tailored towards their learning objective, we are interested in acquiring cate-
gories and structured associated features jointly from thematically unconstrained cor-
pora of natural text.
Another line of work (Kemp et al., 2003; Perfors et al., 2005) models the joint learning
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of relevant features and domain-specific feature type biases in children. They focus on
the acquisition of domain-specific representational structures (such as hierarchies or
clusters) and discuss results in the context of word learning. In contrast to our work,
their model assumes a priori established categories (such as FOOD and ANIMALS),
and learns from task-specific data representations in the form of objects described by
a limited set of relevant features (however, a weighting of those features is learnt).
Perfors and Tenenbaum (2009) present a Bayesian model which simultaneously learns
categories (i.e., groupings of concepts based on shared features) and learns to learn
categories (i.e., abstract knowledge about kinds of featural regularities that charac-
terize a category). They compare their model predictions against behavioral data from
adult participants, which limits the scope of their experiments to small data sets e.g., of
artificial stimuli with a restricted number of abstract features. In addition to the differ-
ences in the training data, the models discussed so far were not tested under cognitively
motivated learning conditions, e.g., by using incremental learning algorithms.
The ability to automatically extract feature-like information for concepts from text
would facilitate the laborious process of feature norming and improve the coverage
concepts and their features. A few approaches to feature learning from textual cor-
pora exist, and they have primarily focused on emulating or complementing norming
studies by automatically extracting norm-like properties from corpora (e.g., elephant
has-trunk, scissors used-for-cutting). Steyvers (2010) use a flavor of topic mod-
els to augment data sets of human-produced feature norms. While vanilla topic mod-
els (Blei et al., 2003) represent documents as sets of corpus-induced topics, Steyvers
(2010) additionally use topics derived from the feature norms. The learnt topics yield
useful extensions of the original feature norms, with properties that were previously
not covered, suggesting that corpora are an appropriate resource for augmenting fea-
ture norms of concepts.
Another line of research concerns entirely text-based feature extraction. A common
theme in this line of work is the use of pre-defined syntactic patterns (Baroni et al.,
2010), or manually created rules specifying possible connection paths of concepts to
features in dependency trees (Devereux et al., 2009; Kelly et al., 2014). While the set
of syntactic patterns pre-defines the relation types the system can capture, the latter
approach can extract features which are a priori unlimited in their relation to the target
concept. Once extracted, the features are typically weighted using statistical measures
of association in order to filter out noisy instances. Similar to our own work, the mo-
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tivation underlying these models is large-scale unsupervised feature extraction from
text. These systems are not cognitively motivated acquisition models, however, due
to (a) the assumption of involved prior knowledge (such as syntactic parses or man-
ually defined patterns), and (b) the two stage extraction-and-filtering process which
they adopt. Humans arguably do not first learn a large set of potential features for con-
cepts, before they infer their relevance. The systems discussed above learn features for
individual concepts rather than categories.
To our knowledge, we propose the first Bayesian model that jointly learns categories
and their features from naturalistic large-scale input data. Our model is knowledge-
lean, it learns from raw text in a single process, without relying on parsing resources,
manually crafted rule patterns, or post-processing steps. Our work also differs from ap-
proaches which combine topic models with human-produced feature norms (Steyvers,
2010). Our aim is not to boost the generalization performance of a topic model, rather
we investigate how both categories and features can be jointly learnt from data.
5.2 A Bayesian Model for Joint Learning of Categories
and their Features
This section presents our Bayesian model of category and feature induction (hence-
forth, BCF). We give an intuitive overview of BCF, before we formally derive our
model. Afterwards, we derive two approximate learning algorithms: a Gibbs sampler
for batch learning (Section 5.2.1) and an incremental particle filter (Section 5.2.2).
Intuition BCF is a joint model for learning categories and their featural represen-
tation. In a single process, BCF acquires (a) categories (e.g., {ANIMAL, VEHICLE,
TOOL}) of concepts (e.g., {cat, car, drill}), (b) feature types (e.g., appearance,
diet, utility), and (c) associations between categories and feature types. Specifi-
cally, it infers one global set of feature types which is shared across categories (e.g., AN-
IMALS and VEHICLES can be described in terms of colors). However, categories dif-
fer in their strength of association with feature types (e.g., the feature type function
will be highly associated with TOOLS, but less so with ANIMALS). BCF jointly opti-
mizes categories and their featural representation: the learning objective is to obtain
a set of meaningful categories, each characterized by relevant and thematically coher-
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(k1) bouquet scarf hat
slipper coat veil hair
cape glove cap fur...
C
at
eg
or
ie
s (k2) buzzard penguin toad
crocodile bird chickadee
pheasant emu duck...
(k3) broccoli spinach
cauliflower yam potato
blueberry cantaloupe...
(k4) dresser apartment
shack gate basement
garage curtain cabinet...
Fe
at
ur
e
ty
pe
s
(g1) wear cover
veil woman coat
glove hair cap
face head
(g2) white black
color brown dark
colour yellow
spot red hair
(g3) mammal dog
food rodent rat
bird eat animal
rabbit mouse
(g4) wasp insect
beetley ant moth
beetle caterpillar
nest larva egg
Figure 5.1: Examples of categories (top) and feature types (bottom) inferred by the
BCF model from a corpus of encyclopedic text. Connecting lines indicate a strong
association between the category and the respective feature type.
ent feature types. Input to our model is a collection of natural language text stimuli,
each of which consists of a mention of target concept, within its local linguistic con-
text. We treat each stimulus as an observation of the concept: the word referring to the
concept as an instance of the concept itself, and its context words as a representation
of its features. The set of target concepts is fixed, however, the set of context words
(i.e., features) is potentially unbounded and determined by our input text corpora.
We assume that each concept belongs to a single category. We further assume that
each input stimulus refers to exactly one underlying feature type. Our goal in infer-
ence is to assign a feature type to each input, as well as a category to each concept
type. Specifically, the occurrences of a concept will be assigned a category based on
how similar the concept’s associated feature types are compared to the feature types as-
sociated with any potential category. Simultaneously, upon observing a stimulus (i.e.,
a concept in context), the model assigns the context to a particular feature type based
on its probability under all potential feature types, and the prior probability of observ-
ing that feature type with the stimulus concept’s assigned category. From a cognitive
point-of-view this is intuitive: relevant features are triggered by category membership:
cats and dogs might be discussed in terms of their diet, but chairs and tables are not;
their material may however be a relevant featural aspect. Conversely, if we encounter
an instance of a previously unknown concept which is described in terms of its diet,
we may infer that it belongs to the category ANIMAL with a higher probability than to
the category FURNITURE.
Figure 5.1 illustrates example output produced by our model, in terms of learnt cat-
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symbol explanation
d ∈ {1..D} stimulus (e.g., “This dog likes to catch balls.”)
c ∈ {1..C} concept mention in a stimulus
i ∈ {1..I} context word positions in a stimulus
` ∈ {1..L} concept types (e.g., cat, dog, chair, table)
f ∈ {1..V} features (e.g., {runs, barks, eats} {red, made_of_wood})
k ∈ {1..K} categories (e.g., ANIMAL, FURNITURE)
g ∈ {1..G} feature types (e.g., behavior, appearance)
θ K-dimensional parameter vector of category distribution
{µk}Kk=1 G-dimensional parameter vectors of feature type distributions
{φg}Gg=1 V -dimensional parameter vectors of word distributions
Table 5.1: Notational overview of the BCF model (the category and feature type labels
are provided for illustration; BCF is an unsupervised clustering model which induces
unlabeled categories and feature types).
egories, learnt feature types and their mutual associations. Connecting lines indicate
category-feature type associations. Feature types are shared across categories, for ex-
ample the categories CLOTHING (k1), BIRDS (k2), and FOOD (k3) are all associated
with feature type color (g2).
Model Description We now describe the BCF model more formally. Our model is
parameterized with respect to the number of categories K it can infer, as well as the
number of global feature types G that are available across categories. A distribution
over feature types is inferred for each category. We furthermore specify the set of L
target concepts a priori, and provide an input corpus which consists of stimuli covering
all and only these target concepts.
A notational overview is provided in Table 5.1 The generative story of our model is
displayed in Figure 5.2a, and Figure 5.2b shows the plate diagram representation of
BCF. The generative story proceeds as follows. We assume a global multinomial dis-
tribution over categories Mult(θ). Its parameter vector θ is drawn from a symmetric
Dirichlet distribution with hyperparameter α. For each concept type ` = [1...L ], we
draw a category k` from Mult(θ). For each category k, we assume an independent
set of multinomial parameters over feature types µk, drawn from a symmetric Dirich-
let distribution with hyperparameter β. Finally, for each feature type g, we draw a
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(a) Generative story of BCF.
Generate category distribution, θ∼ Dir(α)
for concept type `= 1..L do
Generate category, k` ∼Mult(θ)
for category k = 1..K do
Generate feature type distribution, µk ∼ Dir(β)
for feature type g = 1..G do
Generate feature distribution, φg ∼ Dir(γ)
for stimulus d = 1..D do
Observe concept cd and retrieve category kc
d
Generate a feature type, gd ∼Mult(µkcd )
for feature position i = 1..I do
Generate a feature fd,i ∼Mult(φgd)
(b) Plate diagram of BCF.
gc f
k` θ αµkβ
φ γ
I
D
LK
G
Figure 5.2: Top (a): The generative story of the BCF model. Observations f and
latent labels k and g are drawn from Multinomial distributions (Mult). Parameters for
the multinomial distributions are drawn from Dirichlet distributions (Dir). Bottom (b):
The plate diagram of the BCF model. Shaded nodes indicate observed variables, clear
nodes denote latent variables, and dotted nodes indicate constant hyperparameters.
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multinomial distribution over features Mult(φg) from a symmetric Dirichlet distribu-
tion with hyperparameter γ. With these global assignments in place, we can generate
sets of stimuli d = [1...D] as follows: we first retrieve the category kc
d
of an observed
concept cd; we then generate a feature type gd from the category’s feature type dis-
tribution Mult(µkcd ); and finally, for each position i = [1...I] we generate feature fd,i
from the feature type-specific feature distribution Mult(φgd).
The joint probability of the model over latent categories, latent feature types, model
parameters, and data factorizes as:
p(g, f ,µ,φ,θ,k|c,α,β,γ) =
p(θ|α)∏` p(k`|θ)∏
k
p(µk|β)∏
g
p(φg|γ)∏
d
p(gd|µkcd )∏
i
p( f d,i|φgd).
(5.1)
Since we use conjugate priors throughout, we can integrate out the model parameters
analytically, and perform inference only over the latent variables, namely the category
and feature type labels associated with the stimuli (see Sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2 for
a mathematical discussion of this approach).
To sum up, our model takes as input a text corpus of concept mentions in local context,
and infers a concept categorization, a global set of feature types, as well as a distri-
bution over feature types per category. After integrating out model parameters where
possible, we infer two sets of latent variables:
(1) feature type-assignments to each stimulus {g}D,
(2) category-assignments to each concept type {k}L .
The next two sections introduce a batch learning algorithm (a Gibbs sampler; Sec-
tion 5.2.1) as well as a cognitively motivated incremental learning algorithm (a particle
filter; Section 5.2.2) for approximate estimation of these parameters.
5.2.1 Batch Learning
Exact inference in the BCF model is intractable, so we turn to approximate posterior
inference to discover the distribution over value assignments to latent variables given
the observed data. In this section we introduce a Gibbs sampling algorithm (Geman
and Geman, 1984) which is a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm which iteratively
re-assigns single variables based on the current assignments of all other variables. We
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Algorithm 4 The Gibbs sampling algorithm for the BCF model.
1: Input: model with randomly initialized parameters.
2: Output: posterior estimate of θ,φ, and µ.
3: repeat
4: for stimulus d do . Sample stimulus-feature type assignments
5: decrement stimulus d-related counts6:
gd ∼ p(gd
kcd
= i|g−d
kcd
, f−,kc
d
,β,γ) Equation (5.3)
7: update stimulus d-related counts
8: for concept c do . Sample concept-category assignments
9: retrieve category kc
10: decrement concept c-related counts11:
kc ∼ p(k` = j|gk`,k−,α,β) Equation (5.5)
12: update concept c-related counts
13: until convergence
discussed the theory underlying Markov chain Monte Carlo and the Gibbs sampler in
detail in Section 3.3.2 and describe here the particular instantiation of the algorithm for
our BCF model. The sampling procedure is summarized in Algorithm 4. The Gibbs
sampler repeatedly iterates over the training data set and resamples values of the latent
variables. One Gibbs iteration for our model consists of two blocks:
Resampling stimulus-feature type assignments. In the first block we iterate over
the input stimuli d, and resample each stimulus-feature type assignment gd from its
full conditional posterior distribution over feature types conditioned on (a) the values
assigned to all other latent variables unrelated to the current variable of interest, i.e, all
features except those in stimulus d,
(
f−
)
, and all stimulus-feature type assignments
except the one to stimulus d,
(
g−d
kcd
)
; (b) the category currently assigned to d’s target
concept c,
(
kc
d)
; and (c) the relevant hyperparameters
(
β,γ
)
:
p(gd
kcd
= i|g−d
kcd
, f−, kc
d
= j, β, γ) (5.2)
= p(gd
kcd
= i|g−d
kcd
,kc
d
= j,β) × p( f d|f−,gd
kcd
= i,γ) (5.3)
∝
(n ji +β)
(∑i n
j
i +β)
× ∏v∏
fv
a=1(n
i
v+ γ+a)
∏ f∗a=1(∑v niv+ γ+a)
. (5.4)
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The factorization of the posterior distribution in (5.3) follows from the model struc-
ture as described above and shown in the plate diagram in Figure 5.2b. The posterior
distribution factors into the probability of a particular feature type i and the probabil-
ity of the observed features in the stimulus given that feature type. Because of the
Dirichlet-Multinomial conjugacy in our model, these two distributions can be straight-
forwardly computed using only the counts of current value-assignments to all variables
in the model except the ones currently resampled (equation (5.4)):2 the probability of a
hypothetical feature type i is proportional to the number of times it has assigned previ-
ously to stimuli with observed category j, n ji , smoothed by the Dirichlet parameter β.
Similarly, the probability of the observed features of stimulus d under hypothetical
feature type i is proportional to the number of times each individual feature v in d has
been observed under feature type i, niv (smoothed by the Dirichlet parameter γ). In the
second term in (5.4), fv refers to the count of any particular feature v in stimulus d,
and f∗ refers to the number of features in d (irrespective of their value).
We compute the (unnormalized) probabilities of individual hypothetical feature types i
as explained above. These values are then normalized and a new feature type is sam-
pled from the resulting distribution.
Resampling concept-category assignments. The second block of our Gibbs sam-
pler performs a sweep over all concept types ` ∈ {1...L}, and resamples each concept
type `’s category assignment k`. Similarly to the process described above, the new cat-
egory assignment of concept ` is resampled from its full conditional distribution over
categories conditioned on (a) all concept-category assignments except for k`,
(
k−
)
;
(b) the feature type assignments relevant to concept `,
(
g−k`
)
; and (c) all relevant hyper-
parameters
(
α,β
)
:
p(k` = j|g−k`, k−, α, β) = p(k` = j|k−,α) × p(gk`|g−k`,k` = j,β), (5.5)
∝ (n j +α) × ∏g∏
f `g
a=1(n
j
g+β+a)
∏ f
`∗
a=1(∑g n
j
g+β+a)
. (5.6)
Based on the independence assumptions in our model, this probability factorizes into
the prior probability of hypothetical category j and the probability of feature types
observed with concept ` under the hypothetical category j (equation (5.5)). Like above
2Please refer to Section 3.3.2.3 (p. 47) for a mathematical explanation of this result, and to Ap-
pendix A for a detailed derivation.
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these probabilities can be computed purely based on counts of variable-assignments in
the current sampler state (equation (5.6)). In the second term of (5.6), f `g refers to the
number of times feature type g was assigned to a stimulus containing concept type `,
and f `∗ to the number of stimuli containing ` (irrespective of the assigned feature type).
Using the procedure described above we compute an (unnormalized) probability for
each hypothetical category, normalize the probabilities and resample concept `’s cate-
gory k` from the resulting distribution.
5.2.2 Incremental Learning
The Gibbs sampler introduced above stores the complete training data set, and passes
over it repeatedly, approximating the target posterior distribution in an iterative fash-
ion. This process does not resemble the nature of human learning. Humans learn
incrementally, updating knowledge on-the-fly with information observed in the envi-
ronment (Diaz and Ross, 2006), and are subject to memory limitations so that infor-
mation observed in the environment is not stored for future processing in its entirety
(Levy et al., 2009).
Here, we derive a particle filter (Doucet et al., 2001), an incremental learning algo-
rithm, which instills in our BCF model a cognitively plausible learning mechanism:
the training data are presented in an incremental fashion, stimulus by stimulus, and
re-vision of previously encountered data is only possible to a limited extent. As dis-
cussed previously in this thesis (Section 3.3.3, Section 4.3.2), particle filters are an
instantiation of the sequential Monte Carlo estimation framework which maintain an
approximation of the target distribution through a set of hypotheses, and update these
samples incrementally in real-time as novel information becomes available. Particle
filters allow to flexibly adapt the memory capacity of the algorithm by varying the
number of samples N maintained from the posterior distribution (particles). With an
increasing number of particles, the filter can represent the probability space increas-
ingly accurately (with the number of particles approaching infinity, the approximation
is guaranteed to converge towards the target posterior distribution).
The process particle filtering for the BCF model is schematically illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.3 (a). Each particle maintains a sample as concrete instantiation of a categoriza-
tion and featural representation. Figure 5.3 (b) illustrates the information contained in
5.2. A Bayesian Model for Joint Learning of Categories and their Features 129
Figure 5.3: (a) Visualization of the particle filtering procedure for BCF with a 3-particle
filter. Each particle corresponds to a clustering of the observed stimuli (category-
assignments of observed concepts (circles), and feature type assignments of observed
stimuli (boxes)) up to time t (left) . The collection of weighted particles is the current ap-
proximation of the posterior distribution over clusterings (right). The 5 stimuli observed
by the filter are shown in the tables. We show one update step for all particles with stim-
ulus 5, and one subsequent resampling and rejuvenation step. In the resampling step
the highest-weight (red) particle is duplicated, replacing the lowest-weight (green) par-
ticle. In the rejuvenation step each particle revisits previous categorization decisions;
(b) a zoom into the red particle at time t = 5 (revised). Each particle consists of a set
of categories (left), category-specific distributions over feature types (indicated through
weighted connections), and featuretype-specific distributions over features (right). We
labeled the categories and feature types for illustration.
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Algorithm 5 The Particle Filter for the BCF model.
1: Initialize particles by randomly partitioning first d stimuli . Initialization
2: Initialize weights wd = 1N
3: for stimulus t = [d+1..T ] do
4: for particle n = [1...N] do
5: . Particle Updateztn = {gdtn ,kc
dt
n } ∼ q(z1:t−1n |y1:t−1)q(ztn|zt−1n ,yt)
= p(gdt = i,kc
dt
= j|f−,g−,k−;α,β,γ) Equation (5.7)
Stn← (St−1n ,ztn)
6: . Weight Updatew˜tn = w
t−1
n × p(yt |zt−1)
= wt−1n ×∑
i
∑
j
p(gdt = i,kc
dt
= j|f−,g−,k−;α,β,γ)
7: wt ← normalize(w˜t)
8: if ESS(wt)≤ thresh then . Resampling
9: P (i)←{Mult(wt)}Ni=1
10: wt = 1N
11: for particle n ∈ P (i) do . Rejuvenation
12: for rejuvenation point o = [1...O] do
r ∼ unif(0,1)
o∼ unif(1...t) ; gd
o ∼ eqn (5.3) if r ≤ 0.8
o∼ unif(1...C) ; ko ∼ eqn (5.5) otherwise
each particle at any time. An algorithmic overview of the particle filter is displayed in
Algorithm 5.
The particle filter propagates a set of weighted hypotheses or particles through time.
We introduce a notion of time into our model by defining each individual stimulus
observation as a time step. At any time t each particle corresponds to a categoriza-
tion, a set of feature types, and category-feature type associations based on all stimuli
observed up to time t, as illustrated in Figure 5.3 (b). At each time the current observa-
tion is integrated individually into each particle, and the particle state and its weight are
updated with the new information and propagated to time t + 1. This update process
is schematically illustrated in Figure 5.3 (a), where stimulus 5 is integrated into each
of the three particles containing a category and feature representation of previously
encountered stimuli 1–4.
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Technically, the particle filter for the BCF model is based on the technique of sequential
importance sampling (SIS; see Section 3.3.3 for a technical introduction) and its struc-
ture resembles the structure of the particle filter developed for the BayesCat model
in Section 4.3.2.1. Samples representing the target distribution of interest (here the
posterior distribution of the BCF model) are obtained from an importance distribution
(which is easier to sample from than the exact posterior distribution). Each sample is
assigned a weight according to its discrepancy from the true target distribution. The
importance distribution in our particle filter is represented through the set of particles
available from the previous time step (approximating the target posterior at time t−1).
Samples and weights are recursively updated from time t−1 to time t with information
extracted from novel input stimuli observed at time t.
In each update step, we sample a feature type for stimulus dt , gdt , as well as a category
for stimulus dt’s concept, kg
dt , and update the relevant distributions as follows. Inde-
pendently for each particle, we sample
(
gdt ,kc
dt ) jointly from its posterior distribution
conditioned on the particle’s state from time t− 1 which incorporates all information
encountered up to this time (see lines 5–6 in Algorithm 5),
P
(
gd = i,kc
dt
= j|f−,g−,k−;α,β,γ) ∝
P
(
kc
dt
= j|gk`,k−,α,β
) × P(gd
kcd
= i|g−d
kcd
, f−,kc
d
= j,β,γ
)
.
(5.7)
The two components on the right-hand side correspond to equations (5.5) and (5.3),
respectively. This posterior distribution takes into account both the prior probabilities
over (k,g), represented through the particle swarm at time t, as well as the data in the
observation at time t.
From an importance sampling perspective, this posterior distribution is locally opti-
mal3 in the sense that it minimizes the divergence of the importance weights (see Sec-
tion 3.3.3, page 51 f. for a detailed discussion). The importance weights themselves
are updated according to the predictive probability of observation t, and normalized to
sum to one (see lines 6–7 in Algorithm 5).
Despite the local optimality of our importance distribution, the repeated approximate
particle updates ultimately lead to divergence of the particle weights, resulting in few
or even only one particle accumulating the majority of weight mass. Practically the
empirical estimation of the posterior distribution through the set of weighted particles
3It is locally optimal because it assumes that previous particle states (i.e., variable assignments) are
fixed.
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then corresponds to a point estimate: the filter does not accurately represent the area
under the target distribution. Figure 5.3 (a) illustrates the phenomenon of high variance
in particle weights after particle propagation from t = 4 to t = 5 (right).
Resampling Like in the particle filter for the BayesCat model (Section 4.3.2.1) we
alleviate this problem through resampling, a technique to improve the coverage of
the sample space through our particles. A resampling step is executed whenever the
variance among particle weights exceeds as threshold. Weight variance is measured
through the effective sample size (ESS):
ESS(wt) =
(
1
∑n(wtn)2
)
. (5.8)
Whenever this value falls below a threshold we resample N particles from a Multi-
nomial distribution parameterized by the current set of particle weights N times with
replacement. This leads to multiple copies of high-weight ‘good’ particles which rep-
resent the high-probability areas of the sample space, and which are further explored
in the learning process. Low-weight (‘bad’) particles which do not get sampled in
this process are discarded. After resampling, the particle weights are re-set to uni-
form since the resulting sample of particles corresponds to an empirical estimate of
the previous weight distributions. The resampling process corresponds to lines 8–10
in Algorithm 5, and illustrated in Figure 5.3 (a).
Rejuvenation While resampling re-configures the particle filter such that it explores
high-probability areas of the sample space, it impoverishes the sample: The repre-
sentation of the distribution contains multiple copies of identical samples. Further-
more, low-weight particles are discarded which may well be only locally unlikely and
might be accurate at a later stage after more data has been observed. To introduce
diversity back into the resampled particle set a technique called rejuvenation can be
applied, which ‘jiggles’ each resampled particle without altering the distribution it
represents (Gilks and Berzuini 2001, see Section s3.3.3.3, page 54).
We jiggle each resampled particle according to a Gibbs kernel which leaves the target
posterior distribution unchanged. We randomly resample a fixed number of stimulus-
feature type assignments to previously encountered stimuli, and concept-category as-
signments to previously encountered concepts. We resample feature types 80% of the
time since these variables are assigned on the stimulus-level and whereas categories
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are assigned to concepts which are much smaller in number. The rejuvenation proce-
dure is illustrated in the bottom part of Figure 5.3 (a), and technically summarized in
Algorithm 5 (line 12 onwards). As discussed in Section 4.3.2.1 rejuvenation is also
plausible from a cognitive point of view, since human learning is not strictly incremen-
tal: it is possible to re-consider knowledge in the light of newly gained observations or
evidence.
5.3 Experiment 3: Large-Scale Category and Feature
Learning
In this and the following section we evaluate model performance under the two in-
ference algorithms. This section focuses on evaluating the quality of categories and
feature types obtained by our model when applied to a large-scale corpus and learned
in an optimal batch fashion with the Gibbs sampler, and compares BCF to a compet-
itive text-based feature extraction model. We evaluate BCF as a cognitive model of
human category and feature learning in Section 5.4. We present a detailed analysis
of the categories, feature types and category-feature type associations. We start by
presenting our data set, before we introduce the models used for comparison with our
approach, and explain how system output was evaluated. We then report results on a
series of experiments.
Data Like in the BayesCat evaluation (Chapter 4), our experiments are based on a
set of basic level target concepts (e.g., cat or chair) from two norming studies (McRae
et al., 2005; Vinson and Vigliocco, 2008), which were subsequently classified into
41 categories (Fountain and Lapata, 2010). The data set was described in detail in
Section 4.4.1 (p. 80). Here, we use 34 of these categories as a goldstandard in our
categorization experiments (comprising 492 concepts in total). We filter the set of cat-
egories for the joint category and feature evaluation, excluding very general categories
such as THING or STRUCTURE. This decision is based on the intuition that it is difficult
to identify characteristic features for them. As a heuristic, concepts were excluded if
they were close to the root of WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998b), e.g., at depth 2 or 4.
To obtain the input stimuli for the BCF model, we used a subset of the Wackypedia cor-
pus (Baroni et al., 2009), an automatically extracted and part of speech tagged dump of
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the English Wikipedia. For each target concept, we identified one corresponding article
in Wackypedia. We identify mentions of target concepts c in the resulting data set and
define context as the set of words making up the sentence c occurs in (except c). Next,
we extracted a set of stimuli which consists of (a) every sentence from the concept’s
corresponding article, and (b) any sentence in a different article which mentions the
concept. This resulted in a data set of 63,076 stimuli which we split into 60% training,
20% development and 20% test. We removed stopwords as well as words with a part
of speech other than noun, verb, and adjective. Furthermore, we discarded words with
an age of acquisition above 10 years (Kuperman et al., 2012) to restrict the vocabulary
to frequent and generally familiar words, which reduced the set of context word types
from 25,100 to 6,500 (by 74%).
Models and Parameters We compared the performance of BCF against BayesCat,
our Bayesian model of category acquisition introduced in Chapter 4 and Strudel, a
pattern-based model which extracts concept features from text (Baroni et al., 2010).
In all experiments in this section BCF is trained in a batch fashion using the Gibbs
sampler introduced in Section 5.2.1.
BayesCat induces categories which are represented through a distribution over target
concepts, and a distribution over features (i.e., individual context words). In contrast to
BCF, it does not learn types of features. In addition, while BCF induces a hard assign-
ment of concepts to categories, BayesCat learns a soft categorization. Soft assignments
are converted into hard assignments by assigning each concept to its most probable cat-
egory as described in Section 4.4 (equation (4.9), page 84). We ran BayesCat on the
same input stimuli as BCF, with the following parameters: the number of categories
was set to K = 40, and the hyperparameters to α = 0.7,β = 0.1,γ = 0.1. For the
BCF model, we used the same value for K = 40, the number of feature types was set
to G = 75, and the hyperparameters to α= 0.5,β= 0.5, and γ= 0.1. Parameters were
tuned on the development set. For both models, we report results averaged over 10
Gibbs runs, each represented as the final sampler state after 1,000 iterations. We used
annealing during learning which proved effective for avoiding local optima.
Strudel automatically extracts features for concepts from text collections following
a pattern-based approach. It takes as input a part of speech-tagged corpus, a set of
target concepts and a set of 15 hand-crafted rules. Rules encode general, but quite
sophisticated linguistic patters which plausibly connect nouns to descriptive attributes
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(e.g., extract an adjective as a property of a target concept mention if the adjective
follows the mention, and the set of tokens in between contain some form of the verb
‘to be’. (Baroni, 2010)). Strudel obtains a large set of concept-feature pairs by scanning
the context of every occurrence of a target concept in the input corpus, and extracting
context words that are linked to the target concept by one of the rules. Each concept-
feature pair is subsequently weighted with a log-likelihood ratio expressing the pair’s
strength of association. Baroni et al. (2010) show that the learnt representations can be
used as a basis for various tasks such as typicality rating, categorization, or clustering
of features into types. We obtained Strudel representations from the same Wackypedia
corpus used for extracting the input stimuli for BCF and BayesCat. Note that Strudel,
unlike the two Bayesian models, is not a cognitively motivated acquisition model, but
an optimized system developed with the aim of obtaining the best possible features
from data.
5.3.1 Quality of Learnt Categories
In our first experiment we evaluate the quality of the categories induced by the three
models presented above. The models produce hard categorizations, however, the cog-
nitive gold standard we use for evaluation (Fountain and Lapata, 2010) represents soft
categories. We obtained a hard categorization by assigning members of multiple cate-
gories to their most typical category (typicality scores are provided with the data).4
Method BCF and BayesCat learn a set of categories which we can directly compare
to the gold standard. For Strudel, we produce a categorization as follows: we represent
each concept as a vector over features (obtained from Wackypedia), where each com-
ponent corresponds to the concept-feature log-likelihood ratios provided by Strudel.
Following Baroni et al. (2010), we then cluster the vectors using K-means and the
Cluto toolkit.5 As for the other models, we set the number of categories to K = 40.
Metrics We use the same metrics for category quality assessment as in the evalua-
tion of our BayesCat model in Chapter 4. They are described in detail in Section 4.4
(pages 84 ff.). To assess the quality of the clusters produced by the models, we measure
4http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s0897549/data/.
5http://glaros.dtc.umn.edu/gkhome/cluto/cluto/overview
136 Chapter 5. Joint Learning of Categories and their Structured Features
hom com v1 pur col pcf1
Random 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.14 0.16
BCF 0.68 0.64 0.66 0.59 0.52 0.55
BayesCat 0.65 0.59 0.62 0.57 0.45 0.50
Strudel 0.70 0.62 0.66 0.61 0.48 0.54
Table 5.2: Model performance on the category induction task.
purity (pur; the extent to which each learnt cluster corresponds to a single gold class)
as well as its inverse, collocation (col; the extent to which all items of a particular gold
class are represented in a single learnt cluster). Both measures are based on set-overlap,
and we also report their harmonic mean (pc f 1; Lang and Lapata (2011)). In addition,
we report the V-measure (v1; Rosenberg and Hirschberg (2007)) and its factors measur-
ing the homogeneity of clusters (hom) and their completeness (com). The two factors
intuitively correspond to purity and collocation, but are based on information-theoretic
measures.
Results Our results are summarized in Table 5.2. In addition to model perfor-
mance we report PCF1 and V-Measure for a random clustering baseline (cf., Sec-
tion 4.4.1, page 86 for a discussion). The score reflects average cluster quality of
10 random assignments. Overall, the results reveal that BCF and Strudel perform al-
most identically, and both outperform BayesCat. BCF learns the categories from data,
whereas for Strudel we construct the categories post-hoc after a highly informed fea-
ture extraction process (relying on syntactic patterns). It is therefore not surprising that
Strudel performs well, and it is encouraging to see that BCF does too. Also, note that
Strudel tends to learn clean clusters at the cost of recall, whereas the tradeoff is less
extreme for BCF. This patterns is commonly observed with pattern-based approaches,
like Strudel. It is tempting to attribute the superior performance of BCF compared
to BayesCat to the advantage of a joint learning process for categories and features
in knowledge-lean, cognitively motivated models. However, there is another factor
to consider. While BCF and Strudel are constrained to assign each concept to only
one category, BayesCat induces a soft categorization which is turned into a hard cat-
egorization in a post-learning step. While this setting allows for more flexibility, it
also induces more uncertainty and results in categorizations which resemble the gold
standard less closely compared to the two other models.
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5.3.2 Quality of Learnt Features
We next investigate the quality of the features BCF learns by letting the model predict
the right concept solely from a set of features. If a model has acquired informative
features, they will be predictive of the unknown concept. Specifically, the model is
presented with a set of previously unseen test stimuli with the target concept removed.
For each stimulus, the model ranks all possible target concepts based on the features f
(i.e., context words).
Method We compare the ranking performance of BCF, BayesCat, and Strudel, like
in the category evaluation above. For the Bayesian models, we directly exploit the
learnt distributions. For BCF, we compute the score of a target concept c given a set of
features as:
Score(c|f) =∑
g
P(g|c)P(f|g). (5.9)
Similarly, for BayesCat we compute the score of a concept c given a set of features as
follows:
Score(c|f) =∑
k
P(c|k)P(f|k). (5.10)
For Strudel, we rank concepts according to the cumulative log-likelihood ratio-based
association score over all observed features for a particular concept c:
Score(c|f) =∑
f∈f
association(c, f ). (5.11)
Metrics We report precision at rank 1, 10, and 20. We also report the average rank
assigned to the correct concept. All results are based on a random test set of 2,000
previously unseen stimuli. To control for the possibility that the models are learning a
strong (yet trivial) correlation between target concepts and identical words occurring
as features, we also report results on a modification of our test set where we remove
any mention of the target concept from the context, if present (the −tgt condition).
Results Our results on the concept prediction task are shown in Table 5.3. Both
Bayesian models (BCF and BayesCat) outperform Strudel across all metrics and con-
ditions. Strudel’s extraction algorithm, which relies on pre-defined patterns, might be
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pr@1 pr@10 pr@20 avg rank
BCF
full 0.12 0.50 0.63 56.1
−tgt 0.09 0.40 0.53 78.5
BayesCat
full 0.11 0.49 0.64 37.7
−tgt 0.09 0.39 0.53 52.4
Strudel
full 0.07 0.33 0.47 64.4
−tgt 0.07 0.35 0.49 62.2
Table 5.3: Model performance on the concept prediction task in terms of precision
at rank 1, 10, 20, and average rank assigned. −tgt refers to the condition where we
remove context words which are identical to the target concept as opposed to using the
full context.
too restrictive with respect to the set of features it extracts which as a result are not
as discriminative as the features learnt by BCF and BayesCat, which are a priori un-
restricted. BayesCat and BCF perform comparably given that they learn from exactly
the same data and exploit local co-occurrence relations in similar ways. BayesCat pro-
duces better average rank scores than BCF, while achieving lower precision scores.
This can be explained by the fact that BCF assigns low ranks to correct concepts more
reliably than BayesCat. Figure 5.4 shows the relative cumulative frequencies of the
ranks assigned by the three models. We display the top ranks 1 through 20 (out of
492). As can be seen, BCF performs slightly better than BayesCat. Pairwise differ-
ences between the systems are all statistically significant (p 0.01); using a one-way
ANOVA with post-hoc Tukey HSD test).
Note that performance decreases for both Bayesian models in the −tgt condition,
i.e., when occurrences of the target concept are removed from the context. Strudel
is less affected by this given its pattern-based learning mechanism which is not prone
to associating target word types with themselves. However, repetitions are a natural
phenomenon from a cognitive standpoint and it seems reasonable to consider multiple
occurrences of a concept as a canonical feature of the learning environment.
Overall, the precision scores may seem low. However, bear in mind that the mod-
els rank a set of 492 target concepts. A random baseline would achieve a pr@1 of
only 0.002%. In addition, the target concepts we are considering are by design highly
confusable: They were selected so that they form categories and are thus bound to
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Figure 5.4: Number of times the correct target concept was placed within the top 20
ranks by BCF, BayesCat, and Strudel. The differences between the systems’ perfor-
mance are statistically significant (with the vector of 2K ranks as assigned by the par-
ticular systems as input; ANOVA (F=45.865 p< 0.01)).
share some features which makes the prediction task harder. Example output for all
three models is shown in Figure 5.5. The models take context features “journey move
hundred mile strong” and “avoid cut quick claw tip” as input and are expected to pre-
dict salmon and finger, respectively. Unlike Strudel, BCF and BayesCat rank salmon
almost correctly and the other high ranked concepts are reasonable in the given context
as well. For the second example, only Strudel predicts the correct concept correctly,
but again the top-ranked concepts of the other two models are reasonable in the given
context.
5.3.3 Quality of Learnt Feature Types
In this suite of experiments we evaluate two aspects of the feature types induced by
our model: (1) Are they relevant to their associated category? and (2) Do they form a
coherent class? Our evaluation followed the intrusion paradigm originally introduced
to assess the output of topic models (Chang et al., 2009). We performed two intrusion
studies using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowd-sourcing platform.
In the feature intrusion study, participants were shown examples of categories and a list
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salmon journey move hundred mile strong current
reproduce
BCF a salmon tuna goldfish lobster fish
BayesCat fish radio goldfish salmon clock
Strudel train house apartment ship car
finger avoid cut quick claw tip painful
BCF tent ski peg curtain hut
BayesCat eye ear spider leg hair
Strudel finger toe hair tail hand
Figure 5.5: Model output on the concept prediction task for salmon (top) and finger
(bottom): the top part of each table shows the true concept (left) and the context pro-
vided to the model as input (right). The bottom part of the table shows the five most
highly ranked concepts (left to right) for each model.
of feature types. Both categories and feature types were represented as word clusters.
Example tasks are shown in Figure 5.6. One of the feature types was an ‘intruder’ not
associated with the category in the model output, and participants were asked to detect
the intruder feature type. If a model learns relevant feature types, we would expect
participants to be able to identify the intruder relatively easily.
We also conducted a word intrusion study, where participants were shown a single
feature type (again represented as a word cluster). One of the words, which was not
highly associated with the feature type in the model output, was added as an ‘intruder’,
Figure 5.7 displays two example tasks. Again, participants were asked to detect the
intruder feature (i.e., word). If the features are overall coherent and meaningful, it
should be relatively straightforward to identify the intruder.
Method We compared the feature types learnt by BCF and Strudel. We omitted
BayesCat from this evaluation as it does not naturally produce feature types, rather it
associates unstructured lists of features with categories. As mentioned earlier, Strudel
does not induce feature types either, however, it associates concepts with features
which can be post-processed to obtain feature types as follows. Given a category in-
duced by Strudel (as explained in Section 5.3.1), we collected the features associated
with at least half of the concepts in the category with a log likelihood score no less
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‘Select intruder feature type (right) wrt category (left).’
ant hornet butterfly moth
flea beetle grasshopper
wasp caterpillar
cockroach
◦ egg female food young bird
◦ ant insect butterfly wasp larva
◦ body air fish blood muscle
◦ sound human nerve bird brain
• wear cover veil woman coat
◦ culture symbol popular feature animal
veil coat hair fur glove
cape hat cap bouquet
scarf slipper
◦ wear cover veil woman coat
◦ white black color brown dark
• cat box object litter mark
◦ eye tooth ear skin lip
◦ wear suit trouser woman garment
◦ animal feather material wool skin
Figure 5.6: Two illustrations of the feature type intrusion task, with annotator instruc-
tions shown at the top. The correct responses are marked with a filled circle.
than 19.51.6 We then clustered these features with K-means (using the Cluto toolkit)
into K = 5 feature types. Note that the Strudel feature types were (i) elicited through
a pipelined procedure, and (ii) are not shared across categories, but optimized for each
category individually. We therefore expect Strudel to perform well in this evaluation.
For BCF, for each category k, we select the five feature types g with highest associa-
tion P(g|k), together with one intruder feature type g′ which is highly associated with
some other category k′ but not with k. For Strudel we took the five feature types elicited
through the procedure described above, and one random feature type from the global
set of feature types. Each feature type was represented by a cluster of five words.
In the word intrusion task, participants were only shown feature types (i.e., word clus-
ters) irrespectively of the associated category. BCF feature types g were represented
as the set of the five words w with highest probability P( f |g). In addition, we added
one intruder word which had low probability under g but high probability under some
other feature type. For Strudel, we represented feature types as a random subset of five
words, and added an additional intruder word from the global set of features.
6Following Baroni et al. (2010), this number corresponds to a probability of co-occurrence below
0.00001, assuming independence.
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‘Select the intruder word.’
◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦
egg female box food young bird
• ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
leg cat population dog wolf animal
Figure 5.7: Two illustrations of the word intrusion task, with annotator instructions
shown at the top. The correct responses are marked with a filled circle.
For the feature type intrusion task, we evaluated a total of 40 categories for each model.
Each participant assessed 10 categories per session (5 per model). Categories and fea-
ture types were presented in random order. For the word intrusion task, we evaluated
a total of 66 feature types for each model. Participants saw 11 feature types per ses-
sion, in randomized order. In both cases, we collected 10 responses per item. The
instructions given to participants in the Mechanical Turk experiments are included
in Appendix B.1 (for the feature type intrusion task), and in Appendix B.2 (for the
word intrusion task). The full set of stimuli for both tasks and systems is available
at http://frermann.de/mturk2015/.
Results We evaluated feature type relevance and coherence by measuring precision
(the proportion of intruders identified correctly). We also use the Kappa coefficient to
measure inter-subject agreement (Fleiss, 1981) on our two tasks.
Our results are presented in Table 5.4. Participants identify the intruder feature type
correctly more than 50% of the time. The performance of Strudel is slightly better
compared to BCF, both in terms of accuracy and Kappa (however the differences are
not statistically significant, using a t-test). Again this is not surprising considering
that Strudel’s feature types were elicited through a highly informed, pipelined process.
The results show that the simpler and cognitively plausible BCF model learns feature
types of a quality comparable to a highly engineered, competitive system. Examples of
feature types discovered by BCF and Strudel are shown in Figure 5.8, for the category
CLOTHING. As can be seen, Strudel obtains a large number of action-related features
(e.g., replace, change, steal ). BCF creates more varied feature types. For example,
the second cluster refers to external properties (e.g., color), the fourth cluster denotes
related concepts such as hyponyms, and the last cluster contains CLOTHING materials.
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Feature Type Intrusion Word Intrusion
Precision Kappa Precision Kappa
BCF 0.52 0.23 0.78 0.60
Strudel 0.56 0.26 0.36 0.21
Table 5.4: Performance of Strudel and BCF on the feature type and word intrusion
tasks. We report precision and inter-subject agreement (Fleiss’ Kappa; all Kappa values
are statistically significant at p 0.05).
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Figure 5.8: Example feature types learnt for the category CLOTHING by Strudel (top)
and BCF (bottom).
Concerning the word intrusion task, we observe that participants are able to detect
the intruder more accurately when presented with BCF feature types as compared to
Strudel feature types (differences between Strudel and BCF are statistically significant
at p 0.05, again using a t-test). Figure 5.9 schematically illustrates the distribution
over the number of annotators that agree on the correct intruder word for both Strudel
and BCF. We can see (considering the combined green bars 9 and 10) that for more
than 50% of the test items either 9 or 10 out of 10 annotators agreed on the correct
intruder when presented with output from the BCF model. The results suggest that
the feature types learnt by BCF are more coherent, and indeed express meaningful
properties shared by concepts belonging to the same category. While being relevant
to the category, Strudel’s feature types do not seem to exhibit internal coherence to a
similar extent. The examples in Figure 5.8 qualitatively confirm this result: It is more
difficult to assign a meaningful label to the feature types induced by Strudel (top) than
to those induced by BCF (bottom). For example, the second BCF feature type from the
left could be labeled color and the rightmost one material. The mutual dependence
of category formation and feature learning allows BCF to learn feature types which are
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Figure 5.9: Illustration of Mechanical Turk annotator responses for the word intrusion
task. Each bar shows the proportion of all responses in which N ∈ {1, ...,10} annota-
tors agree on the correct label for BCF (green) and Strudel (orange).
both relevant and individually interpretable.
5.3.4 Discussion
We applied our joint model of category and feature learning, BCF, to large-scale
encyclopedic text extracted from Wikipedia, and showed that it effectively captures
category- and associated structured featural information encoded in this data. Evalu-
ation of the inferred categories and their features shows that BCF performs compet-
itively compared to a system specifically engineered to extract high quality features,
despite the more complex learning objective, and the knowledge-lean approach.
We approximated the learning environment with large text corpora extracted from
Wikipedia. However, we do not claim that the induced features closely correspond
to features produced by humans in human feature elicitation studies. Instead, we show,
through crowdsourcing-based human evaluation, that the learnt features are meaning-
ful in that they are relevant to their associated category and form a coherent class.
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Having demonstrated how our model performs on a broad task and under an optimal,
batch learning algorithm, the following section will focus on BCF as a cognitive model
of human learning.
5.4 Experiment 4: Child Category and Feature Learn-
ing
In this section we investigate the learning process of the BCF model under conditions
which more closely resemble those faced by children acquiring categories and asso-
ciated features. We apply BCF to a corpus of child-directed language, approximating
the learning environment that children are exposed to. We train BCF with the incre-
mental learning algorithm introduced in Section 5.2.2, which approximates the target
posterior distribution in an sequentially performing one sweep over the training data
and recursively improving its estimate. We refer to this incremental version as i-BCF
(and to its batch version learnt with a Gibbs sampler as BCF).
Our evaluation is structured into two parts. In the first part we are interested in ver-
ifying that i-BCF induces meaningful categories and feature types. To this end we
compare the incremental i-BCF to BCF, its Gibbs sampling-based counterpart. Both
models are trained on a corpus of child-directed language. We quantitatively evaluate
the induced categories, as well as the learnt feature representations. We also present
qualitative examples of categories and feature types induced by the particle filter. Hav-
ing confirmed that the incremental i-BCF model is capable of learning meaningful
categories and representations, we move on to investigate the effect of resource con-
straints on the learning process: we compare the performance of i-BCF models trained
with particle filters with varying numbers of particles.
Data The child-directed speech corpus underlying our BayesCat experiments (Sec-
tion 4.5) is not appropriate as input data to the (i-)BCF models, because the respective
stimuli comprise a context window of only ±2 words. Each concept mention is thus
represented by a very restricted feature set, which is likely too limited for learning
structured feature representations.7 Instead, we extracted a dense longitudinal corpus
7We confirmed this hypothesis experimentally: i-BCF models trained on the CHILDES corpus used
in Section 4.5 did not learn meaningful features and showed less discernible learning curves.
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of child-directed speech from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000), compris-
ing frequent recordings of child-parent interactions over an extended time span.8 From
this underlying data set we extract stimuli from it with a slightly larger context window
of ± 3 words.9
We create an input corpus, comprising four sub-corpora, all of which contain tran-
scribed speech data from natural interactions of children with their caretakers (mostly
their mothers) at home:
• The ‘Thomas’ corpus (Lieven et al., 2009) contains data from interactions with
one monolingual British English child who was recorded over a period of 3 years
(from age 2 to age 5). Recordings were made five times a week for one hour
during the first year, and for one hour per month in the two following years.
• The ‘MPI-EVA-Manchester’ corpus (Theakston et al., 2015) contains recordings
of interactions from two monolingual British English children. Their interac-
tions with caretakers were recorded between age 2 and 3. Recordings were made
10 times per month most of the time, but more frequently (10 times a week) for
the first and last two months of the recording period.
• The ‘Manchester’ corpus (Theakston et al., 2001) comprises recordings of 12
monolingual British children between 2 and 3 years old. The recordings are less
dense with two recorded sessions (30 minutes each) in every 3-week period for
one year.
• The ‘Providence’ corpus (Demuth et al., 2006) contains recordings form longi-
tudinal studies of 6 monolingual American English children aged between one
and three years. Recordings were made for one hour every two weeks.
We filter all child-produced utterances from the corpora, so that our input corpus con-
sists only of child-directed language. We divide the documents into time-stamped sub-
sets by conflating documents by the age of the child being spoken to into bins covering
one month. The earliest covered time period is 0 years 11 months, and the last period
is 4 years 11 months. We remove stop words, comprising a standard list of function
8This corpus also underlies the cognitive experiments on meaning development in child concept
representations in Chapter 6, and was thus constructed with a demand of temporally dense recordings
in mind.
9Note that spoken, child-directed language is largely made up of short utterances which frequently
switch topic, so that even larger context windows will result in a high proportion of irrelevant informa-
tion in individual stimuli.
5.4. Experiment 4: Child Category and Feature Learning 147
words, names, as well as a list of non-content words specific to child-directed speech
(for example different forms of ‘mum’ and ‘dad’).
We extracted input stimuli which consist of one target concept within a ±3 word con-
text window. We restrict the set of context words, removing all words which occur
fewer than 100 times in the resulting corpus of stimuli, leading to a reduction of con-
text word types from 10,922 to 1,459 (by 87%). We then only keep input stimuli which,
after context filtering, still possess their full context (i.e., six surrounding words). The
resulting corpus covers 119 target concepts from 26 different categories. This is a sub-
set of the 492 concepts used in the Wikipedia-based evaluation in Section 5.3. Due
to the nature of child-directed speech the remaining concepts did not appear in our
final corpus. We extract a total of 47,639 stimuli comprising 1,459 context feature
types. During the incremental learning process, the extracted stimuli are presented to
the model in chronological order, sorted with respect to the age of the addressed child.
Method We train i-BCF models on the CHILDES corpus described above using par-
ticle filters with varying numbers of particles, N ∈ {1,5,10,20,50,100}. We set the
effective sample size threshold for resampling to ESS(w) = 0.5∗N and rejuvenate 100
previously observed stimuli after each resampling process. These parameters are iden-
tical to the settings used in the incremental BayesCat experiment in Chapter 4. The
i-BCF parameters are set to the following values: the number of categories K = 30, the
number of feature types G = 35, and the hyperparameters α = 0.3,β = 0.1,γ = 0.1.
The parameter values were adapted to the smaller nature of the CHILDES corpus as
compared to the Wikipedia corpus, but not tuned exhaustively. For the particle filters
with N > 1 particles we report performance as the score of the best-performing particle.
All reported quantitative results are based on averages over 10 runs of any N-particle
filter.
In order to contextualize the performance of the i-BCF models, we also train a BCF
model (using a Gibbs sampler) on the CHILDES corpus. The BCF parameters are set
to the same values as those of i-BCF, and we ran the Gibbs sampler for 1,000 iterations.
Like in the Wikipedia experiments, we use annealing in order to avoid local optima.
Again, all results are averages over 10 runs of the sampler. Unlike in the Wikipedia
experiments, we do not report results on Strudel (Baroni et al., 2010) here. Strudel’s
feature extraction mechanism relies on a set of syntactic rules, which were defined for
grammatical (written) language. The language of the CHILDES corpus, however, is
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hom com v1 pur col pcf1
Random 0.54 0.48 0.51 0.35 0.29 0.32
BCF 0.72 0.67 0.69 0.62 0.55 0.58
i-BCF 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.56 0.56
BCF (Wikipedia) 0.68 0.64 0.66 0.59 0.52 0.55
Table 5.5: Quality of categories induced by the i-BCF model (with 100 particles)
and the BCF model when trained on the CHILDES corpus. We also report a ran-
dom clustering baseline (Random). For comparison we repeat the BCF results on the
Wikipedia corpus (note that due to differences in the underlying test set, the scores on
the CHILDES and the Wikipedia corpus are not directly comparable).
spoken and child-directed and hence frequently non-standard and ungrammatical.
We report categorization quality in terms of two automatic clustering evaluation scores,
purity, collocation, pcf1, and V-measure, as described in Section 5.3.1. In addition, we
compare i-BCF against BCF on its ability to predict a missing target concept based on
the stimulus context, as in the evaluation described in Section 5.3.2. We use a random
selection of 300 unseen test stimuli in this evaluation, and report precision at ranks
1, 10 and 20. In addition to these task-based evaluation metrics we also report the
learning curves in terms of model log-likelihood i-BCF models with varying numbers
of particles.
5.4.1 Quality of Learnt Categories and Features
We compared the output of the batch BCF model against the categories and features
learned by the incremental i-BCF model. All results reported in this section are taken
from the final representations induced by the highest-weighted particle of a 100 particle
filter after observation of the full training corpus, unless otherwise specified.
Table 5.5 compares the quality of induced categories of BCF and i-BCF, as well as
a random baseline (Random). Details on the random baseline and its misleadingly
high V-Measure scores are provided in Section 4.4.1 (page 86). We repeat the BCF
categorization performance on the Wikipedia corpus from Section 5.3. The quality of
categories induced by BCF on the two corpora are comparable, although the numbers
do not align directly since the target concept data sets for the two corpora differ in
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Figure 5.10: Examples of categories (top) and feature types (bottom) inferred by the
i-BCF model (with 100 particles) trained on the CHILDES corpus. Connecting lines
indicate a strong association between the category and the respective feature type.
size. BCF clearly outperforms i-BCF which is unsurprising given its ideal batch learn-
ing behavior. This observation is also in line with our comparison of the incremental
BayesCat model with its batch counterpart in the previous chapter (Table 4.6, Page 93).
Figure 5.10 displays qualitative examples of the categories and associated feature types
induced by the 100 particle i-BCF model from the CHILDES corpus. The examples
confirm that despite the quantitative gap in performance, the incremental model still
learns discernible categories and meaningful featural associations from child-directed
language. Categories such as ANIMAL (k3), BODYPART (k2) or FOOD and FRUIT (k7,
k8) emerge. A number / counting related feature type emerges (g2) which is asso-
ciated with a BIRTHDAY/CAKE category (k1), the BODYPART category (including the
concept finger) (k2) as well as category k6 which includes the concept clock. Over-
all, the feature types are not as interpretable as those induced from the Wikipedia
data (cf., Figure 5.5) which is unsurprising given the noisier data set of natural, child-
directed speech which, in contrast to Wikipedia, is not constructed with the explicit
single purpose of knowledge transfer.
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pr@1 pr@10 pr@20
BCF 0.12 0.51 0.67
i-BCF 0.07 0.32 0.49
Gibbs (Wikipedia) 0.12 0.50 0.63
Table 5.6: Comparison of the concept prediction performance of the i-BCF model
(with 100 particles) and BCF when trained on the CHILDES corpus. For comparison
we repeat the BCF results on the Wikipedia corpus (note that due to differences in
the underlying test set, the scores on the CHILDES and the Wikipedia corpus are not
directly comparable).
We compare the performance of BCF and i-BCF on the feature prediction task in Ta-
ble 5.6. We report precision results at ranks 1, 10 and 20.10 Models are presented with
the context of an unseen input stimulus and predict a ranking of target concepts based
on their probability in the given context, as described in Section 5.3.2. Again BCF’s
performance on Wikipedia is overall comparable to its performance on the CHILDES
corpus (but note that the numbers do not align directly due to different model set-
tings and test sets). Like in the previous evaluation, there is a drop in performance
for i-BCF, when compared to BCF. Note that i-BCF still performs significantly above
chance (random choice would lead to an expected precision at rank 1 score of 0.008).
Figure 5.11 lists examples of model output in the concept prediction task for i-BCF
models with 1-particle (N = 1), and 100-particles (N = 100), and for BCF. All mod-
els were trained and tested on the CHILDES corpus. The first example shows model
predictions for a test stimulus with context {silver vest red black car color}. Both the
100-particle i-BCF and BCF rank the correct concept (car) among their top 5 predic-
tions, which are overall coherent and meaningful. The 1-particle i-BCF predictions
are less relevant and less coherent. Examples 2–4 show instances where the correct
concept is highly ranked by most systems. Examples 5 and 6 display examples where
the advantage of batch BCF model becomes apparent. The context of example 6, {hair
love night eat worm food}, leads BCF to correctly consider the latter features and pre-
dict a set of relevant animals within the top 5 ranks. The i-BCF models on the other
hand seem go be deceived by the heterogeneous feature set of the stimulus, and make
less consistent predictions.
10Unlike in Experiment 3, we do not report average rank results because no meaningful pattern
emerged suggesting that they do not reflect model performance.
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1 car silver vest red black car color (rank)
i-BCF N = 1 cat pajamas bucket orange shirt (24)
i-BCF N = 100 train car helmet bicycle wheel (2)
BCF ambulance bicycle car tractor helmet (3)
2 crayon nicole chalk play move over draw (rank)
i-BCF N = 1 crayon crane ball envelope fence (1)
i-BCF N = 100 bed crayon hand pot ball (2)
BCF bus ball train pie crayon (5)
3 cup kettle boil ready tea lift orange (rank)
i-BCF N = 1 knife bin bag potato bread (6)
i-BCF N = 100 bed crayon hand pot cup (5)
BCF cup bottle orange tray fridge (1)
4 cat nice ginger pussy realize watch happy (rank)
i-BCF N = 1 door fridge cat key gate (3)
i-BCF N = 100 nose ear eye cat bear (4)
BCF cat mouse fence tail dog (1)
5 house actual park outside roof catch fire (rank)
i-BCF N = 1 train ambulance garage horse bicycle (21)
i-BCF N = 100 train car helmet bicycle wheel (23)
BCF telephone house mouse door spider (2)
6 bird hair love night eat worm food (rank)
i-BCF N = 1 hand cheese hair plate toilet (36)
i-BCF N = 100 bin chair box hair table (22)
BCF caterpillar butterfly frog bird crocodile (4)
Figure 5.11: Model output for the concept prediction task for i-BCF with 1 particle
(N = 1), i-BCF with with 100 particles (N = 100), and by the batch BCF model (BCF).
The top row of each example shows the true concept to be predicted (bold italics; left)
and the context provided to the model as input (right). The bottom part of each example
shows the five most highly ranked concepts (left to right) for each model, as well as the
rank of the correct concept in brackets on the right.
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Figure 5.12: Model log-likelihood development on the CHILDES corpus for i-BCF mod-
els with varying numbers of particles.
The qualitative examples do not only reflect the quantitative results presented in Ta-
ble 5.6, but also show that the task is far from trivial. Due to the removal of stopwords
and low-frequency words, the local context of a concept may not be highly predictive
of the missing concept. The 300 unseen test stimuli were selected at random without
filtering for meaningful contexts.
5.4.2 Analysis of Memory Constraints
In this section we investigate i-BCF’s incremental learning process itself. We are inter-
ested in (a) whether discernible learning curves in terms of continuous improvement in
performance emerge; and (b) how this process is influenced by restricting the number
of particles available to the particle filter. Increasing the numbers of particles allows for
a better empirical estimate of the sample space at the cost of exceedingly high memory
usage: each particle holds a sample from the posterior distribution of interest which
is individually updated with newly observed information. Clearly human cognitive
processing capabilities are limited by memory and we investigate the influence of the
number of particles on the quality of the representations learnt by our i-BCF models.
Method i-BCF models are sequentially presented stimuli of child-directed language,
chronologically sorted with respect to the addressed child. We compute learning curves
for i-BCF models trained with N ∈ {1,5,10,20,50,100} particles for a variety of eval-
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uation metrics. We report learning curves based on (1) model log-likelihood, a model-
internal measure for convergence; (2) category quality in terms of purity, collocation,
pcf1 measure, as well as homogeneity, completeness and v1; and (3) feature-based
concept prediction in terms of rank precision scores.
Results Figure 5.12 displays the development of model log-likelihood for particle
filters with varying numbers of particles. The overall log-likelihood values improve
for i-BCF models with an increasing number of particles (higher is better). This is
expected because more particles provide better coverage of the probability space and
hence approximate the posterior distribution is approximated increasingly accurately.
The difference in performance between the 1-particle filter and filters with multiple
particles is most pronounced, whereas filters with multiple particles available perform
very similarly. Note that performance differences are to some extent smoothed out
by the fact that the learning curves are based on average values for 10 runs of the
respective filters. Similar to our observation for the BayesCat model the log-likelihood
flattens out towards the end of the learning curve (Figure 4.8b, page 100). While
ideally it should eventually improve, we suspect that the size of the stimuli set used in
this experiment was too small.
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 display the development of category quality in terms of purity,
collocation and their harmonic mean (pcf1) in Figures 5.13a–5.13c, as well as homo-
geneity, completeness and their harmonic mean (V-measure) in Figures 5.14a–5.14c.
Overall, clearly discernible learning curves in terms of continuously improving qual-
ity emerge which gives further indication that our i-BCF models learn categories and
features effectively in a joint and incremental fashion. As a further overall pattern we
can observe that more particles lead to higher-quality category estimates throughout
the board.
Finally, Figure 5.15 displays the incremental process of learning to predict concepts
based on their surrounding features, and thus provides a measure of the development of
the quality of learnt featural representations over time. We report prediction precisions
at ranks 1, 10 and 20. Overall we observe again improvement over time. i-BCF models
with more particles again show superior performance, particularly in the early learning
phase.
Comparing performance across evaluation metrics (log-likelihood in Figure 5.12, cat-
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Figure 5.13: Purity (a), Collocation (b) and PCF1 (c) learning curves on the CHILDES
corpus for i-BCF models with varying numbers of particles.
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Figure 5.14: Homogeneity (a), Completeness (b) and V-Measure (c) learning curves
on the CHILDES corpus for i-BCF models with varying numbers of particles.
156 Chapter 5. Joint Learning of Categories and their Structured Features
(a)
 0.025
 0.03
 0.035
 0.04
 0.045
 0.05
 0.055
 0.06
 0.065
 0.07
0;11 2;00 2;01 2;03 2;04 2;06 2;08 2;10 3;00 3;10 4;11
ac
cu
ra
cy
 a
t 
ra
n
k
 1
age (year;month)
1 particle
5 particles
10 particles
20 particles
50 particles
100 particles
(b)
 0.16
 0.18
 0.2
 0.22
 0.24
 0.26
 0.28
 0.3
 0.32
 0.34
0;11 2;00 2;01 2;03 2;04 2;06 2;08 2;10 3;00 3;10 4;11
ac
cu
ra
cy
 a
t 
ra
n
k
 1
0
age (year;month)
1 particle
5 particles
10 particles
20 particles
50 particles
100 particles
(c)
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 0.45
 0.5
 0.55
0;11 2;00 2;01 2;03 2;04 2;06 2;08 2;10 3;00 3;10 4;11
ac
cu
ra
cy
 a
t 
ra
n
k
 2
0
age (year;month)
1 particle
5 particles
10 particles
20 particles
50 particles
100 particles
Figure 5.15: Concept prediction learning curves for accuracy at rank 1 (a), rank 10
(b), and rank 20 (c) on the CHILDES corpus for i-BCF models with varying numbers of
particles.
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egorization in Figures 5.13 and 5.14, and concept prediction in Figure 5.15) shows that
the gap in performance is particularly pronounced for the 1-particle filter compared to
filters with multiple particles, especially in terms of the model-internal log-likelihood
metric. This is unsurprising as filters with more particles can explore the model space
increasingly effectively and are more likely to cover high-probability regions of the
parameter space. For the task-based evaluations, however, the performance across fil-
ters with varying number of particles is more comparable. This is in line with our
findings in the context of the BayesCat model discussed in Section 4.5.2 (page 106 f.):
Particle filters with a very moderate number of particles perform competitively across
task-based evaluations. Viewed in the context of human learning, this is an encourag-
ing result since it seems unlikely that humans have the cognitive capacities to maintain
a large number of ‘hypotheses’ in parallel for any learning task. We showed that our
incremental model can learn categories and featural representations effectively even
under limited resources.
5.4.3 Discussion
Learning to group concepts into categories and to identify their relevant features is a
formidable task children face. In this section we modeled the joint category and feature
acquisition process with a cognitively motivated Bayesian model. We showed that our
model induces discernible categories and featural representations from a corpus of
natural, child-directed language and under an incremental learning algorithm which
approximates the nature of human learning.
We presented our model with transcribed child-directed speech, approximating the
environment from which a child acquires category knowledge.11 The restriction to
purely linguistic input does not faithfully capture the breadth of information a child
has access to – visual and pragmatic cues are undoubtedly essential for any learning
process. Nevertheless, our models induced meaningful categories and featural repre-
sentations. Following the evaluation of BayesCat in Chapter 4, these results provide
11As discussed in Chapter 4 (page 107), high-frequency function words as well as rare words are
filtered from the input corpora presented to our models. This preprocessing step is very common in
modeling information from co-occurrence statistics in text corpora, and has been shown to increase the
interpretability and relevance of induced information. The models presented in this thesis are sensitive
to high-frequency words and induced features would likely be dominated bu function words. From a
cognitive point of view filtering high and low-frequency term can also be interpreted as an approximation
of attention: through pragmatic information such as prosody or gesture the child’s attention is guided
towards relevant words and their referents (Dominey and Dodane, 2004).
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further support to our hypothesis that linguistic input is a rich source of information
which incorporates much of the structure and information necessary for conceptual
learning.
We captured the incremental nature of human learning in our models by using a se-
quential Monte Carlo learning algorithm (particle filter). We showed that, while the
quality of learnt categories and representations decreases compared to an ideal batch
learner, meaningful representations nevertheless emerge. The batch learner, a Gibbs
sampler, can be viewed as an ideal observer which holds the complete training data
set in memory and repeatedly iterates over the data to improve the learnt representa-
tions. A particle filter, much more like humans, is presented with training data points
sequentially, observing one stimulus at a time, and immediately integrates the newly
observed information into the knowledge extracted from previously seen input.
With every input stimulus, our particle filter samples (a) a feature type for the stimulus
and (b) the category of the concept mentioned in the stimulus. Questioning category
membership with every observation of a concept, however, seems exhaustive. A more
realistic learner might only periodically re-consider its current belief about a catego-
rization whenever the associated featural representations have been skewed by recent
observations. One could imagine a resample-move based particle filter which samples
stimulus-level feature types with every input stimulus, but resamples a categorization
of concepts only periodically. However, we leave this project to future work.
5.5 Summary
This chapter presented BCF, a cognitively motivated Bayesian model which jointly
learns categories and their features, arguing that the two tasks are co-dependent. We
derived two approximate learning algorithms: a Gibbs sampler, which is an ‘ideal’
batch learner with access to all training data throughout the learning process; and an
incremental learner in form of a particle filter, an instantiation of a sequential Monte
Carlo algorithm which more faithfully resembles the incremental nature of human
learning. We investigated the incremental learning procedure as well as the influence
of memory constraints on the learning process through the particle filter.
Our model learns features from raw text without relying on elaborate pre- or post-
processing or pre-defined knowledge (e.g., in terms of syntactic patterns). We showed
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that high quality categories, feature types and their associations emerge from large-
scale encyclopedic data when estimated with a batch learner. In addition, we applied
our model to a corpus of cognitive data of child-directed language, approximating
the environment a child is exposed to when acquiring categories and their represen-
tation. Evaluation of the quality and development of acquired categories and features
demonstrated our model’s effectiveness under an incremental learning algorithm. We
also showed that its performance degrades gracefully when resource constraints are
imposed on the learning process.
An interesting direction for future work would be to learn feature types from multiple
modalities (not only text) and to investigate how different information sources (e.g., vi-
sual or pragmatic input) influence feature learning. The BCF model learns descriptive
feature types represented as a collection of feature values. In addition to such descrip-
tive features (e.g., behavior) categories also possess defining features (e.g., animate)
which are bound to one particular value. Extending the model in a way that allows to
learn qualitatively different types of features is desirable from a cognitive perspective.
In addition, it would be interesting to investigate the emergence of feature types with
nonparametric Bayesian methods.
Another interesting avenue for future work would be to explicitly evaluate the in-
cremental formation of categories and their featural representations experimentally
against behavioral data obtained from children: do categories and features form in the
same order as they do in child acquisition, and do the intermediate representations
captured by our i-BCF model resemble those found in young children? We expect this
evaluation to be challenging due to the difficulty to obtain longitudinal developmental
data for children.
Finally, the BCF model can be applied to tasks beyond those discussed in this chap-
ter. For example, one could learn definitions (aka features) of terms (aka concepts) in
specialist fields (e.g., finance, law, medicine) or monitor how the meaning of words or
concepts as represented by their features changes over time.
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis were concerned with modeling the acquisition of cate-
gories and features: we investigated the acquisition process of natural categories and
their structured featural representations from large-scale naturalistic input data with
computational cognitive models. Our evaluation implicitly assumed the existence of
one true categorization and, consequently, featural representation of concepts. The
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success of a learner was measured by the extent to which its output resembles this gold
standard categorization. Human conceptual knowledge, however, is flexible and sus-
ceptible to change: Conceptual representations have been shown to be dynamic and
adapt over time and situations. The following chapter is dedicated to these phenom-
ena and investigates the development of linguistic and conceptual representations over
time.
Chapter 6
Modeling Meaning Change over Time
The previous two chapters investigated the process of category and feature acquisition
assuming a single true “gold” categorization against which the quality of the model
output was evaluated. This assumption is reasonable to the extent that there exists a
strong agreement on the meaning of concepts and categories among members of a soci-
ety in order to ensure effective communication. Various phenomena suggest, however,
that conceptual representations can be dynamic, and flexibly adapt to the situation or
environment. Concepts and categories are our mental tools for efficiently represent-
ing and interacting with the world. These representations must be necessarily flexible
and able to adapt to the ever changing environment they represent. Gradual individual
(e.g., through education) or societal (e.g., cultural or technological innovation) devel-
opment over time triggers a smooth adaptation of concepts to match the demands of
their users.
Concept representations change in the course of learning, and this phenomenon has
been observed in both adults (Schyns and Rodet, 1997; Navarro et al., 2013) and chil-
dren (Keil, 1987). Due to limited exposure, children have imperfect and partial knowl-
edge which affects their concept representations. With added experience, their featural
concept representations become increasingly accurate and differentiated. For exam-
ple, young children tend to over-emphasize perceivable surface features of concepts
(e.g., they describe the concept uncle as a person who is a friend of the family
and frequently brings presents; Keil 1987). Over time, children learn the true
defining features of the concept (i.e, that an uncle is the brother of one parent).
Another example of flexibility in meaning representation concerns diachronic change
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of word meaning. Language is a dynamic system that constantly adapts to changes in
the cultural, economic or technical environment of its speakers (Traugott and Dasher,
2001). New words are established, for example in the context of technological inno-
vation (e.g., the verb to google), meanings of words are extended (e.g., for about ten
years the noun tweet has been used to refer to a short digital message) or restricted
(e.g., the word meat was originally used to refer to ‘food’ in general).
In this chapter we investigate meaning development of individual concepts. We de-
velop SCAN, a dynamic Bayesian model of Sense ChANge, which captures concept
meaning as a set of senses whose changing nature is tracked over time. We model
time as a sequence of discrete contiguous intervals and infer a meaning representa-
tion for each interval. Our model captures temporal variation within senses as well
as change across senses, in their relative importance. We explicitly model the smooth
and gradual nature of meaning change by enforcing that temporally adjacent meaning
representations are co-dependent.
We apply SCAN to two phenomena of dynamic development of conceptual represen-
tations.1 First, we investigate the change in concept representation in young children
over time. We expose SCAN to input stimuli extracted from transcribed speech directed
to children between one and five years in age, and monitor the development of meaning
representations with increasing age. We show that the learnt temporal representations
capture how premature child-like conceptual meanings develop towards more accu-
rate and nuanced representations. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first
computational study of meaning development in infants from naturalistic input. We
investigate thematically broad featural patterns for a variety of natural concepts.
In addition, we use SCAN to study diachronic change of natural language (McMahon,
1994). Specifically, we monitor semantic change of individual words over centuries.
We show that our model is able to detect changes across word senses like the emer-
gence of a new sense (e.g., the word mouse in the mid-20th century acquired a new
1A note on terminology: In both applications, our model will be presented with textual input in the
form of target terms in local context. In our child concept acquisition study, we will refer to target terms
as concepts and to their meaning representation as sets of feature types (e.g., a mouse has feature
types such as appearance or behavior). In this evaluation, concepts are nouns referring to living or
non-living things, on the basic category level. In the diachronic language change study, we will refer
to target terms as words and their representation as sets of senses (e.g., the word mouse has a sense
relating to animals and a sense relating to technical device). We will use words comprising an a
priori unrestricted set of nouns and verbs in our experiments. This distinction in terminology reflects the
conventions in the NLP and cognitive literature, respectively, and makes it easier to discuss our work in
the respective contexts.
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sense relating to a computer device). Moreover, it infers subtle changes within a sin-
gle sense (e.g., in the 1970s the words {cable, ball, mouse pad} were typical for the
computer device sense, whereas nowadays the terms {optical, laser, usb} are more
typical). We expose our model to a large text corpus of historical documents, cover-
ing more than three centuries, and show that it performs competitively on a range of
meaning change detection tasks whilst inducing discernible word senses and capturing
their development over time.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We motivate the two applica-
tions of SCAN and position it in the context of prior work in Section 6.1. Section 6.2
introduces our model formally and presents an approximate algorithm for parameter
estimation. Section 6.3 presents our experiments on concept meaning development
in children, and in Section 6.4 we evaluate SCAN on a variety of tasks relating to
diachronic word meaning change. Section 6.5 summarizes our findings.
6.1 The Dynamic Nature of Meaning
We present prior experimental work on the acquisition and development of concept
representations, and their change over time in Section 6.1.1. Section 6.1.2 reviews
previous work on capturing diachronic word meaning change. Both sections include
a review of previously proposed computational models, and position our own work in
this context.
6.1.1 Acquisition and Development of Concept Representations
One of the most fundamental and challenging problems a young child is confronted
with is to associate all and only relevant features with objects and concepts in her
environment: which properties define an object to be a ball? Is a round candle a ball?
What makes an animal a dog? Should it be alive? Does it have to possess a tail? Does
it have to live next door? Is it called Bello? In this chapter we investigate the process
with which featural representations of concepts develop in infants over time.
We review evidence for the dynamic nature of cognitive featural representations with
a particular focus on developmental patterns during concept acquisition in infants. We
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conclude with an overview of computational models of human feature learning (Sec-
tion 6.1.1.1).
The Dynamic Nature of Features The way humans acquire and use features sug-
gests that cognitive featural representations are flexible and susceptible to change.
First and foremost, children develop increasingly accurate concept representations over
time. Feature learning and refinement is not unique to children, but similarly occurs
in adults when they acquire new skills, e.g., in the process of specialist training, such
as learning to distinguish a healthy from a broken bone in X-ray scans (Schyns and
Rodet, 1997; Schyns et al., 1998; Norman et al., 1992). In this sense adults can be
viewed as ‘experts’ and children as ‘novices’ in the context of learning to categorize
and conceptually represent natural objects. In addition to individuals, societies create
new meanings and shift the meaning of the linguistic concepts they use in communica-
tion in order to accommodate changes in their environment and communicative needs.
We turn to this phenomenon in detail in Section 6.1.2.
Category representations do not only change diachronically, but also depend on the
local situational context, e.g., the set of additional concepts present in a scene. Tver-
sky (1977) showed that features used in similarity ratings change based on the set of
concepts at hand: asked which of {Sweden, Hungary, Poland} is most similar to Aus-
tria, participants respond with Sweden (based on neutrality in the Cold War). When
the same question is asked about {Sweden, Hungary, Norway} participants choose
Hungary (based on geographical proximity). Situational context also influences the
relevance of different features (e.g., the central features of an apple in a still life paint-
ing class likely differs from its central features in a lunch break context). This phe-
nomenon has received attention under the term of cross-categorization and has been
investigated both from a behavioral (Barsalou, 1987) and computational (Shafto et al.,
2011) perspective. Finally, established categories have an influence on the featural
representation of their members, as discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
The majority of behavioral studies (and computational models, see Section 6.1.1.1) on
the development of representations in human learning focuses on perceptual features.
These studies either investigate naturalistic adult learning processes such as learning to
detect injuries in X-ray scans (Schyns and Rodet, 1997; Norman et al., 1992) or they
are based on controlled laboratory experiments where participants learn discriminative
features for a set of abstract shapes (such as 2-d or 3-d computer rendered images
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with a controlled feature space). One notable exception is Austerweil and Griffiths
(2011), who experimentally investigate the acquisition of conceptual features in adults.
They expose participants to facts about “Martian animals” found on a meteorite and
investigate the development of the conceptual distinctions participants infer.
Conceptual Development in Children Common experience with conceptual mis-
takes young children make suggests that their concepts and categories blatantly di-
verge from those established among adults in a society. The differences in child and
adult representations as well as the reliable convergence of child representations to-
wards adult representations have received much attention in cognitive science and psy-
chological research in the past (see e.g., (Meadows, 2006, Chapter 2.12) for a recent
overview). Although initial research suggested that children are unable to create con-
sistent categories given a set of ‘sortable’ objects (such as blocks of different size,
shape or color, Inhelder and Piaget 1964), more recent results indicate that children
do possess coherent concepts. These representations, however, differ from adult rep-
resentations with regard to the salience given to different aspects of concept meaning,
which result from children’s limited general knowledge (Mervis, 1987).
A range of behavioral studies found patterns of inaccuracies in child-like concept rep-
resentations. On the basic category level, children (a) form categories that are broader
than adults’ (e.g., round objects are balls, Chapman et al. 1986); (b) form categories
that are narrower than adults’ (e.g., only the blue toy car is a car); or (c) form cate-
gories that partially overlap with adult categories (e.g., cars include trains but exclude
dune buggies, Mervis 1987). Other work has investigated the development of featural
category representations and their structure. Goldstone et al. (2001) found that children
conflate features that adults distinguish (e.g., shade and size).
Keil (1987) investigates the structure of featural representations for different kinds
of categories (animate, artifact and nominal), and their development. For socially con-
structed (nominal) concepts like uncle or tax he finds that the set of features shifts from
characteristic to defining.2 Children of different ages were presented with two kinds
of definitions of concepts such as uncle: the definition either (a) contained many typi-
cal (brings presents for Christmas) but no necessary (is brother of mother
2Characteristic features are properties which are highly associated with a concept, but not necessary
(e.g., although an island typically has sandy beaches, it remains an island even if this property is
absent). Defining features are essential and their lack would change the identity of the concept (e.g., a
piece of land that is not surrounded by water cannot be an island).
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or father) features; or (b) contained necessary, and in addition very untypical (is 2
years old) features. Results show that children with increasing age gradually shift
from preferring definition (a) to preferring definition (b). Similar patterns emerged for
categories of animates (i.e., living things), and artifacts through ’object transformation’
studies. Children of various ages were presented with scenarios in which perceptual
features of animate concepts were drastically changed (e.g., “[...] one takes a raccoon,
fluffs up his tail, sews a smelly sack inside, and even trains it to secrete the contents
when alarmed [...]” (Keil, 1987, p. 187). While younger children judge the animal to
change categories as a result of this transformation, older children and adults agree that
despite the drastic changes the animal is still a raccoon. (Gelman, 1988) confirms the
observed behavioral patterns for additional concepts and categories.
Why do the patterns of inaccuracies discussed above emerge, and how do child-like
representations eventually approach adult-like representations? Various explanations
and theories are offered in the literature. One salient argument concerns the lack of
general knowledge, or theories, that underlie child category representation (Murphy
and Medin, 1985). Young children do not know that the essence of animates (such as
raccoons) is captured in their DNA and that changing the raccoon’s perceptual features
will not change its fundamental property of being a raccoon. Similarly young children
are not aware of family relations that define the term uncle (Keil, 1987). They thus rely
on surface features which are prevalent and perceptible. Additionally, due to a lack of
experience, false beliefs or false features might temporarily influence the child’s cat-
egorization (e.g. a leopard, which looks similar to a cat might say “meow”, Mervis
1987). Finally, children may weigh features differently due to the limited set of situa-
tions they have been exposed to (Mervis, 1987): although they know all the properties
of the concept island, the features {water, beach, holiday} might be salient in the
child’s representation so that she temporarily classifies all places that resemble a beach
resort as islands (Keil, 1989, Chapter 4). Gelman (1988) shows an increased influence
of domain-specific knowledge on category-specific inferences in school children when
compared to pre-schoolers.
The development from child-like conceptual representations towards adult-like repre-
sentations has been shown to be individual. The characteristics of the child’s environ-
ment, i.e., the salience of different concepts in the surroundings influences the speed
and order of learning (Neisser, 1987). In addition, the feedback received through in-
teractions with adults has been shown to have an influence on the learning process
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(e.g., through explicit illustration of important properties of objects, or acknowledging
relevant properties that the child discovered herself, Mervis 1987). We will return to
individual developmental difference in feature learning in the analysis of our results.
The influence of language on the conceptual development in children has been the sub-
ject of debate and is difficult to pin down exactly (see (Goswami, 2014, Chapter 3) for
a discussion). Does increasing linguistic competence change mental concept repre-
sentations, or merely facilitate their communication? Evidence suggests that language
supports the acquisition of imperceptible, knowledge-based features, which allow chil-
dren to learn conceptualizations that go beyond perceptual representation (see also our
discussion in Section 2.1). Experiments with 2-year old children showed that linguistic
labels (e.g., ‘bird’) improve feature prediction accuracy when perceptual cues are not
informative (e.g., for atypical category members, Gelman and Coley 1990). In the ab-
sence of a label 2-year olds tend to predict features based on perceptual similarity (e.g.,
bird features are predicted for a dinosaur perceptually similar to a bird rather than for
atypical birds like pelicans). Similar studies showed that 3-4 year olds do not require
the label and are able to use structural knowledge immediately, which prevents them
from relying on misleading perceptual cues (Gelman and Markman, 1986, 1987).
Our experiments (Section 6.3) investigate the extent to which the developmental pat-
terns discovered in behavioral studies are captured by our computational model of dy-
namic sense change. We investigate this question from a modeling, and now position
our work in the context of previously proposed models of human feature learning.
6.1.1.1 Computational Models of Human Feature Learning
A variety of computational accounts for human feature learning have been proposed
ranging methodologically from neural networks to Bayesian methods, covering both
the acquisition of perceptual (surface) features and conceptual (underlying relational,
or knowledge-based) features. We begin our overview with low-level neural network
models of perceptual feature learning, and proceed to describing higher-level Bayesian
methods and computational models of conceptual feature learning.
Kruschke (1992) model perceptual feature acquisition using a neural network which
learns to weigh features based on their utility for concept categorization. The model
is based on an exemplar categorization model and assumes that features emerge as a
result of concept categorization. The original model was constructed for perceptual
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stimuli represented as points in a feature space and has subsequently been extended to
account for binary featural representations of stimuli indicating the presence or absence
of particular features (Lee and Navarro, 2002).
Modeling feature learning purely based on categorization performance does not cap-
ture the fact that statistical co-occurrence patterns of features across objects also play
an important role in feature acquisition. Goldstone (2003) and Goldstone et al. (2008)
develop a neural network model for perceptual feature learning. In addition to the con-
ceptual bias (features should explain category membership of concepts) their model
includes a distributional bias: features that are spatially close in the stimulus (e.g., ad-
jacent pixels) should receive similar feature values.
Both models discussed above learn features by re-weighting an existing inventory of
features. Fahlman and Lebiere (1990) propose a method for incrementally changing
the structure of a neural network such that additional nodes can be added to account for
increasing complexity in the input data. Love et al. (2004) use this method to model
incremental category learning.
A similar idea of adaptively increasing model complexity with the complexity of the
structure in the input has been put forward in the form of non-parametric Bayesian
models. A series of rational (aka ideal learner) Bayesian models have been proposed
which infer perceptual features from raw pixel input, and account for a variety of cog-
nitive phenomena in human concept learning such as the influence of categorization on
feature creation and incremental learning (Austerweil and Griffiths, 2009, 2011, 2013).
These models formalize feature learning as non-parametric Bayesian inference of the
simplest set of features that explains the input stimuli. They incorporate a simplicity-
encouraging prior over features in form of the Indian Buffet Process (IBP).
The models discussed so far largely focus on the acquisition of perceptual features for
a set of visual concepts. The stimuli themselves tend to be limited in their feature com-
plexity (e.g., 2-dimensional line drawings with black or white pixels, or 3-dimensional
computer rendered gray scale images). They do not resemble the visual input a child
encounters, namely cluttered scenes with a potentially unbounded number of objects
of varying complexity.
Beyond computational models of visual feature learning, a limited number of models
for learning conceptual features have been proposed as well. Austerweil and Grif-
fiths (2011) apply their IBP-based models discussed above to adult acquisition of con-
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ceptual categories: They present participants with descriptions of instances of novel
species present in a set of “Martian fossils”, and investigate the process with which
participants identify discriminating features for the species. While this work is con-
ceptually most similar to our goal of modeling conceptual feature learning, it focuses
on feature development in adults, who are equipped with substantial prior experience
with concept representations and categorization. The inherent limitations of labora-
tory experiments restrict the scope of their setup to a small number of concepts and
features. It is not clear how the results extend to a more naturalistic setting of learning
on a larger scale with potentially unlimited features.
Zeigenfuse and Lee (2010) present a Bayesian model of feature learning from a large
set of human-produced feature norms and similarity ratings for a set of domain-specific
concepts (e.g., animals). Their model extracts a subset of the input features that explain
the feature similarity ratings well. They assume an underlying feature learning process
that optimizes the distance of concepts in a representational space, where each concept
is represented by a weighted vector of features. Other work (Perfors et al., 2005)
investigated the development of features and structured domain knowledge and their
interaction in the context of concept acquisition in children. They develop a Bayesian
model which infers adequate domain-specific knowledge structure (e.g., hierarchical
vs flat) from a set of binary-featured object-feature matrices for the domains of food
and animal. Both models infer features from an already highly constrained feature set
(based on human produced features). We model the acquisition from noisy input data
in the form of transcribed child-directed speech.
Finally, our model is related to computational models of word learning. Young chil-
dren learn new nouns with a rapid pace, and it has been shown that knowledge about
correlating properties facilitates this process (Jones et al., 1991; Landau et al., 1998).
Various models have been proposed that explore the interplay of word learning and
category learning, comprising both connectionist (Colunga and Smith, 2005; Colunga
and Sims, 2011) as well as probabilistic approaches (Yu, 2005). See Section 2.2 for a
thorough review of computational models of word learning and their relation to con-
cept and category acquisition.
Experiment 5 in Section 6.3 explores the development of feature representations of
concepts in the form of thematically coherent clusters of words which change over
time in their nature and relevance, from child-directed language. We advance previous
work in three ways: First, we are interested in the development of conceptual features
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of living and non-living things. Secondly, we investigate the process of how young
children acquire features for basic level concepts. Finally, we model the acquisition
process in a more natural setting that previous work, based on the statistical regularities
in natural language input available to the child. To the best of our knowledge we
present the first large-scale computational study of conceptual development in children.
6.1.2 Diachronic Meaning Change of Words
We now turn to meaning development on a larger scale. We will use SCAN to track
and analyze how language changes over decades or centuries. We will investigate
diachronic low-level semantic change of the meaning of individual words.
Language is a dynamic system, constantly evolving and adapting to the needs of its
users and their environment (Aitchison, 2001). Words in all languages naturally exhibit
a range of senses whose distribution or prevalence varies according to the genre and
register of the discourse as well as its historical context. As an example, consider the
word cute which according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED, Stevenson 2010)
first appeared in the early 18th century and originally meant clever or keen-witted.
By the late 19th century cute was used in the same sense as cunning. Today it mostly
refers to objects or people perceived as attractive, pretty or sweet. Another
example is the word mouse which initially was only used in the rodent sense. The
OED dates the computer pointing device sense of mouse to 1965. The latter sense
has become particularly dominant in recent decades due to the ever-increasing use of
computer technology.
The arrival of large-scale collections of historic texts (Davies, 2010) and online li-
braries such as the Internet Archive and Google Books have greatly facilitated compu-
tational investigations of language change. The ability to automatically detect how the
meaning of words evolves over time is potentially of significant value to lexicographic
and linguistic research but also to real world applications. Time-specific knowledge
would presumably render word meaning representations more accurate, and benefit
downstream tasks where semantic information is crucial. Examples include informa-
tion retrieval and question answering, where time-related information could increase
the precision of query disambiguation and document retrieval (e.g., by returning doc-
uments with newly created senses or filtering out documents with obsolete senses).
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6.1.2.1 Computational Models of Diachronic Meaning Change
Most work on diachronic language change has focused on detecting whether and to
what extent a word’s meaning changed (e.g., between two epochs) without identifying
word senses and how these vary over time. A variety of methods have been applied to
the task ranging from the use of statistical tests in order to detect significant changes
in the distribution of terms from two time periods (Popescu and Strapparava, 2013;
Cook and Stevenson, 2010), to training distributional similarity models on time slices
(Gulordava and Baroni, 2011; Sagi et al., 2009), and neural language models (Kim
et al., 2014; Kulkarni et al., 2015). Other work (Mihalcea and Nastase, 2012) takes
a supervised learning approach and predicts the time period to which a word belongs
given its surrounding context.
Bayesian models have been previously developed for various tasks in lexical seman-
tics (Brody and Lapata, 2009; Ó Séaghdha, 2010; Ritter et al., 2010) and word meaning
change detection is no exception. Using techniques from non-parametric topic model-
ing, Lau et al. (2012) induce word senses (aka topics) for a given target word over two
time periods. Novel senses are then are detected based on the discrepancy between
sense distributions in the two periods. Follow-up work (Cook et al., 2014; Lau et al.,
2014) further explores methods for how to best measure this sense discrepancy. Rather
than inferring word senses, Wijaya and Yeniterzi (2011) use a Topics-over-Time model
and k-means clustering to identify the periods during which selected words move from
one topic to another.
A non-Bayesian approach is put forward in Mitra et al. (2014, 2015) who adopt a
graph-based framework for representing word meaning (see Tahmasebi et al. (2011)
for a similar earlier proposal). In this model words correspond to nodes in a seman-
tic network and edges are drawn between words sharing contextual features (extracted
from a dependency parser). A graph is constructed for each time interval, and nodes
are clustered into senses with Chinese Whispers (Biemann, 2006), a randomized graph
clustering algorithm. By comparing the induced senses for each time slice and ob-
serving inter-cluster differences, their method can detect whether senses emerge or
disappear.
Our work draws ideas from dynamic topic modeling (Blei and Lafferty, 2006b) where
the evolution of topics is modeled via (smooth) changes in their associated distribu-
tions over the vocabulary. Although the dynamic component of our model is closely
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related to previous work in this area (Mimno et al., 2008), our model is specifically
constructed for capturing sense rather than topic change. Our approach is conceptually
similar to Lau et al. (2012). We also learn a joint sense representation for multiple time
slices. However, in our case the number of time slices in not restricted to two and we
explicitly model temporal dynamics. Like Mitra et al. (2014, 2015), we model how
senses change over time. In our model, temporal representations are not independent,
but influenced by their temporal neighbors, encouraging smooth change over time. We
therefore induce a global and consistent set of temporal representations for each word.
Our model is knowledge-lean (it does not make use of a parser) and language indepen-
dent (all that is needed is a time-stamped corpus and tools for basic pre-processing).
Contrary to Mitra et al. (2014, 2015), we do not treat the tasks of inferring a semantic
representation for words and their senses as two separate processes.
Our evaluation in Section 6.4 reveals that SCAN (a) induces temporal representations
which reflect word senses and their development over time, (b) is able to detect mean-
ing change between two time periods, and (c) is expressive enough to obtain useful
features for identifying the time interval in which a piece of text was written. Over-
all, our results indicate that an explicit model of temporal dynamics is advantageous
for tracking meaning change. Comparisons across evaluations and against a variety of
related systems show that despite not being designed with any particular task in mind,
our model performs competitively across the board.
6.2 A Dynamic Bayesian Model of Semantic Change
In this section we introduce SCAN, our dynamic Bayesian model of Semantic ChANge.
SCAN induces a globally coherent representation of meaning development of individ-
ual words over time3, comprising a set of time-specific word meaning representations.
We start by explaining the intuitions and assumptions underlying our model, and con-
tinue with a technical model description, before we describe an approximate learning
algorithm.
3Throughout the model description we use the term word to refer to target terms whose meaning
change we aim to model. This refers either to linguistic words in the diachronic language change
evaluation, or to mental concepts in the concept development study. Similarly, we use the term sense
throughout the model description, which will correspond either to word senses (of linguistic words) or
to feature types (of mental concepts).
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Intuition We create a SCAN model for an individual target word c which captures the
development of its meaning over time. The input to the model is a corpus of short text
snippets (or documents), each consisting of a mention of the target word c and its local
context w as a symmetric context window of±n words. Each snippet is annotated with
its corresponding time stamp. This corresponds to the age of the addressed child for
the cognitive development experiments, and the year of the document’s origin for the
diachronic meaning change experiments. Example input documents are displayed in
Tables 6.1 (page 183) and 6.4 (page 197).
Given such a set of input documents, how do we model word meaning and its temporal
dynamics? We represent the meaning of a word as a set of senses. Each sense captures
an internally coherent aspect of its meaning, and is characterized through a set of words
that are associated with that sense. Senses are further distinguished in terms of their
prevalence since not all meanings are equally common for each word at all times. We
assume that each input text snippet refers to exactly one sense. We formalize temporal
dynamics assuming a discrete set of contiguous time intervals. Given a target word
whose meaning development is to be tracked, our model infers a meaning representa-
tion for each time interval. We introduce dependencies between temporally adjacent
time-specific meaning representations so as to explicitly capture the gradual nature
of meaning change with respect to both sense prevalences and sense-characterizing
words.
The output of a SCAN model is a globally coherent set of time interval-specific word
representations comprising the prevalence and content of word senses over time. In-
dividual representations are inferred jointly, capturing meaning change as a smooth
process, and inducing a globally meaningful and coherent picture of word meaning.
Model Description We now describe SCAN more formally. The generative story of
our model is displayed in Figure 6.1a and its plate diagram representation can be found
in Figure 6.1b.
A SCAN model is parameterized with regard to the number of senses k ∈ [1...K] of the
target word c, and the length of time intervals ∆T which might be finely or coarsely
defined (e.g., spanning a month, a year, or a decade). We conflate all inputs originating
from the same time interval t ∈ [1...T ] and infer a temporal representation of the target
word per interval. We use v ∈ [1...V ] as an index over the vocabulary. A temporal
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(a) Generative story of SCAN.
Draw κφ ∼ Gamma(a,b)
for time interval t = 1..T do
Draw sense distribution φt |φ−t ,κφ ∼N (12(φt−1+φt+1),κφ)
for sense k = 1..K do
Draw word distribution ψt,k|ψ−t ,κψ ∼N (12(ψt−1,k +ψt+1,k),κψ)
for document d = 1..D do
Draw sense zd ∼Mult(φt)
for context position i = 1..I do
Draw word wd,i ∼Mult(ψt,zd)
(b) Plate diagram of SCAN.
wz z w z w
φt−1 φt φt+1
κφa,b
ψt−1 ψt ψt+1
κψ
I
Dt−1
I
Dt
I
Dt+1
K
Figure 6.1: Top (a): The generative story of SCAN. Observations (w) and latent la-
bels (z) are drawn from Multinomial distributions (Mult). Parameters for the multinomial
distributions are drawn from logistic normal distributions (N ). Bottom (b): The plate dia-
gram representation of SCAN for three time steps {t−1, t, t+1}. Constant parameters
are shown as dashed nodes, latent variables as clear nodes, and observed variables
as gray nodes.
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meaning representation of word c at each time t comprises:
• the relative prevalence of senses at that time, as a K-dimensional multinomial
distribution over senses φt , and
• a representation of each sense k at time t as a V -dimensional multinomial distri-
bution over the vocabulary ψt,k .
Intuitively, the temporal meaning representations are not independent of each other,
but develop dynamically over time, each depending on their temporal neighbors. We
encode this intuition into the prior distributions, embedding them into a time series
model and ‘tieing together’ the values of each individual multinomial parameter φtk
and ψt,kw with its temporal neighbors at times t−1 and t +1. We technically describe
this prior in Section 6.2.1.
The generative story of SCAN (Figure 6.1a) proceeds as follows. Each SCAN model
captures the meaning change of one given target word c. First, we draw a precision
parameter (κφ) from its prior Gamma distribution, which regulates the global extent of
sense prevalence change over time for target word c. For each time interval t we draw
parameters of a Multinomial distribution over senses from the logistic normal prior (φt ,
capturing each sense’s prevalence). For each time interval t and each sense k we draw
a set of Multinomial parameters over the vocabulary, from a separate logistic normal
prior (ψt,k, capturing each sense’s content). Next, we generate time-specific text snip-
pets (or documents). For each snippet d, we first observe its time stamp t, and generate
a sense from the time-specific Multinomial sense distribution φt . Finally, we draw
a fixed number of context words independently from the sense-specific Multinomial
distribution over words for time t, ψt,k.
6.2.1 The Time Series Prior
We define the prior of the SCAN model in a way that allows us to ‘tie’ Multinomial
parameterizations across neighboring time steps, i.e., to capture the smooth nature of
meaning change. The Dirichlet distribution is the most common choice of a prior
distribution in a model with Multinomial data-generating distributions due to mathe-
matical convenience. However, it is limited in the dependencies it can encode between
parameters. Instead we draw our multinomial parameters from the logistic normal dis-
tribution (Aitchison, 1982; Blei and Lafferty, 2006a), and embed these distributions
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in a time series model. We first describe the parameter-generating process, and then
explain how we embed the logistic normal prior distributions into a time series model.
The Logistic Normal Distribution. A draw from the logistic normal distribution con-
sists of:
(1) a draw of an n-dimensional random vector from the multivariate normal distri-
bution parameterized by mean vector µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ, x ∼
N (µ,Σ), and
(2) a mapping of the drawn parameters to the simplex through the logistic transfor-
mation θi = exp(xi)/∑i′ exp(xi′).
The logistic transformation ensures that θ is a valid set of multinomial parameters
(i.e., that 0≤ θi ≤ 1 ∀θi and ∑iθi = 1). The parameterization of the multivariate nor-
mal distribution (through mean vector µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ) allows to
encode structured prior knowledge, such as correlation of parameters (Blei and Laf-
ferty, 2006a). The distribution can also be straightforwardly integrated into time series
models (Blei and Lafferty, 2006b; Mimno et al., 2008), which is our goal here.
We follow the two-stage procedure explained above, and draw for each time t a K-
dimensional random vector from the logistic normal prior over the sense prevalence
distributions:
β∼N (µφ,Σφ), (6.1)
and deterministically compute the multinomial parameters φt through the logistic trans-
formation:
φtk =
exp(βk)
∑k′ exp(βk′)
. (6.2)
Equivalently, for each time t we draw parameters independently for each sense-specific
multinomial distribution over the vocabulary:
γ∼N (µψ,Σψ)
ψt,kv =
exp(γw)
∑v′ exp(γv′)
.
(6.3)
We assume that given a time t all individual sense prevalences φtk, as well as all sense-
specific word probabilities ψt,kv are independent of each other. Hence we define Σφ
and Σψ as diagonal matrices where the value along the diagonal will correspond to κφ
and κψ, respectively (see below). We assume zero mean vectors µφ = µψ = 0.
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Modeling temporal dynamics. We embed the logistic normal distributions in a dy-
namic model which captures the development of meaning through temporally local
dependencies between multinomial parameters, and encourages smooth change. We
model the dynamics of meaning development over time in SCAN through intrinsic
Gaussian Markov Random Fields (iGMRFs; Rue and Held 2005). This section pro-
vides a brief reminder of iGMRFs in the context of our model. Please refer to Section
3.2.3 for a more general introduction and motivation for their use as priors in Bayesian
models. An exhaustive introduction to GMRFs can be found in Rue and Held (2005)
(see also Vivalt (2014) for an accessible overview; for an application of iGMRFs to
topic models, see Mimno et al. (2008)).
Let φ = {φ1...φT} denote a T-dimensional random vector, where each φt might for
example correspond to the probability of a sense at time t.4 We define a prior which
encourages smooth change of parameters at neighboring times, in terms of a first-order
random walk on the line (graphically depicted as the chains of φ and ψ in Figure 6.1b).
Specifically, we define this prior as an intrinsic Gaussian Markov Random Field, which
allows us to model the change of adjacent parameters as drawn from a normal distri-
bution,5 e.g.:
∆φt ∼N
(
0,
1
κ
)
, (6.4)
where we assume zero mean and κ is the precision, i.e., the inverse of the variance.
iGMRFs are defined with respect to the parameter chains φ and ψk, respectively (Fig-
ure 6.1b); it is sparsely connected with only first-order dependencies which allows
for efficient inference. A second feature, which makes iGMRFs popular as priors
in Bayesian modeling, is the fact that they can be defined purely in terms of the lo-
cal changes between dependent (i.e., adjacent) variables, without the need to spec-
ify an overall mean of the model. The full conditionals explicitly capture these intu-
itions (cf. Section 3.2.3 for technical details):
φt |φ−t ,κ∼N
(1
2
(φt−1+φt+1),
1
2κ
)
, (6.5)
for 1 < t < T − 1, where φ−t is the vector φ except element φt and κ is a precision
parameter. The value of parameter φt is distributed normally, centered around the
mean of the values of its neighbors, without reference to a global mean. The precision
4This is the simplest case, modeling the development of one sense. In our model each φt is a K-
dimensional vector, specifying a probability distribution over K senses.
5In what follows we assume a zero mean and leave the diagonal variance-covariance matrix Σ im-
plicit.
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parameter κ controls the extent of variation: how tightly coupled are the neighboring
parameters? Or, in our case: how tightly coupled are temporally adjacent meaning
representations of a word c?
Hyperparameter Sampling. The hyperparameters κφ and κψ control the degree to
which prevailing senses and sense-specific word distributions are allowed to vary over
time. We estimate the value of κφ during inference, which allows us to model the
extent of temporal change in prevalence of senses individually for each target word.
We draw κφ from a conjugate Gamma prior κφ ∼Gamma(a,b) with shape parameter a
and rate parameter b. We do not infer the sense-word precision parameter κψ. Instead,
we fix it at a high value, triggering little variation of word distributions within senses.
This leads to individual senses being thematically consistent over time, making sure
that we track the development of senses that refer to the same aspect of a target word’s
meaning throughout.
In summary, given a corpus of D documents, we wish to infer the following latent
variables:
(1) sense assignments to documents {z}D,
(2) time-specific sense distributions {φ}T ,
(3) time- and sense-specific word distributions {ψ}T×K , and
(4) the sense precision parameter κφ.
The full posterior distribution over latent variables given the data w, parameters a,b,κψ,
and the choices of distributions described above factorizes as,
P(z,φ,ψ,κφ|w,κψ,a,b)
= P(κφ|a,b)P(φ|κφ)P(ψ|κψ)P(z|φ)P(w|z,ψ)
∝ Ga(κφ;a,b)∏
t
[
N (φt |κφ)∏
k
[
N (ψt,k|κψ)]×
∏
d
[
Mul(z|φt)∏
i
Mul(wi|ψz,t)]]
= Ga(κφ;a,b)∏
t
[
N (φt |κφ)∏
k
[
N (ψt,k|κψ)
]
∏
d
[
φtz∏
i
ψz,twi
]]
,
(6.6)
where we use Ga to refer to the Gamma distribution, Mul to refer to the multinomial
distribution, and N to refer to the Logistic Normal distribution obeying the structural
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Algorithm 6 The Gibbs sampling algorithm for the SCAN model.
1: Input: model with randomly initialized parameters.
2: Output: posterior estimate of z,φ,ψ,κφ
3: repeat
4: for document d do . Sample sense assignments z
5: zd ∼ p(zd = k|w−,z−,φ,ψ) = φk,t ∗∏ f
(
ψk,tf
)Ndf
6: for time t do . Sample sense parameters φ
7: βk ∼ p(β|z) ∝∏k
(
exp(βkt )
∑k′ exp(βk′)
)Nkt N (βk; ,κφ)
8: φt = logistic-transform(β)
9: for time t do . Sample word parameters ψ
10: for sense k do
11: γw ∼ p(γ|z,w) ∝∏ f
(
exp(γk,tv )
∑w′ exp(γ
k,t
w′ )
)Nk,tf N (γk,tv ;κψ)
12: ψt,k = logistic-transform(γ)
13: . Sample precision parameter κφ
14: κφ ∼ p(κφ|φ)p(κφ;a,b) = Ga
(
KT
2 +a,
1
2 ∑t,s
(
φts− 12(φkt−1+φkt+1))
)2
+b
)
15: until convergence
dependencies defined through the iGMRF prior.6
6.2.2 Batch Learning
We use a blocked Gibbs sampler for approximate inference, which repeatedly executes
three steps which alternately resample (a) document-sense assignments, (b) multino-
mial parameters from the logistic normal prior, and (c) the sense precision parameter
from a Gamma prior. The full sampling procedure is displayed in Algorithm 6.
The logistic normal prior is not conjugate to the multinomial distribution. This means
that the form of the conditional posterior distributions over logistic normal parame-
ters β and γ is unknown and cannot be sampled from straightforwardly. One way to
alleviate the problem of sampling from an unknown or very complex distribution are
auxiliary variable (or data augmentation) techniques. A set of auxiliary variables is
drawn from a well-known distribution (the uniform distribution in our case), and the
6In order to keep notation to a minimum, we use N as a shorthand for the Logistic Normal distribu-
tion, comprising both the draw from the normal distribution and the logistic transformation.
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parameters of interest are drawn conditioned on this set of auxiliary variables. This
cascade is carefully set up such that the auxiliary variables do not change the underly-
ing distributions of interest but only serve as helper variables to ease the computations.
We adapt the auxiliary variable sampler introduced in Mimno et al. (2008) to our model
(see also Groenewald and Mokgatlhe (2005)), and describe the three components of
our sampler in turn below.
Resampling document-sense assignments z. Our sampler first iterates over the
input documents d (each consisting of a set of words w), and resamples their sense
assignments under the current model parameters {φ}T and {ψ}K×T . Similarly to the
approach taken in Gibbs sampling for Dirichlet-Multinomial models, each document
label zd is individually resampled given the current values of all other variables in the
model.7 We sample from its posterior distribution, combining the prior distribution
over labels at time t with the likelihood of observing words w under this label at time t:
p(zd|w, t,φ,ψ) ∝ p
(
zd|t
)
p
(
w|t,zd
)
= φtzd∏
i
ψt,z
d
wi
(6.7)
Resampling multinomial parameters φ and ψ. Next, we resample parameters {φ}T
and {ψ}K×T from the logistic normal prior, given the current sense assignments to the
data. We use the auxiliary variable sampler proposed in Mimno et al. (2008). An
illustration of the procedure is displayed in Figure 6.2.
Recall that Multinomial parameters φ (andψ) are obtained by drawing vectors β (and γ)
from the MVN and subsequently mapping them to the simplex. The parameter vec-
tors β and γ are resampled independently and component-wise, and are subsequently
re-normalized to yield the valid multinomial parameters φ and ψ. Intuitively, we will
sample a new value for each individual βtk (and, equivalently, γ
t,k
w ) from a bounded,
weighted area (cf., Figure 6.2, center). The boundaries are determined by the current
assignments of target sense k to documents from target time t (or, equivalently for γt,kw ,
observations of target words w under sense k and time t). The weights of different
values in the bounded area are determined by the iGMRF prior, triggering values to
7For a mathematical description of Gibbs sampling for Dirichlet-Multinomial models please refer to
Section 3.3.2.3 (pages 47 ff.).
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Figure 6.2: Schematic illustration of the process underlying the auxiliary variable sam-
pling scheme for logistic-normal distributed parameters. We sample a new value for
parameter βt,newk based on its old value (β
t,old
k ), the number of times sense k was as-
signed to any document from time slice t, and the iGMRF prior.
be similar to their temporally neighboring values, with the degree of similarity (or per-
mitted flexibility) determined through the precision parameters κφ and κψ. We will
describe the resampling procedure for one component βtk below, noting that the proce-
dure for γt,kw follows the exact same reasoning.
We resample the prevalence parameter βtk, capturing the probability of sense k at time t,
from a bounded weighted area. The boundaries of the weighted area are approximated
using a set of auxiliary variables. Indeed, this approximation is identical to the approx-
imation of the cumulative distribution function of a logistic distribution, which means
that we can proceed as follows.8 We draw an auxiliary variable for each document d
from target time t. The value is drawn uniformly from an interval with boundaries
depending on whether the document’s sense assignment zd corresponds to our target
sense k (case 1) or not (case 2):
ui ∼
unif
(
0, exp(βk)∑k′ exp(βk′)
)
if zd = k
unif
( exp(βk)
∑k′ exp(βk′)
,1
)
otherwise.
(6.8)
The largest value drawn in the former case, uzd=kmax , will determine the lower bound of
the region from which a new value for βtk will be drawn: the more documents at time t
are already assigned sense k, the higher the lower bound is expected to be. This is
illustrated through the swarm of violet sample points in Figure 6.2 (left). Conversely,
8Please consult Groenewald and Mokgatlhe (2005) and Mimno et al. (2008) for the mathematical de-
tails, which legitimate the approach, but are not necessary for an intuitive understanding of the method.
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the lowest value drawn in the latter set of random variables (if zd 6= k), uzd 6=kmin , will
determine the upper bound of the region: the more documents are assigned senses
other than the current target sense k, the lower the upper bound is expected to be
(cf., Figure 6.2 (blue samples on the right)).9
Given these values, the new value for βtk is drawn from the area bounded by,
log
(
∑k′ 6=k exp(βtk)
)
uzd=kmax
1−uzd=kmax
< βtk < log
(
∑k′ 6=k exp(βtk)
)
uzd 6=kmin
1−uzd 6=kmin
. (6.9)
The area within the boundaries is weighted with respect to the prior iGMRF as defined
above (Equation 6.5). We thus draw the new value of βtk from a truncated normal
distribution, with mean averaged over all dependent (i.e., adjacent) parameter values,
and precision determined by κφ. The normal distribution is truncated at the bounds
defined above. Finally, we deterministically update the parameter vector φt given the
new value βtk using the logistic transformation.
To sum up, the resampled value of each individual βtk is determined by (a) the impor-
tance of sense k from the current sense assignments to documents from time t; and
(b) the extent to which any new value agrees with the temporal coherence constraint
imposed by the iGMRF prior.
Resampling the precision parameter κφ. Finally, we periodically resample the
sense precision parameter κφ from its posterior distribution
p(κφ|φ,a,b) ∝∏
t
∏
k
N (φtk|κφ)×Ga(κφ;a,b)
∝∏
t
∏
k
N (φtk|
1
2
(φt−1k +φ
t+1
k ),
1
2κφ
)×κφa−1 exp[−κφb],
(6.10)
which is itself a Gamma distribution with parameters:
κφ|{φ}t ,a,b∼ Ga
(
KT
2
+a,
∑t,k
(
φtk− 12(φt−1k +φt+1k )
)2
2
+b
)
(6.11)
Intuitively, this represents the prior shifted by half the number of observations and half
the sum of squared divergences from the mean.
This section presented the technical details of SCAN, and derived a blocked Gibbs sam-
pler for approximate learning. In the remainder of the chapter, we apply our model to
9Mimno et al. (2008) explain various ways to make this procedure more efficient. We use these
methods in our implementation, and refer the interested reader to their paper for additional details.
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age (y-mm) utterance
1-01 day pajamas pajamas bed yawn stretch touch
1-05 bed brush brush bed brush teeth tooth
2-00 sleep tire book bed bed sit fall
2-06 snore under gentle bed sweet dream silly
3-00 wake early play bed awful mess upstairs
1-01 bottle bottle apple apple apple apple apple
1-05 color around red apple green pea yellow
2-00 eat apple red apple mm nice first
2-07 apple cut quarter apple seed pip core
3-00 thing type fruit apple pear orange share
Table 6.1: Examples of child-directed utterances for the target concepts bed and ap-
ple from the CHILDES corpus (after removal of stopwords and low frequency terms),
together with the age of the addressed child.
two phenomena of meaning change: the development of featural concept representa-
tions in children (Section 6.3), and diachronic change of word meaning (Section 6.4).
6.3 Experiment 5: Development of Concept Represen-
tations in Infants
Children learn the meaning of concepts over time, and acquire increasingly nuanced
and complex representations. We reviewed prior research in support of this claim in
Section 6.1.1. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first computational in-
vestigation of this phenomenon at scale, modeling the development of representations
comprising a broad variety of features for a large number of concepts. We model
the development of concept representations by exposing SCAN, as introduced in Sec-
tion 6.2, to a corpus of child-directed language.
We learn SCAN models for individual concepts (aka basic level categories such as dog,
chair, or ball) from sets of input stimuli in the form of short child-directed text snip-
pets comprising a mention of the target concept embedded in local context. Example
documents are shown in Table 6.1. We model temporal meaning representations as a
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Full Thomas
number of children 21 1
age range (y;mm) 0;11 – 4;11 2;00 – 4;11
number of utterances 129,958 45,081
Table 6.2: Details on the full corpus and the Thomas corpus. Note that the full corpus
includes the Thomas corpus.
set of feature types. Our model captures (a) the internal development of feature types
over time (for example a color feature type may contain increasingly nuanced color
representations); and (b) the development of their relative importance (for example
relational associations containing travel-related features may emerge over time in re-
lation to cars or trains, gaining importance in relation to their perceivable features and
leading to a more diverse concept representation).
In contrast to Chapters 4 and 5, which investigated the acquisition and representations
of superordinate level categories, here we use our dynamic Bayesian model to study
the meaning development of basic level categories (Rosch, 1978) in young infants. Our
corpora comprise language directed to children from their first word onset (one year)
up to about five years of age, and thus cover the initial phase of linguistic development.
Basic level categories are used most frequently as labels by caretakers, and are the first
categories children learn to distinguish (Rosch, 1978). Furthermore, basic level objects
tend to be associated with a single word. Like in the previous models and experiments
in this thesis, we treat a linguistic mention of a word referring to a target concept as an
observation of the target concept itself, and its local context as the concept’s features.
We train one SCAN model per word (or concept) of interest.
The experiments presented in the following sections are designed to investigate quan-
titatively (Section 6.3.1) and qualitatively (Section 6.3.2) whether the representations
that SCAN induces from corpora of child-directed language reflect characteristics of
concept development in infants.
Data In order to capture change of meaning representations in children over time,
we require longitudinal input data, i.e., (a) frequent recordings of language directed to
the child (in order to learn time-specific meaning representations), and (b) recordings
spanning a significant temporal period (in order to capture the development of these
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representations). In fact, the corpus used in the cognitive experiments in Chapter 5,
derived from the CHILDES database of child-related speech (MacWhinney, 2000),
was constructed with these desiderata in mind. The corpus is described in detail in
Section 5.4 (page 145). From this underlying data set, we create two corpora of input
stimuli for our experiments: one corpus conflates the data from the four sub-corpora
(comprising input to 21 children). The other corpus contains only the Thomas cor-
pus (Lieven et al., 2009), the largest longitudinal collection of input specific to one
individual child. These two corpora allow us to investigate whether conflating data for
many children, as opposed to data comprising input to only one child, has an influence
on the model output. Details on the size and coverage of the corpora can be found in
Table 6.2.
From each of the two data sets described above, we created concept-specific input
for our SCAN model. We trained models for a set of 30 concepts, which are listed
in Appendix C.1. The majority of this set (21 words) was taken from the data set
of concepts of living and non-living things used in the evaluations in the preceding
chapters (McRae et al., 2005; Vinson and Vigliocco, 2008), and described in detail in
Section 4.4.1 (p. 80). We selected nouns based on a sufficient number of mentions
in the child-directed data. In addition, we added verbs, superordinate categories and
adjectives as target concepts, again selected based on their frequency in the data. The
target concept-specific input corpora consist of short text snippets, containing a men-
tion of the target concept surrounded by a symmetric window of n=±3 content words
(we remove stop words and low frequency terms). Each input is annotated with the age
(in months) of the child being spoken to. Table 6.1 shows examples of input documents
for the target concepts bed and apple.
6.3.1 Development of Feature Complexity
This experiment investigates the development of the complexity of concept-specific
feature representations over time. We approximate the complexity of inferred featural
representations through the age-of-acquisition (aoa) rating of their associated features
(i.e., context words). Age-of-acquisition ratings measure the age at which a person
understands the meaning of a word (but does not necessarily use it). Large databases of
age-of-acquisition ratings exist that cover more than 30,000 English words (Kuperman
et al., 2012). Age-of-acquisition has been shown to correlate with other measures
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of complexity, such as word length, concreteness, or imageability (Kuperman et al.,
2012). We quantify the development of temporal interval-specific complexity of learnt
representations as a function of the aoa scores of their associated features. We provide
a qualitative analysis of the development of concept representations in Section 6.3.2.
We compare the difference in development of meaning representations between two
models, trained on the respective corpora introduced above: The full corpus compris-
ing input to 21 children, and the Thomas corpus containing input to a single child.
This allows us to study whether the same pattern of feature development emerges for
individuals, as well as across children.
Models and parameters We create a SCAN model for each of the 30 concepts in
our set of targets. SCAN models are parameterized with respect to the number of
feature types (senses in the model description) they support, and with respect to the
size of the temporal intervals. We set the number of feature types to K = 5, and the
size of temporal intervals to ∆T = 3 months. We set the word-feature type precision
parameter κψ= 50 (triggering thematically stable feature types which refer to the same
aspect of meaning across temporal intervals). We adjusted these parameters to the size
and characteristics of our datasets using a small set of development concepts, but did
not tune them exhaustively.
Method For each of the 30 target concepts, c, we induce time-specific concept repre-
sentations as distributions over feature types gt , where each feature type is represented
as a distribution over features. We represent each induced feature type gt as the 10
features with highest probability under gt , f
gt
n : n = [1...10]. Taken together for all
30 concepts, interval-specific feature sets comprise 1,500 context word token, and on
average around 370 context word types (i.e., distinct features). For each feature in this
set, we retrieve an age-of-acquisition rating aoa( f gtn ) from Kuperman et al. (2012)’s
resource (which covers over 97% of the features in our data set).
We compute time interval t-specific complexity scores cmpt by averaging feature aoa-
scores over all target concepts c and all their time-specific feature types gt ,
cmpt =
1
F ∑c ∑gt
10
∑
n=1
aoa( f gtn ), (6.12)
where F is the total number of feature tokens in the time-specific representations.
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Figure 6.3: Development of complexity of featural concept representation with increas-
ing age of children for the full corpus (top) and the Thomas corpus (bottom). Com-
plexity is quantified through averaged age-of-acquisition of concept-associated features
(cf., cmpt , equation (6.12)).
Results Figure 6.3 displays the development of age-of-acquisition scores over time
for both the full corpus (6.3a) and the child-specific Thomas corpus (6.3b). Across
corpora, the average age-of-acquisition rating of features consistently increases. The
trend is statistically significant (Spearman’s ρ= 0.91 (full corpus), ρ= 0.83 (Thomas
corpus); p < 0.002). Overall, the trend is more stable for the full corpus.
Note that SCAN is not a model of word learning – we use age-of-acquisition as a
way to quantify the complexity of concept representations. The absolute values of
the age-of-acquisition scores reported in Figures 6.3a and 6.3a do not correspond to
the age of the child. Our model does not learn what these words mean, but it learns
that they are features which are relevant to and representative of a concept. Based on
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repeatedly observed co-occurrences, a child may learn that certain words are associated
with certain concepts without having a clear representation of their meaning.
We provided quantitative support for the claim that our model learns concept repre-
sentations that increase in complexity over time, mirroring the way in which children
incrementally and dynamically acquire increasingly nuanced conceptual knowledge
about the world. In the next experiment, we qualitatively analyze representations of a
subset of these concepts as learnt by our model, and their qualitative dynamic devel-
opment.
6.3.2 Qualitative Analysis of Feature Development
We present qualitative output of our SCAN models trained on a selection of target
concepts, using the same set of models parameter settings as in the previous exper-
iment. We compare differences in the development of meaning representations over
time when training on the full corpus and the Thomas corpus. While we expect that
the larger amount of training data available in the conflated corpus will trigger more
stable representations, we also assume that time-specific representations are highly
child-specific as they depend on the input and situations the child encounters. The
representations induced from the Thomas corpus should reflect this.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 display the development of meaning representations as captured
by our model based on the full corpus of 21 children, and Figure 6.6 shows inferred
representations from the Thomas corpus. Additional model output for both corpora
is provided in Appendix C.2. Individual meaning representations are visualized as a
bar capturing the relative prevalence (p(k|t) = φtk) of different feature types (color-
coded). One such visualization is displayed for each temporal interval, illustrating the
development of feature type prevalence over time. Each feature type is illustrated to
the right of the plot as the ten words w most highly associated with the feature type,
marginalizing over the time-specific representations
(
p(w|k) = ∑tψt,kw
)
.
Analysis of the full corpus Figure 6.4a shows the meaning development of the con-
cept train. Initially thematically rather unspecific feature type (violet) is prevalent.
Over time features relating to train journey (pink; including words like {ticket, sta-
tion, wait}), and location (orange; {bridge, track}) increase in importance, leading
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(a) Target concept train
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
train track drive down play
 dear man back over run 
train track play big bridge
 set noise build over engine 
train choo drive back play
 ride bye take engine big 
train station choo drive take
 stop wait  person ticket 
train play drive car take
 bring round back track set 
(b) Target concept car
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
police car drive fire train
 play engine sit man back 
car play back big toy
 take tell happen wash book 
car red drive take yellow
 park blue ride box big 
car drive race green sit train
 yellow blue big red 
car down park police
 big road  over bridge drive 
(c) Target concept nose
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;18 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
nose big red blow draw
 wipe eye yuck tell mouth 
nose wipe blow tissue run
 need play down dear bit 
nose bite eat smell ear
 big eye purdie pink nice 
nose eye mouth beep ear
 baby head big tickle stick 
nose big red eye hat green
 rudolph trunk cone elephant 
Figure 6.4: Visualization of feature development of the concepts train, car and nose
(top to bottom), based on the linguistic input to 21 children aged between 11 months
and 4 years and 11 months. Each bar shows the proportional prevalence of each fea-
ture type (color-coded) and is labeled with the start year of the respective time interval
(covering three months). Feature types are shown as the 10 most probable words to
the right of the corresponding plot.
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(a) Target concept box
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
box egg break back lid need
 thing hold keep dear 
box  back empty big 
sit toy inside take open 
box back piece car play 
over bring thing train tripod 
box post letter car back big
 thing empty yellow take 
box green blue big baby 
hide red play crayon book 
(b) Target concept hand
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
hand left wash big move
 finger dry foot rub soap 
hand wash stick hold 
wipe nice give clean dear pull 
hand wash wipe finger need
 eat touch down purdie face 
hand clap hold happy catch
 take over shake baby hurt 
hand hold down draw big
 paint blue color red over 
(c) Target concept hair
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
hair long cut need short curl
 give girl brush nice 
hair pull mess hurt nice
 love big take elastic bit 
hair color blue blonde eye
 red brown head long wear 
hair brush wash comb nice
 bath clean morning need back 
hair cut wash need long
 bit barber nice head lot 
Figure 6.5: Additional model output from the conflated corpus comprising input to 21
children for the feature development of the concepts box, hand and hair (top to bottom).
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to a differentiation in meaning, and a more fine-grained representation of the concept
train.
The graph in Figure 6.4b presents the temporal representations of the concept car. Mir-
roring the initial meaning of train discussed above, initially incoherent and vaguely
play-related features dominate the representation (orange). Over time, features em-
phasizing conceptual associations increase in importance: the dark green and light
green feature types cover concepts related to the target concept car (such as {road,
police, bridge, engine}), leading to a more differentiated representation over time. The
pink feature type captures color features.
We show the meaning development for the concept nose in Figure 6.4c. The initially
prevalent pink feature type is very general comprising other bodyparts {eye, mouth} as
well as related actions {tickle, stick}. The orange and dark green feature types which
increase in prevalence over time focus on the cleaning-related associations of nose.
The light green feature type is animal-related and suggests a broadening of associations
to animals – featuring mentions of elephants and Rudolph (the reindeer).
The graph in Figure 6.5a presents the meaning development of the concept box. Once
more, the initially prevalent feature type (orange) is topically incoherent. Over time,
a post box association emerges (pink), as well as a feature type pertaining to egg
boxes (dark green), together capturing a wider variety of specific aspects related to the
concept nose.
Figure 6.5b presents the temporal representations of the concept hand. Initially the
meaning is represented predominantly through one prevalent feature type (pink) which
captures the general nature of speech directed to very small children ({clap, hold,
happy, baby...}). Over time this feature type decreases in prevalence, making room
for a washing-related feature type (orange/violet). The light green feature type relates
to painting and indicates a development of associations with hand-related actions.
Analysis of the Thomas corpus Figure 6.6a presents the development of the rep-
resentation of the concept bed. We can make out a feature type related to sleeping,
going-to-bed (pink) which is prevalent throughout. A separate feature type covers
the waking up aspect (orange). A reading-related feature type emerges from age of
about 2.5 years (light green) and increases in prevalence throughout. Like the rep-
resentations induced from the full corpus, the meaning representation becomes more
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(a) Target concept bed
2;00 2;03 2;06 2;09 3;00 3;03 3;06 3;09 4;00 4;03 4;06 4;09
age (year;months)
bed time home onto 
bath thing fall bin under hide 
night bed morning time sleep
 asleep back tire purdie early 
take upstairs teddy down bed
 purdie window kitten picture po 
bed sleep bath night before
 big upstairs milk drink nice 
bed read book sleep morning
 leave nice present sweet story 
(b) Target concept hair
2;00 2;03 2;06 2;09 3;00 3;03 3;06 3;09 4;00 4;03 4;06 4;09
age (year;months)
hair wash brush wet mess
 cut bit stick rinse need 
hair cut pull nice tire
 kiss cry granddad ear long 
brush hair blue yellow
 love color smart tooth bit sit 
hair long short sue mess
 blonde day girl head nice 
hair wash thank snip
 cut brown big nice love hat 
(c) Target concept box
2;00 2;03 2;06 2;09 3;00 3;03 3;06 3;09 4;00 4;03 4;06 4;09
age (year;months)
box post letter need nice
 big back christmas keep thing 
box car back train keep 
 lid pop thank apple down 
box post letter back nice
 play yellow empty toy big 
box empty smarties back blue
 chocolate sweet inside lid bring 
box big dear break 
egg thing toy wash lid old 
(d) Target concept apple
2;00 2;03 2;06 2;09 3;00 3;03 3;06 3;09 4;00 4;03 4;06 4;09
age (year;months)
apple tree green peel red 
eat nice big pear cut 
apple piece jeannine eat 
give call sweet man face boy 
apple eat piece big cheese 
nice cut finish drink wash 
pear apple banana strawberry
 grape eat fruit peach peel orange 
apple eat juice nice pear
 back truck tree box mm 
Figure 6.6: Development of meaning representations of the concepts bed, hair, box,
and apple (top to bottom). Representations are induced from the Thomas corpus cap-
turing development between the age of 2 years and 4 years 11.
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faceted over time.
The meaning development of the concept hair is displayed in the plot in Figure 6.6b.
A {washing, cleaning}-related aspect of meaning increases in prevalence towards
the end of the modeled period, suggesting a newly learnt association (dark green). The
orange and pink feature types reveal the effect of modeling meaning representations
based on input to only one child. Both refer to a particular person of Thomas’ envi-
ronment (his granddad and his friend Sue, respectively). For comparison, we show the
meaning development for the concept hair learnt from the full corpus in Figure 6.5c.
The learnt meaning aspects are more general.
The two bottom plots (Figures 6.6c and 6.6d) show the meaning development of con-
cepts box and apple, respectively. The pink feature type of box shows another instanti-
ation of individual differences in meaning representation, referring to smartie boxes.
This type did not emerge from the model trained on the conflated data. For the word
apple (Figure 6.6d) different aspects of its meaning clearly emerge: one corresponding
to an apple as food (violet), one corresponding to its category fruit (pink), as well as
an aspect corresponding to its natural origin (dark green).
6.3.3 Discussion
Children’s representations of categories and concepts evolve over time until they reli-
ably resemble the meanings which are shared in the society they grow up in. In this set
of experiments we showed that dynamic development of concept meaning representa-
tions emerges from a computational model of concept acquisition from child-directed
language. The linguistic contexts in which concepts occur in child-directed speech
changes with increasing age of the child, and allows the acquisition of increasingly ac-
curate and diverse meaning representations. We quantified the increasing complexity
of concept representations by linking the induced feature types to the age of acquisition
of their representative terms. In addition, we qualitatively analyzed the development of
meaning representations. We observed the phenomenon of initial overgeneralization
(cf., concepts train and box in Figures 6.4a and 6.5a), as well as a shift from child-like
representations to more general representations (cf., concept hand in Figure 6.5b).
Recognizing that meaning development of concepts is highly individual and dependent
on the child’s personal environment (Neisser, 1987), we investigated concept develop-
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ment from input to a single child, and from input to multiple children. SCAN picks
up meaning change in both settings. We found that the representations learnt from a
single child’s corpus are more individual (cf., concept hair in Figure 6.6b); and that the
prevalence of these highly personalized aspects of meaning decrease over time, sug-
gesting a generalization process. In future work it would be desirable to compare the
individual differences in feature learning across multiple children. With the notable
exception of the Thomas corpus used throughout our experiments, however, currently
available data sets of speech directed to individual children are either sparse, providing
only infrequent samples of recordings and/or cover a shorter time period which makes
it difficult to detect feature development.
As in previous chapters of this thesis we model the acquisition and development of
conceptual knowledge based on the linguistic environment. Is the development of
concept representations induced by our model exclusively a by-product of conceptual
development in the child’s mind? Certainly there are factors beyond this development
which lead to a qualitative change of the input data the child receives. Examples in-
clude developments in the child’s behavior and abilities (e.g., the ability to use pens to
paint pictures will influence the linguistic contexts in which a child observes the word
hand) or changes in the child’s general environment (e.g., interacting with unknown
people or visiting novel places). Teasing apart changes in abilities and environment
from children’s conceptual development is challenging within our experimental setup,
and provides an interesting direction for future investigations.
The number of feature types associated with a concept is a parameter of our model, and
is constant over time. In this set of experiments we set this parameter to the same value
for all concepts. A more realistic model should be able to (a) induce the number of
feature types individually for each concept, and (b) within concepts allow this number
to vary over time. While in principle our models can capture such trends by setting the
number of feature types to a high value and letting the model decide to not make use
of all feature types, a more principled model should be able to adapt in complexity as
demanded by the data.
Our aim in this study was to show that the dynamic development of featural concept
representations during language acquisition emerges in large-scale experiments based
on naturalistic child-directed language. However, we do not claim to fully capture
the meaning acquisition process with our model: Modeling featural development from
linguistic input remains agnostic about pre-linguistic feature learning, e.g., from statis-
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tical regularities in visual input (Mervis, 1987; Younger and Fearing, 2000). For exam-
ple, awareness of basic object properties, such as object permanence has been shown
in 7 months old children (Baillargeon, 1987). Pre-linguistic development presum-
ably influences subsequent language-based feature learning. Furthermore, by training
concept-specific models, we assume that the learner has established an a priori one-
to-one word-concept mapping. This assumption is crude because one word can map
to a variety of concepts and vice versa. Furthermore, concept to word mappings are
themselves learnt by children around the same time as conceptual representations are
acquired (see our discussion in Section 2.1). We ignore information from the visual
or pragmatic input available to the child, and our corpora only capture snapshots of
specific situations the child encounters.
Despite these limitations, our text-based approach allows us to investigate the develop-
ment of a broad class of features for a variety of concepts – their coverage being only
restricted by the thematic variety in the corpus. Besides, previous analyses showed that
language encodes a variety of information of other (e.g., visual) modalities, and that
child-directed speech particularly often refers to perceivable properties of basic-level
categories (Riordan and Jones, 2011; Callanan, 1990). We showed that patterns of
child featural development identified in the literature emerge from our Bayesian mod-
els based on statistical regularities in the linguistic input to the child. In addition to
incremental category learning (Chapter 4) and joint acquisition of categories and fea-
tures (Chapter 5) the phenomenon of dynamic meaning acquisition can be successfully
captured with a Bayesian model trained on corpora of child-directed language.
6.4 Experiment 6: Development of Word Meaning
This section evaluates SCAN’s ability to capture phenomena related to diachronic
meaning change. Evaluation of models which detect meaning change is fraught with
difficulties. There is no standard set of words which have undergone meaning change
or benchmark corpus which represents a variety of time intervals and genres, and is
thematically consistent. Previous work has generally focused on a few hand-selected
words and models were evaluated qualitatively by inspecting their output, or the extent
to which they can detect meaning changes from two time periods. For example, Cook
et al. (2014) manually identify 13 target words which undergo meaning change in a
focus corpus with respect to a reference corpus (both news text). They then assess how
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their models fare at learning sense differences for these targets compared to distractors
which did not undergo meaning change. They also underline the importance of using
thematically comparable reference and focus corpora to avoid spurious differences in
word representations.
We evaluate our model’s ability to detect and quantify meaning change across several
time intervals (not just two). Instead of relying on a few hand-selected target words,
we use larger sets sampled from our learning corpus or found to undergo meaning
change in a judgment elicitation study (Gulordava and Baroni 2011, Section 6.4.2). In
addition, we adopt the evaluation paradigm of (Mitra et al. 2014, Section 6.4.3) and
validate our findings against WordNet. Finally, we apply our model to the recently es-
tablished SemEval-2015 diachronic text evaluation subtasks (Popescu and Strapparava
2015, Section 6.4.4). In order to present a consistent set of experiments, we use our
own corpus throughout which covers a wider range of time intervals and is compiled
from a variety of genres and sources and is thus thematically coherent (and described
in detail below). Wherever possible, we compare against prior art, with the caveat that
the use of a different underlying corpus unavoidably influences the obtained semantic
representations.
Data The corpus described in the following underlies all experiments described in
this section. We created a DiAchronic TExt corpus (DATE) which collates documents
spanning years 1700–2010 from three sources: (a) the COHA corpus10 (Davies, 2010),
a large collection of texts from various genres covering the years 1810–2010; (b) the
training data provided by the DTE task11 organizers (see Section 6.4.4); and (c) the por-
tion of the CLMET3.012 corpus (Diller et al., 2011) corresponding to the period 1710–
1810 (which is not covered by the COHA corpus and thus underrepresented in our
training data). CLMET3.0 contains texts representative of a range of genres including
narrative fiction, drama, letters, and was collected from various online archives. Ta-
ble 6.3 provides details on the size of our corpus. Documents were clustered by their
year of publication as indicated in the original corpora. In the CLMET3.0 corpus, oc-
casionally a range of years would be provided. In this case we used the final year of the
range. We tokenized, lemmatized, and part of speech tagged DATE using the NLTK
(Bird et al., 2009). We removed stopwords and function words. After preprocessing,
10http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/
11http://alt.qcri.org/semeval2015/task7/index.php?id=data-and-tools
12http://www.kuleuven.be/~u0044428/clmet3_0.htm
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Corpus years covered #words
COHA 1810–2009 142,587,656
DTE 1700–2010 124,771
CLMET3.0 1710–1810 4,531,505
Table 6.3: Size and coverage of our three training corpora (after pre-processing).
year text snippet
1700 ambassador emperor treat peace king power enlarge english slave dominion condition
1838 sharp listen noble school awaken power mind exercise wit head house
1867 drainage wit rapidity flow water power remove obstacle practice stream wend
1989 governmental action individual equal power preponderant force energy direction govern
2010 invest million dollar building thermal power plant bid tide crisis brazilian
Table 6.4: Example text snippets for the target concept power from our DATE corpus
(after removal of stopwords and low frequency terms), together with the respective year
of origin.
we extracted target word-specific input corpora for our models. These consisted of
mentions of a target c and its surrounding context, a symmetric window of ± 5 words.
Example documents for the target word power are displayed in Table 6.4.
6.4.1 Temporal Dynamics
As discussed in Section 6.1.2.1, our model departs from previous approaches (e.g.,
Mitra et al. 2014) in that it learns globally consistent temporal representations for each
word. In order to assess whether temporal dependencies are indeed beneficial, we im-
plemented a stripped-down version of our model (SCAN-NOT) which does not have any
temporal dependencies between individual time steps (i.e., without the chain iGMRF
priors). Word meaning is still represented as senses and sense prevalence is modeled
as a distribution over senses for each time interval. However, time intervals are now
independent. Inference works as described in Section 6.2.2, without having to learn
the κ precision parameters.
Models and Parameters We compared the two models in terms of their predictive
power. We split the DATE corpus into a training period {d1...dt} of time slices 1
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through t and computed the likelihood p(dt+1|φt ,ψt) of the data at test time slice t+1,
under the parameters inferred for the previous time slice. The time slice size was set
to ∆T = 20 years. We set the number of senses to K = 8, the word precision parameter
κψ = 10, a high value which triggers individual senses to remain thematically consis-
tent over time. We set the initial sense precision parameter κφ = 4, and the Gamma
parameters a = 7 and b = 3. These parameters were optimized once on the develop-
ment data used for the task-based evaluation discussed in Section 6.4.4. Unless other-
wise specified all experiments reported in this section use these values. No parameters
were tuned on the test set for any task. In all experiments we ran the Gibbs sampler for
1,000 iterations, and resampled κφ after every 50 iterations, starting from iteration 150.
We report results based on the final state of the sampler throughout. We randomly se-
lected 50 mid-frequency target concepts from a larger set of target concepts described
in Section 6.4.4. Predictive log-likelihood scores were averaged across concepts and
were calculated as the average under 10 parameter samples {φt ,ψt} from the trained
models.
Results Figure 6.7 displays predictive log-likelihood scores for four test time inter-
vals. SCAN outperforms its stripped-down version throughout (higher is better). Since
the representations learnt by SCAN are influenced (or smoothed) by neighboring rep-
resentations, they overfit specific time intervals less which leads to better predictive
performance.
Figure 6.8 further illustrates how SCAN captures meaning change for the words band,
power, transport and bank. The sense distributions over time are shown as a sequence
of stacked histograms, senses themselves are color-coded (and enumerated) below, in
the same order as in the histograms. Each sense k is illustrated as the 10 words w
assigned the highest posterior probability, marginalizing over the time-specific repre-
sentations p(w|k) = ∑tψt,kw . Words representative of prevalent senses are highlighted
in bold face.
Figure 6.8a demonstrates that the model is able to capture various senses of the word
band, such as strip used for binding (yellow bars/number 3 in the figure) or
musical band (grey/1, orange/7). Our model predicts an increase in prevalence over
the modeled time period for both senses. This is corroborated by the OED which pro-
vides the majority of references for the binding strip sense for the 20th century and
dates the musical band sense to 1812. In addition a social band sense (violet/6,
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Figure 6.7: Predictive log likelihood of SCAN and a version without temporal depen-
dencies (SCAN-NOT) across various test time periods.
darkgreen/8; in the sense of bonding) emerges, which is present across time slices.
The sense colored brown/2 refers to the British Band, a group of native Americans
involved in the Black Hawk War in 1832, and the model indeed indicates a prevalence
of this sense around this time (see bars 1800–1840 in the figure).
For the word power (Figure 6.8b), three senses emerge: the institutional power
(colors gray/1, brown/2, pink/5, orange/7 in the figure), mental power (yellow/3,
lightgreen/4, darkgreen/8), and power as supply of energy (violet/6). The latter
is an example of a “sense birth” (Mitra et al., 2014): the sense was hardly present
before the mid-19th century. This is corroborated by the OED which dates the sense
to 1889, whereas the OED contains references to the remaining senses for the whole
modeled time period, as predicted by our model.
Similar trends of meaning change emerge for transport (Figure 6.8c). The plot in Fig-
ure 6.8d shows the sense development for the word bank. Although the well-known
senses river bank (brown/2, lightgreen/4) and monetary institution (rest) emerge
clearly, the overall sense pattern appears comparatively stable across intervals indicat-
ing that the meaning of the word has not changed much over time.
Besides tracking sense prevalence over time, our model can also detect changes within
individual senses. Because we are interested in tracking semantically stable senses,
we fixed the precision parameter κψ to a high value, to discourage too much variance
within each sense. Figure 6.9 illustrates how the energy sense of the word power
(violet/6 in Figure 6.8) has changed over time. Selected characteristic terms are high-
lighted in bold face. For example, the term “water” is initially prevalent, while the
term “steam” rises in prevalence towards the middle of the modeled period, and is
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(a) Target word band
1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
8 band play people time little 
call father day love boy
7 play band music time country day 
march military frequency jazz
6 little hand play land love 
time night speak strong name
5 little soldier leader time land 
arm hand country war indian
4 music play dance band hear
 time little evening stand house
3 black white hat broad gold 
wear hair band head rubber
2 indian little day horse time
 people meet chief leave war
1 play music hand hear sound
 march street air look strike
(b) Target word power
1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
8 power idea god hand mind
 body life time object nature
7 power nation world war country
 time government sir mean lord
6 power time company water 
force line electric plant day run
5 power government law congress
  executivepresident legislative constitution
4 love power life time woman
 heart god tell little day
3 mind power time life friend
 woman nature love world reason
2 power people law government 
mind call king time hand nature
1 power country government nation war
 increase world political people europe
(c) Target word transport
1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
8 road cost public railway transport 
rail average service bus time
7 ozone epa example section transport 
air policy region measure caa
6 time transport land public ship
 line water vessel london joy
5 air plane ship army day 
transport land look leave hand
4 time road worker union service 
public system industry air railway
3 air international worker plane association 
united union aircraft line president
2 troop ship day land army 
war send plane supply fleet
1 air joy love heart heaven 
time company eye hand smile
(d) Target word bank
1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
8 bank tell cashier teller money 
day ned president house city
7 bank note money deposit credit 
amount pay species issue bill
6 bank money national note government
 credit united time currency loan
5 bank dollar money note national president
 account director company little
4 river day opposite mile bank 
danube town left country shore
3 bank capital company stock rate 
national president fund city loan
2 river water stream foot 
mile tree stand reach little land
1 note bank money time tell 
leave hard day dollar account
Figure 6.8: Tracking meaning change for the words band, power, transport and bank
over 20-year time intervals between 1700 and 2010. Each bar shows the proportion of
each sense (color-coded) and is labeled with the start year of the respective time inter-
val. Senses are shown as the 10 most probable words, and particularly representative
words are highlighted for illustration.
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time line water water company company power power company power power power nuclear
line time power force power water company company power company plant nuclear power
power water line company time power force force force plant nuclear plant plant
water power time power force force water time plant electric electric time utility
force force force line water time electric water water time time company company
war war company time steam day day plant day force company utility time
run day run steam electric line time day time day run run people
equal house electric day run steam steam electric electric run utility electric energy
carry run steam electric day purchase line steam run water day cost cost
electric company day run plant run plant run line people force people run
Figure 6.9: Sense-internal temporal dynamics for the energy sense of the word power
(violet/6 in Figure 6.8). Columns show the ten most highly associated words for each
time interval for the period between 1700 and 2010 (ordered by decreasing probabil-
ity). We highlight how four terms characteristic of the sense develop over time ({water,
steam, plant, nuclear}).
superseded by the terms “plant” and “nuclear” towards the end.
6.4.2 Novel Word Sense Detection
In this section and the next we will explicitly evaluate the temporal representations
(i.e., probability distributions) induced by our model, and discuss its performance in
the context of previous work.
Large-scale evaluation of meaning change is notoriously difficult, and many evalua-
tions are based on small hand-annotated goldstandard data sets. Mitra et al. (2015),
bypass this issue by evaluating the output of their system against WordNet (Fellbaum,
1998a). Here, we consider their automatic evaluation of sense-births, i.e., the emer-
gence of novel senses. We assume that novel senses are detected at a focus time t2
whilst being compared to a reference time t1. WordNet is used to confirm that the
proposed novel sense is indeed distinct from all other induced senses for a given word.
Method Mitra et al.’s (2015) evaluation method presupposes a system which is able
to detect senses for a set of target words and identify which ones are novel. Our model
does not automatically yield novelty scores for the induced senses. However, Cook
et al. (2014) propose several ways to perform this task post-hoc. We use their relevance
score, which is based on the intuition that keywords (or collocations) which character-
ize the difference of a focus corpus from a reference corpus are indicative of word
sense novelty.
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We identify keywords for a focus corpus with respect to a reference corpus using
Kilgarriff’s (2009) method which is based on smoothed relative frequencies.13 The
novelty of an induced sense s can be then defined in terms of the aggregate keyword
probabilities given that sense (and focus time of interest):
rel(s) = ∑
w∈W
p(w|s, t2). (6.13)
where W is a keyword list and t2 the focus time. Cook et al. (2014) suggest a straight-
forward extrapolation from sense novelty to word novelty:
rel(c) = max
s
rel(s), (6.14)
where rel(c) is the highest novelty score assigned to any of the target word’s senses. A
high rel(c) score suggests that a word has undergone meaning change.
We obtained candidate terms and their associated novel senses from the DATE corpus,
using the relevance metric described above. The novel senses from the focus period
and all senses induced for the reference period, except for the one corresponding to the
novel sense, were passed on to Mitra et al.’s (2015) WordNet-based evaluator which
proceeds as follows. Firstly, each induced sense s is mapped to the WordNet synset u
with the maximum overlap:
synset(s) = argmax
u
overlap(s,u). (6.15)
Next, a predicted novel sense n is deemed truly novel if its mapped synset is distinct
from any synset mapped to a different induced sense:
∀s′synset(s′) 6= synset(n). (6.16)
Finally, overall precision is calculated as the fraction of sense-births confirmed by
WordNet over all birth-candidates proposed by the model. Like Mitra et al. (2015) we
only report results on target words for which all induced senses could be successfully
mapped to a synset.
Models and Parameters We obtained the broad set of target words used for the
task-based evaluation (in Section 6.4.4) and trained models on the DATE corpus. We
set the number of senses K = 4 following Mitra et al. (2015) who note that the Word-
Net mapper works best for words with a small number of senses, and the time intervals
to ∆T = 20 as in the previous experiment. We identified 200 words14 with highest nov-
13We set the smoothing parameter to n = 10, and like Cook et al. (2014) retrieve the top 1000 key-
words.
14This threshold was tuned on one reference-focus time pair.
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Figure 6.10: Precision results for the SCAN and SCAN-NOT models on the WordNet-
based novel sense detection. Results are shown for a selection of reference times (t1)
and focus times (t2).
elty score (Equation (6.14)) as sense birth candidates. We compared the performance
of the full SCAN model against SCAN-NOT which learns senses independently for time
intervals. We trained both models on the same data with identical parameters. For
SCAN-NOT, we must post-hoc identify corresponding senses across time intervals. We
used the Jensen-Shannon divergence between the reference- and focus time-specific
word distributions JS(p(w|s, t1)||p(w|s, t2)) and assigned each focus-time sense to the
sense with smallest divergence at reference time.
Results Figure 6.10 shows the performance of our models on the task of sense birth
detection. SCAN performs better than SCAN-NOT, underscoring the importance of
joint modeling of senses across time slices and incorporation of temporal dynamics.
Our accuracy scores are in the same ballpark as Mitra et al. (2014, 2015). Note, how-
ever that the scores are not directly comparable due to differences in training corpora,
focus and reference times, and candidate words. Mitra et al. (2015) use the larger
Google syntactic n-gram corpus, as well as richer linguistic information in terms of
syntactic dependencies. We show that our model which does not rely on syntactic
annotations performs competitively even when trained on smaller data. Table 6.5
(top) displays examples of words assigned highest novelty scores for the reference
period 1900–1919 and focus period 1980–1999, as induced by SCAN models.
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t1=1900–1919 t2=1980–1999
union soviet united american union european war civil military people liberty
dos system window disk pc operate program run computer de dos
entertainment television industry program time business people world president company
station radio station television local program network space tv broadcast air
t1=1960–1969 t2=1990–1999
environmental supra note law protection id agency impact policy factor federal
users computer window information software system wireless drive web building
virtual reality virtual computer center experience week community separation
disk hard disk drive program computer file store ram business embolden
Table 6.5: Example target terms (left) with novel senses (right) as identified by SCAN in
focus corpus t2 (when compared against reference corpus t1). Top: terms used in novel
sense detection study (Section 6.4.2). Bottom: terms from the Gulordava and Baroni
(2011) gold standard of word meaning change (Section 6.4.3).
6.4.3 Word Meaning Change
In this experiment we evaluate whether model induced temporal word representations
capture perceived word novelty. We adopt the evaluation framework (and data set)
introduced in Gulordava and Baroni (2011).15
Method Gulordava and Baroni (2011) do not model word senses directly; instead
they obtain distributional representations of words from the Google Books (bigram)
data for two time slices, namely the 1960s (reference corpus) and 1990s (focus cor-
pus). To detect change in meaning, they measure cosine similarity between the vector
representations of a target word in the reference and focus corpus. It is assumed that
low similarity indicates that a word has undergone meaning change. To evaluate the
output of their system, they created a test set of 100 target words (nouns, verbs, and
adjectives), and asked five annotators to rate each word with respect to its degree of
meaning change between the 1960s and the 1990s. The annotators used a 4-point
ordinal scale (0: no change, 1: almost no change, 2: somewhat change, 3: changed
significantly). Words were subsequently ranked according to the mean rating given by
the annotators. Inter-annotator agreement on the novel sense detection task was 0.51
15We thank Kristina Gulordava for sharing their evaluation data set of target words and human judg-
ments.
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system corpus Spearman’s ρ
Gulordava (2011) Google 0.386
SCAN DATE 0.377
SCAN-NOT DATE 0.255
frequency baseline DATE 0.325
Table 6.6: Spearman’s ρ rank correlations between system novelty rankings and the
human-produced ratings. All correlations are statistically significant (p< 0.02). Results
for SCAN and SCAN-NOT are averages over five trained models.
(pairwise Pearson correlation) and can be regarded as an upper bound on model per-
formance.
Models and Parameters We trained SCAN models for all words in Gulordava and
Baroni’s (2011) goldstandard. We used the DATE subcorpus covering years 1960
through 1999 partitioned by decade (∆T = 10). The first and last time interval were
defined as reference and focus time, respectively (t1=1960–1969, t2=1990–1999). As
in the previous experiment, a novelty score was assigned to each target word (using
Equation (6.14)). We computed Spearman’s ρ rank correlations between gold stan-
dard and model rankings (Gulordava and Baroni, 2011). We trained SCAN models
setting the number of senses to K = 8. We also trained SCAN-NOT models with identi-
cal parameters. We report results averaged over five independent parameter estimates.
Finally, as in Gulordava and Baroni (2011) we compare against a frequency baseline
which ranks words by their log relative frequency in the reference and focus corpus.
Results The results of this evaluation are shown in Table 6.6. As can be seen, SCAN
outperforms SCAN-NOT and the frequency baseline. For reference, we also report the
correlation coefficient obtained in Gulordava and Baroni (2011) but emphasize that
the scores are not directly comparable due to differences in training data: Gulordava
and Baroni (2011) use the Google bigrams corpus (which is much larger compared to
DATE). Table 6.5 (bottom) displays examples of words which achieved highest novelty
scores in this evaluation and their associated novel senses, as induced by SCAN models.
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6.4.4 Diachronic Text Classification
In the previous sections we demonstrated how SCAN captures meaning change be-
tween two periods. In this section, we assess our model on an extrinsic task which
relies on meaning representations spanning several time slices. We quantitatively eval-
uate our model on the SemEval-2015 benchmark data sets released as part of the Di-
achronic Text Evaluation exercise (Popescu and Strapparava 2015; DTE). In the fol-
lowing we first present the DTE subtasks, and then describe our experimental setup,
and systems used for comparison to our model.
SemEval DTE Tasks Diachronic text evaluation is an umbrella term used by the
SemEval-2015 organizers to represent three subtasks aiming to assess the performance
of computational methods used to identify when a piece of text was written. A sim-
ilar problem is tackled in Chambers (2012) who label documents with time stamps
whilst focusing on explicit time expressions and their discriminatory power. The Se-
mEval data consists of news snippets, which range between a few words and multi-
ple sentences. A set of training snippets, as well as gold-annotated development and
test data sets are provided. DTE subtasks 1 and 2 involve temporal classification:
given a news snippet and a set of non-overlapping time intervals covering the period
1700 through 2010, the system’s task is to select the interval corresponding to the snip-
pet’s year of origin. Temporal intervals are consecutive and constructed such that the
correct interval is centered around the actual year of origin. For both tasks temporal
intervals are created at three levels of granularity (fine, medium, and coarse).
Subtask 1 involves snippets which contain an explicit cue for time of origin. The
presence of a temporal cue was determined by the organizers by checking the entities’
informativeness in external resources. Consider the example below:
(6.17) President de Gaulle favors an independent European nuclear striking force
The mentions of French president de Gaulle and nuclear warfare suggest that the snip-
pet was written after the mid-1950s and indeed it was published in 1962. A hypotheti-
cal system would then have to decide amongst the following classes:
{1700–1702, 1703–1705, . . ., 1961–1963, . . ., 2012–2014}
{1699–1706, 1707–1713, . . ., 1959–1965, . . ., 2008–2014}
{1696–1708, 1709–1721, . . ., 1956–1968, . . ., 2008–2020}
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The first set of classes correspond to fine-grained intervals of 2-years, the second set
to medium-grained intervals of 6-years and the third set to coarse-grained intervals
of 12-years. For the snippet in example (6.17) classes 1961–1963, 1959–1965, and
1956–1968 are the correct ones.
Subtask 2 involves temporal classification of snippets which lack explicit temporal
cues, but contain implicit ones, e.g., as indicated by lexical choice or spelling. The
snippet in example (6.18) was published in 1891 and the spelling of to-day, which was
common up to the early 20th century, is an implicit cue:
(6.18) The local wheat market was not quite so strong to-day as yesterday.
Like in subtask 1, systems select a temporal interval from a set of contiguous time
intervals of differing granularity. For this task, which is admittedly harder, levels of
temporal granularity are coarser corresponding to 6-, 12- and 20-year intervals.
Participating SemEval Systems We compared our model against three other sys-
tems which participated in the SemEval task.16 AMBRA (Zampieri et al., 2015) adopts
a learning-to-rank modeling approach and uses several stylistic, grammatical, and lex-
ical features. IXA (Salaberri et al., 2015) uses a combination of approaches to deter-
mine the period of time in which a piece of news was written. This involves searching
for specific mentions of time within the text, searching for named entities present in
the text and then establishing their reference time by linking these to Wikipedia, using
Google n-grams, and linguistic features indicative of language change. Finally, UCD
(Szymanski and Lynch, 2015) employs SVMs for classification using a variety of in-
formative features (e.g., POS-tag n-grams, syntactic phrases), which were optimized
for the task through automatic feature selection.
Models and Parameters We trained our model for individual words and obtained
representations of their meaning for different points in time. Our set of target words
consisted of all nouns which occurred in the development data sets for DTE subtasks 1
and 2 as well as all verbs which occurred at least twice in this data set. After removing
infrequent words we were left with 883 words (out of 1,116). Target words were not
optimized with respect to the test data in any way; it is thus reasonable to expect better
performance with an adjusted set of words.
16We do not report results for the system USAAR which achieved close to 100% accuracy by search-
ing for the test snippets on the web, without performing any temporal inference.
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We set the model time interval to ∆T = 5 years and the number of senses per word
to K = 8. We also evaluated SCAN-NOT, the stripped-down version of SCAN, with
identical parameters. Both SCAN and SCAN-NOT predict the time of origin for a test
snippet as follows. We first detect mentions of target words in the snippet. Then, for
each mention c we construct a document, akin to the training documents, consisting
of c and its context w, the ±5 words surrounding c. Given {c,w}, we approximate a
distribution over time intervals as:
p(c)(t|w) ∝ p(c)(w|t)× p(c)(t). (6.19)
The superscript (c) denotes parameters from the word-specific model. We marginalize
over senses and assume a uniform distribution over time slices p(c)(t). Finally, we
combine the word-wise predictions into a final distribution p(t) = ∏c p(c)(t|,w), and
predict the time t with highest probability.
Supervised Classification We also apply our model in a supervised setting, i.e., by
extracting features for classifier prediction. Specifically, we trained a multiclass SVM
(Chang and Lin, 2011) on the training data provided by the SemEval organizers (for
DTE tasks 1 and 2). For each observed word within each snippet, we added as feature
its most likely sense k given t, the true time of origin:
argmax
k
p(c)(k|t). (6.20)
We also trained a multiclass SVM using character n-gram (n ∈ {1,2,3}) features in
addition to the model features. Szymanski and Lynch (2015) identified character n-
grams as the most predictive feature for temporal text classification using SVMs. Their
system (UCD) achieved the best published scores in DTE subtask 2. Following their
approach, we included all n-grams that were observed more than 20 times in the DTE
training data.
Results We employed two evaluation measures proposed by the DTE organizers.
These are precision p, i.e., the percentage of times a system has predicted the correct
time period. And accuracy acc which is more lenient, and penalizes system predic-
tions proportional to their distance from the true interval. We compute the p and acc
scores for our models using the evaluation script provided by the SemEval organiz-
ers. Table 6.7 summarizes our results for DTE subtasks 1 and 2. We compare SCAN
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Task 1
2 yr 6 yr 12 yr
acc p acc p acc p
Baseline .097 .010 .214 .017 .383 .046
SCAN-NOT .265 .086 .435 .139 .609 .169
SCAN .353 .049 .569 .112 .748 .206
IXA .187 .020 .375 .041 .557 .090
AMBRA .167 .037 .367 .071 .554 .074
SVM SCAN .192 .034 .417 .097 .545 .127
SVM SCAN+ngram .222 .030 .467 .079 .627 .142
Task 2
6 yr 12 yr 20 yr
acc p acc p acc p
Baseline .199 .025 .343 .047 .499 .057
SCAN-NOT .259 .041 .403 .056 .567 .098
SCAN .376 .053 .572 .091 .719 .135
IXA .261 .037 .428 .067 .622 .098
AMBRA .605 .143 .767 .143 .868 .292
UCD .759 .463 .846 .472 .910 .542
SVM SCAN .573 .331 .667 .368 .790 .428
SVM SCAN+ngram .747 .481 .821 .500 .897 .569
Table 6.7: Results on Diachronic Text Evaluation Tasks 1 and 2 for a random baseline,
our SCAN model, its stripped-down version without iGMRFs (SCAN-NOT), the SemEval
submissions (IXA, AMBRA and UCD), and SVMs trained with SCAN features (SVM
SCAN), and with additional character n-gram features (SVM SCAN+ngram). Results
are shown for three levels of granularity, a strict precision measure p, and a distance-
discounting measure acc.
against a baseline which selects a time interval at random17 averaged over five runs.
We also show results for a stripped-down version of our model without the iGMRFs
(SCAN-NOT) and for the systems which participated in SemEval.
17We recomputed the baseline scores for subtasks 1 and 2 due to inconsistencies in the results pro-
vided by the DTE organizers.
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For subtask 1, the two versions of SCAN outperform all SemEval systems across the
board. SCAN-NOT occasionally outperforms SCAN in the strict precision metric, how-
ever, the full SCAN model consistently achieves better accuracy scores which are more
representative since they factor in the proximity of the prediction to the true value. In
subtask 2, the UCD and SVM SCAN+ngram systems perform comparably. They both
use SVMs for the classification task, however our own model employs a less expres-
sive feature set based on SCAN and character n-grams, and does not take advantage of
feature selection which would presumably enhance performance. With the exception
of AMBRA, all other participating systems used external resources (such as Wikipedia
and Google n-grams); it is thus fair to assume they had access to at least as much train-
ing data as our SCAN model. Consequently, the gap in performance can not solely be
attributed to a difference in the size of the training data.
We also observe that IXA and SCAN, given identical class granularity, perform better
on subtask 1, while AMBRA and our own SVM-based systems exhibit the opposite
trend. The IXA system uses a combination of knowledge sources in order to determine
when a piece of news was written, including explicit mentions of temporal expressions
within the text, named entities, and linked information to those named entities from
Wikipedia. AMBRA on the other hand exploits more shallow stylistic, grammatical
and lexical features within the learning-to-rank paradigm. An interesting direction for
future work would be to investigate which features are most appropriate for different
DTE tasks. Overall, it is encouraging to see that the generic temporal word represen-
tations inferred by SCAN lead to competitively performing models on both temporal
classification tasks without any explicit tuning.
6.4.5 Discussion
We applied SCAN, a dynamic Bayesian model of sense development to the phenomenon
of diachronic word meaning change. Our model learns a coherent set of co-dependent
time-specific senses for individual words and their prevalence. Evaluation of the model
output showed that the learnt representations reflect (a) different senses of ambiguous
words (b) different kinds of meaning change (such as new senses being established),
and (c) connotational changes within senses. SCAN departs from previous work in that
it models temporal dynamics explicitly. We demonstrated that this feature yields more
general semantic representations as indicated by predictive log-likelihood and a variety
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of extrinsic evaluations. We also experimentally evaluated SCAN on novel sense de-
tection and the SemEval DTE task, where it performed on par with the best published
results, without any extensive feature engineering or task specific tuning.
In our experiments we used context as a bag of words. It would be interesting to
explore more systematically how different kinds of contexts (e.g., named entities, mul-
tiword expressions, verbs vs. nouns) influence the representations the model learns.
Furthermore, while SCAN captures the temporal dynamics of word senses, it cannot
do so for words themselves. Put differently, the model cannot identify whether a new
word is used which did not exist before, or that a word ceased to exist after a specific
point in time. A model internal way of detecting word (dis)appearance would be desir-
able, especially since new terms are continuously being introduced thanks to popular
culture and various new media sources.
6.5 Summary
This chapter introduced a novel Bayesian model of dynamic sense change, SCAN,
which infers a globally coherent representation of gradual meaning development of
individual words over time. We presented computational investigations of two phe-
nomena pertaining to the dynamic nature of meaning representations: Firstly, we mod-
eled meaning development ‘in the small’ by exploring how young children acquire the
meaning of concepts and how child-like conceptual representations develop over time
to resemble established adult-like representations. Secondly, we investigated meaning
change ‘in the large’, studying the process of diachronic change in word meaning over
decades and centuries.
In order to investigate the dynamic nature of child conceptual representations during
learning, we presented our model with child-directed language and analyzed the devel-
opment of featural representations of concepts over time. Our model learns from con-
cept mentions in their linguistic context, where we use the context as an approximation
of perceived features. We showed for a broad range of concepts and features that con-
cept representations increase in complexity, that phenomena such as diversification of
meaning representation emerge from our model. We can conclude that child-directed
language encodes the necessary structure and information that drives the acquisition
and development of concept meaning.
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In addition, we applied our model to historical data and modeled semantic change
of word meaning over time. In contrast to previous models we explicitly capture the
smooth and gradual nature of meaning change. We demonstrated the benefit of this
modeling decision both qualitatively through learnt time-specific word representations
that are intuitively interpretable, and quantitatively in a series of diverse experiments.
Our general model, developed without a particular semantic task in mind, performs
competitively with related models of word meaning change across evaluations.
Chapters 4 and 5 introduced cognitively plausible Bayesian models of category ac-
quisition together with incremental learning algorithms which approximate the on-line
nature of human learning. While in this chapter we proposed a cognitively motivated
model for child feature acquisition from natural language text, we used a batch learn-
ing algorithm which stores, and repeatedly iterates over, all the training data available.
In order to investigate the behavior of our model under more realistic constraints, it
would be desirable to incrementalize our Gibbs sampler for the SCAN model as well.
However, we leave this for future work.
Another interesting direction for future work concerns the application of our model to
monitoring meaning change in contexts beyond the cognitive and diachronic settings
studied in this chapter. We could apply our model to different text genres and levels of
temporal granularity. For example, we could work with Twitter data, an increasingly
popular source for opinion tracking, and use our model to identify short-term changes
in word meanings or connotations. Investigating feature acquisition and development
from multi-modal data (e.g., comprising visual and linguistic information) could be
another interesting continuation of this work.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
This chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of our main findings (Section 7.1),
and outlines future research directions (Section 7.2).
Humans constantly form and adapt knowledge about their complex environment. Cate-
gories provide an efficient way for storing and using knowledge about the world around
us, and are integral to how we perceive and interact with our surroundings. Given their
fundamental nature, questions of how categories are acquired, mentally represented,
and dynamically adapted have received much attention in prior research. Previous be-
havioral and computational research has mostly involved a small number of toy stimuli
(such as strings of binary numbers) with carefully controlled features. This stands in
sharp contrast to the complexity of the environment which categories are supposed to
capture. This thesis takes a step towards bridging this gap.
There is ample evidence that the acquisition of language and conceptual knowledge
are tightly intertwined problems which mutually guide and boost each other (Chap-
ter 2). Based on this insight we model the acquisition and representation of categories
based on natural language input. Specifically, we use corpora (including data sets of
transcribed child-directed speech from child-parent interactions) to represent the learn-
ing environment from which categories are acquired and from which structured repre-
sentations of categories are learnt. In our case, concept observations amount to their
linguistic mentions in corpora, and concept features are represented by the linguistic
context in which concepts occur. Based on these assumptions we developed three novel
Bayesian models of categorization-related aspects which we evaluated based on their
ability to acquire and represent categories comprising hundreds of concrete natural
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concepts.
Before summarizing our main findings, it is worth discussing the angle of model eval-
uation chosen throughout this thesis, and the limitations it entails. We began this thesis
noting that humans acquire knowledge with a remarkable efficiency under cognitive
constraints: humans learn incrementally, and are subject to memory constraints. In
addition, children learn categories ‘from scratch’. They (arguably) have no access to
prior category knowledge to start with, and cannot process the input they receive in
sophisticated ways (e.g., they cannot syntactically interpret language). These observa-
tions motivate two research questions:
1. Can we build cognitively motivated computational models that incorporate the
above constraints, and efficiently learn representations of high quality?
2. Do humans behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions made by the
models, beyond their ability to learn successfully (e.g., in terms of the kinds of
categories learnt, or the order in which they emerge)?
The models presented in this thesis were evaluated predominantly with respect to ques-
tion 1. We evaluated the output of our models against a human-produced gold standard
of categories, and human-produced plausibility judgments of the acquired featural rep-
resentations. We also compared our own models quantitatively against previous mod-
els of category and feature learning, and showed that they perform competitively across
evaluation tasks.
Our evaluations did not shed light on the question of whether the types of emerging
representations and their developmental process predicted by our models are consistent
with human behavior: Do children learn all and only the categories our model predicts?
Do intermediate category representations resemble those of children in the process of
category acquisition? The overarching goal of this thesis was to model the acquisition
and development of categories and features on a scale and representational complexity
approaching the characteristics of the environment from which humans learn. We are
not aware of a behavioral data set on this scale, and creating such a data set would be
a major undertaking on its own which we leave for future work.
Taken together, the results presented in this thesis show that natural language input
encodes the structure that drives human category learning, and that our Bayesian mod-
els are able to distill the relevant information from naturalistic data on a large scale.
We believe that our work takes a step towards understanding how humans utilize the
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complex structure of their environment to construct conceptual knowledge.
7.1 Main Findings
In the following we summarize the central findings of this work.
Category learning. Chapters 4 and 5 investigated the acquisition of a large number
of categories of concrete natural objects. We introduced two cognitively motivated
Bayesian models of child category acquisition, BayesCat and BCF. Our models are
knowledge-lean (they do not assume sophisticated linguistic processing abilities such
as parsing), they learn categories ‘from scratch’ (no explicit category knowledge is
instilled in the model in the beginning of the learning process), and they learn in an
unsupervised way. We combine our models with a cognitively motivated algorithm for
approximate inference (particle filtering), modeling category learning as an incremen-
tal process which integrates novel information as the data is observed. We find that our
models capture the human category learning process in various aspects. First, analysis
of the incremental learning algorithm revealed that it performs well under the time- and
memory constraints reminiscent of human learning. Secondly, our models learn plau-
sible categories when compared against a human-created gold standard. Thirdly, our
models simulate the incremental human learning process by learning representations
that consistently improve over time, and by acquiring representative features for cat-
egories together with the categories themselves. A previously proposed graph-based
model of incremental category learning was shown to qualitatively and quantitatively
fit human category learning less closely than our models. In summary, our results
provide further evidence to the claim that humans acquire categories by aggregating
information over time and by establishing representations which describe their envi-
ronment increasingly accurately.
Feature learning. Categories are not learnt in isolation. Chapter 5 computationally
investigates the acquisition of conceptual knowledge in a broader context. We intro-
duce BCF, a model which not only explains the acquisition of categories, but also
accounts for the emergence of structured featural representations. Our model cap-
tures the joint emergence of (1) categories themselves, (2) their feature representations
216 Chapter 7. Conclusions
structured into types of relevant properties, and (3) the association of feature types
with categories. To the best of our knowledge our work is the first to investigate these
phenomena jointly using large-scale naturalistic input. Note that we do not assume that
our models induce sets of necessary and sufficient features of concepts and categories
in the classical sense. Rather, we argue that the learnt representations capture relevant
associated information in the spirit of feature norms (McRae et al., 2005) which have
been shown to provide a valuable window into mental representations of concepts and
cateogries. Experimental results reveal the effectiveness of our model, and the ben-
efit of joint category and feature learning. The structured features acquired by our
model are judged more interpretable by humans, compared to feature types induced
by a model which learns categories and features in two separate processes, and is cog-
nitively less plausible in the sense that it requires the availability of a hand-crafted
set of rules based on substantial linguistic knowledge for feature detection. We also
showed that our model captures the joint emergence of categories and their structured
features in infants incrementally when exposed to corpora of child-directed language.
The results presented in this thesis suggest that cognitive models capture aspects of the
acquisition of complex category representations, and lead us to believe that the debate
of the emergence and representation of knowledge can be advanced through large-scale
computational investigations.
Meaning Development. A common assumption in previous models of knowledge
formation is that concepts are represented through a fixed set of features, however,
human conceptual representations can adapt to a changing environment. Chapter 6
presented SCAN, a dynamic Bayesian model of meaning change. Our model infers
time-specific representations of concept meaning, and accounts for the temporal dy-
namics underlying their development. We demonstrated the effectiveness of our model
on two tasks. We used SCAN to investigate word meaning change over centuries. Re-
sults show not only that the inferred time-specific word representations reveal intuitive
and temporally relevant aspects of word meaning, but also that our model performs
competitively across a range of semantic evaluation tasks when compared with pre-
viously developed task-specific systems. In addition, we modeled the development
of concept representations in young infants who form a representation of their envi-
ronment for the first time. We showed that the representations inferred by our model
resemble the increasing complexity of concept representations, a development that has
been observed in the behavioral studies with children. This thesis presents the first
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large-scale computational study of concept development in children that we are aware
of.
Natural language input. All experiments presented in this thesis are based on nat-
uralistic language input as a representation of the environment from which categories
and their representations are learnt. Does language capture the environmental struc-
ture that drives this acquisition process? In line with previous findings which suggest
that non-linguistic information from the environment is redundantly encoded in lan-
guage (Riordan and Jones, 2011), our experiments provide evidence in favor of a pos-
itive answer to this question. Our results furthermore support the view that language
influences category and feature learning: learners use statistical cues from word usage
in context to infer information about categories and their representation. Language
corpora are available in large quantities and for a variety of genres. We evaluated our
models in two settings: on large collections of general (news or encyclopedic) text,
and on corpora of transcribed child-directed speech. This allowed us to compare the
representations that our models can learn from data of a different quality (speech data
is much noisier than news text) and content (encyclopedic data is created with the
purpose of describing knowledge, whereas child-directed speech conveys knowledge
implicitly). Applying models to different kinds of corpora can help explain the influ-
ence of the input on the acquired representations for different groups of learners, and
can provide further insight into the cognitive development of children and adults.
Learning at scale. Bayesian models of category acquisition have primarily been
tested on small data sets of artificial stimuli (Anderson, 1991; Sanborn et al., 2006).
We showed that Bayesian models capture phenomena of category acquisition when
the scope of the learning problem scales both in terms of the number of categories
and concepts to be acquired, as well as in terms of their complexity. Our models
learn categories comprising hundreds of natural concepts from thousands of linguistic
stimuli. Our models learned categories of natural concrete concepts, which have rich
and structured features.
Bayesian modeling. This thesis used the framework of Bayesian modeling to in-
vestigate the acquisition of conceptual knowledge. We introduced three generative
models structured around the incremental, joint and dynamic nature of the acquisi-
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tion of categories and their features from naturalistic data. Bayesian models formalize
probabilistic inference on sets of observed data as a way of inductive learning. Eval-
uation showed that our models acquire categories which match those encoded in a
human-created gold standard, as well as rich and structured sets of relevant associated
features. At the same time our models capture the dynamic and incremental process
of category acquisition. Thus our results provide further evidence for the view of cate-
gory and feature learning as instances of statistical inductive inference. Taken together,
the experiments presented in this thesis lead us to conclude that Bayesian modeling is
a fruitful framework for testing hypotheses about category acquisition, structure, and
development.
7.2 Limitations and Directions for Future Research
The framework for modeling category acquisition and representation adopted in this
thesis involves a number of assumptions and simplifications. We start by pointing
out limitations that these assumptions introduce to our models, and discuss possible
improvements (Sections 7.2.1–7.2.2). We conclude with highlighting directions for
future research (Sections 7.2.3–7.2.5).
7.2.1 Non-parametric Models of Categorization
Non-parametric Bayesian models can adapt their structure to the complexity of the
input data. Previous models of category or features learning have used this feature,
allowing the model to adaptively increase in complexity if demanded by the struc-
ture of the input data (Anderson, 1991; Sanborn et al., 2006; Austerweil and Griffiths,
2013). In contrast, the models developed in this thesis are parametric, the number of
categories or the structure of feature representations is determined a priori. Beyond
inferring the number of categories, non-parametric extensions of our models could
capture other representational aspects of categories more realistically. In Chapter 5
we assumed that every category is represented by the same number of feature types. A
non-parametric model would lift this assumption. A non-parametric model of dynamic
meaning change (Chapter 6) could explicitly capture the emergence and disappearance
of featural aspects of concepts in child language acquisition; or the birth and death of
word senses in diachronic word meaning change.
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7.2.2 Integrating Word and Category Learning
The models presented in this thesis learn from collections of natural language stimuli
consisting of a target concept mention and its surrounding context. This input is based
on the rather bold assumption that the learner has solved a significant part of the word
learning problem: she has successfully mapped each target concept to a word. As
discussed in detail in Chapter 2, word learning itself constitutes a big challenge for
young infants. Our work remains agnostic about the fact that the meaning of words
itself needs to be acquired, and that knowledge about concepts and categories will help
tackle the word learning problem. A fully faithful model would consider the problems
of word and concept or category learning jointly. Extending our models to account for
this joint optimization will be a very interesting avenue for future research.
7.2.3 Representation of the Learning Environment
In this thesis we used natural language input as an approximation of the environment
from which categories and their representations are learnt. While we showed that the
linguistic environment is a useful approximation of the full multimodal input a learner
has access to, it is clear that this multimodal environment is not fully captured in lan-
guage. Computational models of word learning have been trained on multimodal input
data (albeit on smaller-scale problems; Frank et al. 2009; Yu and Smith 2007). Advan-
tageously, Bayesian models are flexible with respect to the input data they receive, so
we expect the application of our models to multimodal data to be a feasible avenue for
future work. Applying our models to such data sets would allow to compare the cate-
gory acquisition process and the acquired representations which emerge from models
trained on multimodal input against those emerging from purely linguistic data.
7.2.4 Learning Abstract Categories
Humans not only categorize the physical world around them, but also infer complex
representations of abstract categories and concepts such as POLITICAL (e.g., parlia-
ment, socialist), LEGAL (e.g., law, trial), or FEELINGS (e.g., mirth or embarrassment).
Lacking any physical realization, and hence perceivable properties, it is to be expected
that language plays a particularly important role in acquiring the meaning of such ab-
stract concepts (Wiemer-Hastings and Graesser, 2000). Using the models presented
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in this thesis to learn classes of abstract concepts and their structured representations
is an obvious extension. The SCAN model of dynamic meaning change (Chapter 6)
could also be used to infer the change of connotations with abstract political concepts
and ideas.
7.2.5 Category Acquisition across Languages and Cultures
One advantage of modeling knowledge acquisition from text is its generalizability
across languages. Linguistic corpora are available in large quantities for many lan-
guages, including corpora of child-directed speech. Since our models are knowledge
lean (i.e., they do not require sophisticated linguistic pre-processing tools), they are
straightforwardly applicable across languages. Do children acquire concepts and cat-
egories in different orders across cultures? Do the same categories emerge at all?
Especially in the context of abstract categorization (7.2.4), these questions provide
interesting potential for future research.
Appendix A
Derivation of the Gibbs Sampler for
Dirichlet-Multinomial Distributions
We first show how to analytically integrate over Multinomial parameters in Dirichlet-
Multinomial models. Afterwards, we derive the full-conditional update equations for
collapsed Gibbs sampling. We derive these equations for a model reminiscent of Naive
Bayes, which is the simplest and most similar model to the models introduced in this
thesis.
Naive Bayes is a model for classifying observations into a fixed and discrete set of
classes k = 1...K. It assumes observations represented as sets of independent features
(e.g., documents as sets of terms) d = [w1, ...,wN ],1 and assigns one class label zd to
each document. Naive Bayes assigns class labels to documents based on (a) the a priori
probability of a label z, and (b) the probability of the observed terms w given z. In terms
of the generative story, we first draw a label z from a Multinomial distribution over
labels Mult(θ). Afterwards we draw iid. terms wi from a class-specific Multinomial
distribution over terms Mult(φz). All Multinomial parameters are drawn from Dirichlet
priors:
θ∼ Dir(α) z∼Mult(θ)
φk ∼ Dir(β) wi ∼Mult(φz).
1Analogously, Naive Bayes can model observations of objects, or concepts, as sets of features.
Throughout this derivation we will use the document-term example and terminology.
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We start from the joint distribution,
p(d,z,θ,{φ}Z1 ;α,β) =
Dir(θ|α)∏
z
Dir(φz|β)∏
d
Mult(zd|θ)∏
d
∏
i
Mult(wdi |φzd)
(A.1)
We will first show how we analytically compute the integrals (getting rid of any explicit∫
in our formula).2 We start by integrating over θ and φ and re-grouping the factors in
equation (A.1) according to their dependencies on these parameters:
p(d,z;α,β) =
∫
θ
∫
φ
p(d,z,θ,{φ}Z1 ;α,β)dθdφ
=
∫
θ
p(θ|α)∏
d
p(zd|θ)dθ ×
∫
φ
∏
z
p(φz|β)∏
d
∏
i
p(wdi |φzd)dφ
=
∫
θ
p(θ|α)∏
d
p(zd|θ)dθ × ∏
z
∫
φz
p(φz|β)∏
d
∏
i
p(wdi |φzd)dφz.
(A.2)
This shows that θ as well as all φz are independent under the model. We go through the
analytic integration for θ, the parameters of the multinomial probability distribution
over classes. The derivation for each φz (the distribution over terms v for a particular
class z) is identical.
∫
θ
p(θ|α)∏
d
p(zd|θ)dθ
=
∫
θ
Dir(θ|α)∏
d
Mult(zd|θ)dθ (A.3)
=
∫
θ
Γ(∑zα)
∏zΓ(α)
∏
z
θα−1+nzz dθ (A.4)
=
Γ(∑zα)
∏zΓ(α)
∏zΓ(nz+α)
Γ(∑z nz+α)
∫
θ
Γ(∑z nz+α)
∏zΓ(nz+α)
∏
z
θα−1+nzz dθ (A.5)
=
Γ(∑zα)
∏zΓ(α)
∏zΓ(nz+α)
Γ(∑z nz+α)
(A.6)
∝ ∏z
Γ(nz+α)
Γ(∑z nz+α)
, (A.7)
where we first, in eqn (A.3)–(A.4),write out the Dirichlet-Multinomial (from eqn 3.10,
3.11). In (A.5) we add factors (before and after the integral) which cancel out, i.e., do
not change the equation, but allow us to evaluate the terms inside the integral to 1
so that it can be dropped in (A.6). We finally drop all constants that do not depend
2This derivation is based on Carpenter (2010), who provides more detailed explanations.
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on z. We have now eliminated the integral, and represent θ implicitly as counts of
class-assignments (nz) to the data.
Following the same procedure we can derive for the set of {φz}
∏
z
∫
φz
p(φz|β)∏
d
∏
i
p(wdi |φzd)dφz ∝ ∏
z
∏vΓ(nzv+β)
Γ(∑v nzv+β)
, (A.8)
where nzv refers to the count of term w occurring with an document labeled with class
z.
In Gibbs sampling, we are interested in sampling each individual zi from its full
conditional distribution. We will now derive the full conditional distribution over all
possible values z j, and show that it has a mathematically simple form with an intuitive
explanation. We resample the class z j for document j given the class assignments to
all other documents z− j, the data d and hyperparameters. As shown in equation (3.29)
this distribution is proportional to the joint distribution derived above, so using (A.7)
and (A.8) we can write:
p(z j|z− j,d,α,β) ∝ ∏zΓ(nz+α)
Γ(∑z nz+α)
×∏
z
∏vΓ(nzv+β)
Γ(∑v nzv+β)
. (A.9)
Since the probability p(z j) is conditioned on the current class assignments to all doc-
uments except j, the counts (nr and nrv) regarding any class r 6= z j are not affected.
We split the terms which depend on z j (the value of the class assigned to document
j; terms 2 and 4 in A.10) from those which do not (i.e., concerning all classes r 6= z j;
terms 1 and 3 in A.10), and update only the counts regarding z j: nz j is incremented by
1 (because it is assigned to one additional document j) and the count of observing any
term v with class z j, (nz
j
v ), is incremented by c
v
j, the number of times term v occurs in
document j,
∏r 6=zΓ(n
− j
r +α)
Γ(1+∑r n
− j
r +α)
×Γ(n− jz j +α+1)×
∏
r 6=z
∏vΓ(n
r,− j
v +β)
Γ(∑v n
r,− j
v +β)
×∏vΓ(n
z j,− j
v +β+ cvj)
Γ(cvj +∑v n
z j,− j
v +β)
.
(A.10)
By definition, Γ(x+q) = Γ(x)∏qi=1(x+ i). We use this fact to pull apart terms 2 and 4
in (A.10) accordingly.3 This slightly complicates the equation but will eventually lead
3Or as a special case Γ(x+1) = xΓ(x). We need the general form for the class-term counts because
each count can be greater than one.
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to a significant simplification:
=
∏r 6=zΓ(n
− j
r +α)
Γ(1+∑r n
− j
r +α)
×Γ(n− jz j +α)(n
− j
z j +α)×
∏
r 6=z
∏vΓ(n
r,− j
v +β)
Γ(∑v n
r,− j
v +β)
× ∏v
(
Γ(nz
j,− j
v +β)∏c
j
v
i=1(n
z j,− j
v +β+ i)
)
Γ(∑v n
z j,− j
v +β)∏c
j
i=1(∑v n
z j,− j
v +β+ i)
.
(A.11)
Here c jv refers to the count of term v in document j, like above, and c j refers to the
total number of terms in j. Next, we conflate all Γ() functions over r 6= z j with those
over z j,
=
∏rΓ(n
− j
r +α)
Γ(1+∑r n
− j
r +α)
× (n− jz j +α)×
∏
r
∏vΓ(n
r,− j
v +β)
Γ(∑v n
r,− j
v +β)
×∏v∏
c jv
i=1(n
z j,− j
v +β+ i)
∏c
j
i=1(∑v n
z j,− j
v +β+ i)
.
(A.12)
All Γ() components are now constant with respect to any particular value for z j, such
that they can be dropped and we finally obtain:
p(z j|z− j,d,α,β) ∝ (n− jz j +α)×
∏v∏
c jv
i=1(n
z j,− j
v +β+ i)
∏c
j
i=1(∑v n
z j,− j
v +β+ i)
. (A.13)
This is a very intuitive result: the probability that document j belongs to class z j is
proportional to the number of times class z j is assigned to any other document (first
term), times the number of times each individual term of document j was observed un-
der class z (second term). Term observation-wise increments i increase the likelihood
of terms under repeated observation: the second observation of a term with class z j is
intuitively more likely than observing it for the first time. All counts are smoothed by
the Dirichlet parameters, α and β, respectively.
Appendix B
Instructions for Mechanical Turk
Experiments
We provide the instructions given in the Mechanical Turk experiments reported in Sec-
tions 5.3.3.
B.1 Feature Type Intrusion Task
Please Note
• You have to be a native speaker of English to take part in this study.
• In order to receive payment, you have to label and rate all feature sets, all fields are
required.
• You are welcome to complete as many hits as you like.
• Please do not forget to accept the HIT before you start working on it.
Informed Consent
This is a linguistic experiment performed at the University of Edinburgh. If you have any
questions about this study, feel free to contact Lea Frermann (l.frermann at ed.ac.uk). Partici-
pation in this research is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw from the experiment at any
time. The collected data will be used for research purposes only. Personal data will be kept
confidential and will not be shared with third parties.
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Personal Details Questionnaire
Please fill in the Personal Details questionnaire correctly, as otherwise you will not receive
payment.
1. Age:
2. Gender:
3. Please specify the country where you have learned your first language:
Instructions
Categories such as ANIMAL or FURNITURE are represented by example concepts (e.g., cat, dog,
bed, table) and can be described in terms of their features or attributes. For example ANIMALS
can be found in locations such as {forests, gardens, trees} or have visual properties, such as
{fur, legs, ears, feathers}. FURNITURE, on the other hand, is typically found in locations such
as {stores, living rooms, kitchens} and has external properties such as {seats, legs, patterns}.
Your Task
In this experiment, you will be presented with concepts (e.g., cat, dog) exemplifying a category
(e.g. ANIMAL) and different feature collections describing this category (e.g., {fur, legs, ears,
feathers}, {forests, gardens, trees}). One of the feature collections is not applicable to this
category. Your task is to detect the feature collection which does not belong to the category.
Please do not forget to accept the HIT before you start working on it.
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B.2 Word Intrusion Task
Please Note
• You have to be a native speaker of English to take part in this study.
• In order to receive payment, you have to label and rate all feature sets, all fields are
required.
• You are welcome to complete as many hits as you like.
• Please do not forget to accept the HIT before you start working on it.
Informed Consent
This is a linguistic experiment performed at the University of Edinburgh. If you have any
questions about this study, feel free to contact Lea Frermann (l.frermann at ed.ac.uk). Partici-
pation in this research is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw from the experiment at any
time. The collected data will be used for research purposes only. Personal data will be kept
confidential and will not be shared with third parties.
Personal Details Questionnaire
Please fill in the Personal Details questionnaire correctly, as otherwise you will not receive
payment.
1. Age:
2. Gender:
3. Please specify the country where you have learned your first language:
Instructions
In this experiment, you will be presented with groups of words which refer to one common
topic. However, each group contains one word which does not belong to this topic. Your task
is to detect this “intruder word”. Please select the intruder based on the meaning of the word,
and not its part-of-speech or spelling. If you think multiple words do not belong to the group
please use your best judgment for selecting the best candidate. You must select one intruder
word for every group of words.
Examples
{apple banana car orange pear} The word “car” is the intruder word since it does not
belong to the general topic of fruit.
{keyboard screen yellow write lap-
top}
The word “yellow” is the intruder word since it does not
belong to the general topic of office equipment/work.
Please do not forget to accept the HIT before you start working on it.

Appendix C
Additional Material on Experiment 5
C.1 Set of Target Concepts
The table below lists the set of target words used in Experiment 5, the study on dynamic feature
development in language acquisition (Section 6.3). Most concepts are basic-level categories
taken from the McRae concept set based on frequency of occurrence in the training corpus.
Exceptions are marked with an (*) and comprise superordinate-level categories, one abstract
noun, adjectives and verbs.
ID concept ID concept ID concept
1 animal* 11 color* 21 head
2 apple 12 dog 22 horse
3 bag 13 door 23 house
4 bed 14 eat* 24 nose
5 bedroom 15 fish 25 orange
6 blue* 16 food* 26 play*
7 box 17 green* 27 red*
8 car 18 hair 28 table
9 cat 19 hand 29 toy*
10 chair 20 hat 30 train
229
230 Appendix C. Additional Material on Experiment 5
C.2 Additional Model Output
We provide example SCAN representations in addition to the output discussed in Section 6.3.2
Time-specific meaning representations are visualized as a bar capturing the relative prevalence
(p(k|t) = φtk) of different feature types (color-coded). One such visualization is displayed for
each temporal interval, illustrating the development of feature type prevalence over time. Each
interval covers ∆t = 3 months, and is labeled with the start date, i.e., age of the child. Each
feature type is illustrated to the right of the plot as the ten words w most highly associated with
the feature type, marginalizing over the time-specific representations
(
p(w|k) = ∑t ψt,kw
)
.
The Full corpus. Example output of SCAN trained on the conflated input to 21 children for
the concepts head, fish, chair, dog and bag.
(a) Target concept head
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
head bump bang over fall
 sit dear hurt play big 
head hat big wear over
 down hair arm fun take 
head  knee shoulder draw
 big nod toe watch arm 
head hurt bump watch round 
down turn dear back shake 
head back watch eye hat
 bang water potato teddy need 
(b) Target concept fish
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;11
age (year;months)
fish catch four big five
 alive net six elephant tank 
fish eat chip finger swim
 buy tea nice shop ooh 
fish eat big cat blue whale
 color penguin baby nice 
fish draw swim big water
 girl nice wow  huh 
fish call play rod game
 water big food car take 
(c) Target concept chair
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
chair sit down move foot
 big back watch climb post 
sit chair down play table 
high breakfast need back 
sit chair rock behind baby 
table under need honey hide 
sit chair big down eat
 table under dear bear yellow 
chair sit table nice new
 stick bit down back under 
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(d) Target concept head
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
dog food puppy eat clever
 cat boy orange many girl 
dog call baby sheep cow
 white color big pig sit 
dog woof big bark 
 read book ruff take red 
dog cat call sooty jump 
draw nice big pussy over 
dog eat cat house food
 bone call tail spot noise 
(e) Target concept bag
0;11 1;02 1;05 1;08 1;11 2;02 2;05 2;08 2;11 3;02 3;05 3;08 3;11 4;02 4;05 4;08 4;11
age (year;months)
bag party car tea give 
big remember need thing back 
bin bag man rubbish dust lorry
 back collect house today 
bag back take need  thing
 thank big box plastic 
bag shop toy carry full
 buy nice play many bit 
bag dear green plastic blue
 back carry bring white orange 
The Thomas corpus. Example output of SCAN trained on the Thomas corpus for the con-
cepts train, bag, fish and orange.
(a) Target concept train
2;00 2;03 2;06 2;09 3;00 3;03 3;06 3;09 4;00 4;03 4;06 4;09
age (year;months)
train play track set 
wooden back floor eat big bit 
train choo play hear poop 
set wait track back station 
train station track bridge
 runaway set down engine tell over 
train drive track nice carriage
 dear help sit call big 
train drive man bus set
 stop track noise need green 
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(b) Target concept bag
2;00 2;03 2;06 2;09 3;00 3;03 3;06 3;09 4;00 4;03 4;06 4;09
age (year;months)
bin bag lorry dust man watch
 big rubbish collect today 
bag back nice thank carry 
party shop thing sweet need 
bag tea big need take 
plastic back carry shop nana 
bag bin party white take
 morning back green thing big 
bag man dust rubbish bin
 week back house next toy 
(c) Target concept fish
2;00 2;03 2;06 2;09 3;00 3;03 3;06 3;09 4;00 4;03 4;06 4;09
age (year;months)
fish chip yellow sea swim
 talk eat buy shop blue 
catch fish five hook four
 six ooh rod alive try 
fish rod water call net 
catch basket down isabel take 
fish big catch tell nice
 tank net elephant eat purdie 
fish finger food deliver
 cat water lala eat net tuna 
(d) Target concept orange
2;00 2;03 2;06 2;09 3;00 3;03 3;06 3;09 4;00 4;03 4;06 4;09
age (year;months)
juice orange nice drink black
 big water bottle yellow straw 
orange chocolate apple juice man
 buy ball lemon thank banana 
yellow blue green orange color
 red pink purple cone round 
light green orange red work
 flash snake down keep tell 
juice orange strawberry nice drink
 marmalade milk actual mm carton 
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